Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
4-23-2015 12:00 AM

Creating Difference: The Legal Production of Race in American
Slavery
Shaun N. Ramdin, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Dr. Martin Kreiswirth, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in English
© Shaun N. Ramdin 2015

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the African American Studies Commons, American Literature Commons, Legal History
Commons, Literature in English, North America Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Ramdin, Shaun N., "Creating Difference: The Legal Production of Race in American Slavery" (2015).
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 2870.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/2870

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

CREATING DIFFERENCE:
THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF RACE IN AMERICAN SLAVERY

(Thesis format: Monograph)
by
Shaun N. Ramdin

Graduate Program in English

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Shaun N. Ramdin 2015

ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS

This dissertation examines the legal construction and development of racial
difference as considered in literature written or set during the final years of American
slavery. While there had consistently been a conceptual correspondence between black
skin and enslavement, race or racial difference did not become the unqualified
explanation of enslavement until fairly late in the institution’s history. Specifically, as
slavery’s stability became increasingly threatened through the nineteenth century by
abolitionism and racial slippage, race became the singular and explicit rationale for its
existence and perpetuation.

I argue that the primary discourse of this justificatory

rationale was legal: through law race and its meaning was finally determined. However,
as there was not a substantial body of legal texts, such as legislation and judicial
opinions, defining race prior, legal determinations of race during this brief and
tumultuous period ultimately produced race in service of slavery.
To frame and understand these legal issues, my dissertation turns to nineteenthcentury American literature. Because of the elusive nature of racial difference, literature
provides a means to reflect upon and critique the law’s complicity in producing race. I
begin with an overview of the difficulty of understanding and defining race as a concept,
as well as the reasons why and when race became definitive of American slavery. I then
turn to Frederick Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom (1855) which explores how
race came to signify wrongdoing as a consequence of race-based slavery. I then discuss
how knowledge of racial difference, characterized by its uncertainty, was stabilized by
gender. As considered in Lydia Maria Child’s 1867 novel, A Romance of the Republic an

ii

individual’s uncertain racial identity was legally determined by recourse to his or her
mother’s. The next chapter examines Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson, published in
1894, which refutes the very existence of a racial difference, suggesting its legal
existence is arbitrarily produced for the purposes of slavery. Finally, I conclude with a
consideration of the limits of, and unexplored issues raised by, this project.

Keywords: slavery, American literature, American legal history, race studies, race
relations, racism, Douglass, Child, Twain.
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1
INTRODUCTION

Racial Difference in American Slavery

Introduction
In 1910 Frank Ferrall of North Carolina, who wanted to divorce his wife, found
himself litigating the content of legal racial definitions before the state Supreme Court.
After marrying his wife, Susie, in 1904, and subsequently having children with her, Frank
decided he wanted to end their marriage. However, in seeking to divorce Susie, Frank
did not question her fidelity to the marriage or complain of her conduct throughout it.
Rather, Frank’s reason for seeking a divorce was that he had discovered that Susie was
not the person he thought she was: rather than being white, as he had assumed and
understood before and at the time they were married, contrary to her physical appearance
and claim otherwise, Susie was actually legally black.1
Relying on North Carolina statutory law that “All marriages between a white
person and a negro or Indian or between a white person and a person of negro or Indian
descent to the third generation inclusive… shall be void,” Frank commenced his divorce
proceeding in 1907 by claiming that Susie’s great-grandfather was black. 2 Susie’s
response was that she had always been honest with Frank about her racial heritage.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Notwithstanding that this project is about complicating or troubling racial categories or definitions, I
have endeavoured to be consistent with my use of the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’ to describe
individuals. My use of such descriptors marks an individual’s social identity, i.e. his or her ‘status’.
And, for the most part, they correspond to an individual’s self-definition and legal status. In instances
where such racial identity is problematic, for example with those who do not self-identify with their
racial legal status, I have tried to note the problematic use of racial designations. This suggests the
difficulty in talking about race and the slipperiness of its signification.
2

Code §1810 (1883), § 2083, Revisal of 1905 (North Carolina).
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Specifically, she denied his claim that she was legally black but did concede that she
possessed some “strain of Indian or Portuguese blood” and that there had been rumours
she was of negro descent, all of which Frank had been aware of before their marriage.3
At the trial of Frank’s claim for divorce, the jury determined that he had failed to
establish that Susie’s great-grandfather was in fact a “negro” and, as such, found that
Frank had failed to establish that Susie met the statutory definition of negro.4 Frank
subsequently appealed the trial court’s finding, urging the North Carolina Supreme Court
to reconsider the racial identity of Susie’s great-grandfather. In particular, Frank argued
that assessing whether an individual was “pure negro” required a consideration of
whether that individual had lived as one – an individual’s “authentic” racial identity was
reflected, at least in part, by the company that individual kept – and the trial jury erred in
not considering any such evidence, relying instead on the documentary evidence adduced
at trial as to Susie’s great-grandfather’s race. 5

Frank’s understanding of race,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

See Ariela J. Gross, What Blood, 101.

4

Again, realizing that racial distinctions and consequent definitions of the races is a vexed issue, as I
discuss in more detail below, I am using the designations ‘black’ and ‘white’ as terms for their
respective, broadly conceived racial categories. That noted, given its historical content, the use of the
term “negro” is required throughout. To some extent ‘negro’ is synonymous with ‘black’ in that it
captures the same range of phenotypic characteristics denoted by ‘black’. Nonetheless, ‘negro’ has a
legal resonance within slavery that ‘black’ did not, for example in its use in legislation. Moreover,
because of its legal deployment to categorize it also captured those did not appear ‘black’ but were
nonetheless legally ‘negroes’, for example by way of legal definitions turning on genealogy as in
Ferrall v. Ferrall. In any event, I have attempted to restrict my use of the term ‘negro’ to discussion
of those sources that use it.
5

As Daniel J. Sharfstein notes, Frank’s brief argued that the legislative definition of “negro” must
have included those who had even remote negro ancestry as well as those who were socially or
culturally defined or treated as “negro”: “Nevertheless, Frank Ferrall pressed his case for the most
extreme, biologically driven assumptions about race were false. ‘[T]he word ‘negro’… cannot mean a
pure-blooded African,’ Ferrall’s brief argued. ‘There have not been any in the State in a century…’.
Rather, the statutory prohibition of marriage between whites and people ‘of negro descent to the third
generation[] must have meant the descent of any person whose social status, associations and daily
living stamped him as being a negro” (Secret History 1506).
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encompassing both behaviour and classificatory records, failed to persuade the state
Supreme Court and the jury verdict was upheld.6
In dismissing Frank’s appeal, Justice Hoke noted that the legislative definition of
“negro” in place at the time had developed organically in North Carolina: earlier
authorities had defined a negro as anyone within four or five generations of an “African”
ancestor but, at the time of Frank’s appeal, that ancestral connection had been reduced to
three generations. Following its earlier decision on racial definitions and schooling
rights, the Court held an individual’s race must be determined by his or her blood, and for
an individual to meet the statutory definition of “negro” required proof that his or her
ancestor within three generations had negro blood.7 Moreover, the Court held that while
Susie’s great-grandfather may have associated with negroes, to define race through his
behaviour or conduct, as opposed to the more measurable or quantifiable notion of
“blood,” was found to be “objectionable” as it set a “varying and uncertain standard by
which to determine a most important legislative requirement in the civic and social polity
of the commonwealth” (178). While Frank may or may not have been factually correct
about it, his failure to establish in court that Susie’s great-grandfather was legally a negro
ultimately doomed his attempt to divorce her.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
7

Ferrall v. Ferrall, 153 N.C. 174.

Hare v. Board of Education, 113 N.C. 9. The Court in Ferrall, by reference to precedent, tracks the
percentage or quantity of negro in an individual through the notion of negro ‘blood’ transmitted by
ancestry, i.e. eventually if enough generations of race-mixing had occurred, the negro blood in an
individual would be sufficiently diluted by white blood to that individual could no longer be fairly or
properly characterized as a negro. Given blood was not and could not be literally measured, it
operated as a pseudo-scientific marker – a presumed biological feature – of race, the presence of
which in often long-deceased ancestors was ultimately determined in non-biological ways such as
behaviour, community opinion, and enslavement. Certainly, courts often resorted to phenotypic
assessments of race in respect of individuals present before them but, even then, the notion of negro
blood remained a fiction to signify difference.
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In addition to Justice Hoke’s reasons, Chief Justice Clark provided reasons for his

concurring opinion.

After reproaching Frank for attempting to “bastardize his own

innocent children,” Chief Justice Clark noted that a judicial declaration of Susie’s
blackness would mark their children as negroes, “a fate which their white skin makes
doubly humiliating to them” (180).8 Finding it incongruent that Frank would scorn racial
mixing and disdain negroes, but still attempt to have his wife and children declared black
(particularly when they did not appear black), Chief Justice Clark’s reasons conclude
that:
The eloquent counsel for the plaintiff depicted the infamy of social
degradation from the slightest infusion of negro blood. He quoted from a
great writer not of law, but of fiction, the instance of a degenerate son who
sold his mulatto mother “down the river” as a slave. But his crime was
punished, and surely was not greater than that of this husband and father,
who for the sake of a divorce would make negroes of his wife and
children, hitherto white and whom the jury still finds to be so. (180-81)
Chief Justice Clark thus found that Frank’s paternal obligations ought to have precluded
him from ever claiming his children’s blackness, and to have even made the claim ought
to have been shameful. In doing so, the learned judge referenced Mark Twain’s novel,
Pudd’nhead Wilson. That minor literary reference in an appellate decision on how race

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8

As Chief Justice Clark summarizes Frank’s position: “He deems it perdition for himself to associate
with those possessing the slightest suspicion of negro blood, but strains every effort to consign the
wife of his bosom and the innocent children of his own loins to poverty and to the infamy he depicts.
The jury did not find with him and he has no reason to ask any court to aid him in such a purpose”
(180-181).
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was legally determined in early twentieth-century North Carolina usefully frames the
issues and tensions explored in this project.
First published as a novel in 1894, Pudd’nhead Wilson examines slavery in the
1850s along the Mississippi river. Its narrative, among other things, revolves around
master and slave infant boys switched at birth, each then raised as his racial and social
‘other’. Certainly, the narrative’s closure turns on their adult selves being re-installed to
their original positions of master and slave after a dramatic courtroom revelation of their
‘true’ racial identities during a murder trial.

On its face, Twain’s narrative of

master/slave confusion and deception, corrected and stabilized by a succinct and
uncomplicated legal declaration of racial difference, seems appropriate to the Court’s
emphasis on ancestral transmission of race in Ferrall. However, the novel – and the
judicial reference to it – reveals the problematic but unquestioned presumptions inherent
in legally defining race.
By Frank’s appeal in 1910, and after slavery’s abolishment, ‘Jim Crow’ laws were
in full effect, segregating and subordinating blacks on the basis they were racially distinct
from whites and inferior to them.9 While reminiscent of the racial duality of slavery,
such segregation required first and foremost an ability to distinguish between the races,
something that became particularly urgent after slavery had been abolished and the fact
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

“Jim Crow”, of course, refers to the collection of laws and practices designed to subordinate blacks
at the close of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. As Michelle Alexander describes it: “By
the end of the nineteenth century, every state in the South had laws on the books that disenfranchised
blacks and discriminated against them in virtually every sphere of life, lending sanction to a racial
ostracism that extended to schools, churches, housing, jobs, restrooms, hotels, restaurants, hospitals,
orphanages, prisons, funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries… [This] new racial order, known as
Jim Crow – a term apparently derived from a minstrel show character – was regarded as the ‘final
settlement,’ the ‘return to sanity,’ and ‘the permanent system’. Of course, the earlier system of
racialized control – slavery – had also been regarded as final, sane, and permanent by its supporters.
Like the earlier system, Jim Crow seemed ‘natural’,’ and it became difficult to remember that
alternative paths were not only available at one time, but nearly embraced” (35).
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of black subordination gave way to potentially unfettered interracial encounters and
relations. Thus, after Emancipation formally rendered all citizens equal regardless of
race, Jim Crow era legislation and judicial decisions revised and refined racial definitions
in an attempt to demarcate black from white, culminating in the ‘one drop rule’ – an
absurd, constructed notion of race that permitted blackness to be legally tracked and
identified in the transmission of ‘black blood’ (theoretically down to even just one drop
of it).10 But as racial definitions and distinctions became increasingly convoluted to
explain and maintain racial segregation, the fundamental presumption that race, or racial
difference, existed as a thing that could be legally determined and defined nonetheless
persisted.
Pudd’nhead Wilson subverts this presumption. When confronted with the racial
deception perpetrated against the community, the court accepts proof of racial difference
in fingerprints – a legal determination presented in the narrative as privileging first and
foremost the property relations of slavery. Like the evidentiary reliance on records of
ancestral race in Ferrall, fingerprints function in Pudd’nhead Wilson as determinative
proof at law of racial identity. However, as I argue, the fingerprint records accepted by
the court as definitive in Pudd’nhead Wilson do not in fact reveal any extra-legal truth
about race, whether biological, historical, or otherwise. Rather, fingerprints operate
merely as an arbitrary marker of difference possessed of legal authority to signify racial
difference. In Ferrall, race is similarly arbitrary: when unable to see or agree on an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

The “one drop rule” refers to laws passed throughout many states in the twentieth century, i.e. after
slavery, that identified as ‘black’ any individual who possessed “one drop” of black blood. Its
implementation reflected the extremes to which racial segregation was pursued as well as the cultural
anxiety about the difficulty of stabilizing any such racial categories. Again, though, as noted above,
such recourse to blood provided a dubious, pseudo-biological explanation for difference that could
only be substantiated in non-biological ways.
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individual’s racial identity, the court’s finding of negro ancestry in that individual – once
up to five generations removed, now three – is determinative of his or her blackness as
statutorily mandated. In their reliance on arbitrary markers to distinguish and stabilize
racial categories amidst the apparent absence of, or disagreement over, racial difference,
the courts in Pudd’nhead Wilson and Ferrall deem the existence of racial difference,
confirming its possibility. And in arbitrarily selecting specific criteria as determinative of
racial difference, those courts produce racial difference for the purpose of identifying it.

The difficulty in defining ‘race’
This thesis explores this production of racial difference at law during slavery. In
arguing that racial difference was produced during this specific historical period, I do not
mean to suggest that legal discourses and definitions singularly created or produced races
or racial difference. Rather, this project explores how the notion of racial difference was
legally manipulated during slavery to perpetuate and maintain racial distinctions. Peggy
Pascoe articulates how the law is active in formulating and defining the racial concepts
and categories it legitimates, “… the legal system does more than just reflect social or
scientific ideas about race; it also produces and reproduces them” (47). This thesis thus
emphasizes the presumption of racial difference and does not attempt to resolve the
dispute over whether races and racial differences are in fact real or essential as opposed
to constructed.

Indeed, the lengthy and ongoing dispute over whether race is real

continues to be predictably contentious.
Even within the scientific community there is vigorous debate over the factual
existence of race. That debate, which is ultimately the province of the geneticists,
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touches on such areas as epistemologies of biological classification, natural selection, and
methods of measuring genetic variance. In 2004’s The Race Myth: Why We Pretend
Race Exists in America, biologist Joseph L. Graves, Jr., states, quite simply, “The fact is
that no biological races exist in modern humans” (5). Graves, Jr.’s argument, briefly, is
that there is not adequate genetic variation across the human population to justify or
explain distinctions between groups along ‘racial’ lines and any such grouping has been
arbitrary.
Conversely, and more recently, in 2014’s A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes,
Race, and Human History, journalist Nicholas Wade argues that there is in fact a
biological reality to race: “Analysis of genomes from around the world establishes that
there is a biological reality of race, despite the official statements to the contrary of
leading social science organizations” (4).

While Wade is careful to state that any

biological reality of race does not inherently or necessarily lead to a racial hierarchy, he
argues that a fear of racism erroneously overlooks that there has been measurable genetic
variance over time within groups of peoples typically understood as distinguishable races,
suggesting racialized development or evolution.
The current general consensus among academics outside the natural sciences
exploring the concept of ‘race’ is that race is not a scientific fact but a construction. For
example, Wade notes that the American Anthropological Association and the American
Sociological Association each refute that race has a biological reality, stating instead it is
“about culture” or a “social construct,” respectively (5). Indeed, for those who argue that
race is only constructed, any argument as to race’s biological reality is misguided at best.

!
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As historian Barbara Jeanne Fields writes in her influential piece, “Slavery, Race and
Ideology in the United States of America”:
Belief in the biological reality of race outranks even astrology, the
superstition closest to it in the competition for dupes among the ostensibly
educated…

Anyone who continues to believe in race as a physical

attribute of individuals, despite the now commonplace disclaimers of
biologists and geneticists, might as well also believe that Santa Claus, the
Easter Bunny and the tooth fairy are real, and that the earth stands still
while the sun moves. (96)
Nonetheless, there are visual or phenotypic differences between people that are capable
of being grouped. But in response to ‘common sense’-type assertions that the fact such
groupings may be made proves different races exist, those who argue race is merely
cultural emphasize the arbitrary emphasis on skin colour (or other features) over other
physical features that are not shared by all people.11
For example, in arguing that race is a “myth” that “exists outside the realm of
rational thought”, historian Jacqueline Jones writes that “Americans who would scoff at
the notion that meaningful social or temperamental differences distinguish brown-eyed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

As Winthrop D. Jordan notes, some time ago, about the ‘genetic approach’ to race in his seminal
White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550-1812: “One of the most important
recent breakthroughs has been the conception of race as a group of individuals sharing a common
gene pool. Such a definition emphasizes the fact that racial characters such as skin color are unlikely
to remain stable over long periods of time. It underlines the fact that the continued existence of races
is dependent upon geographical or social separation. It places in proper perspective the biological
differences among human beings: all mankind shares a vast number of genes in common, yet at the
same time various populations differ as to frequency of genes. With this in mind, racial characteristics
may be defined as biological traits which various populations possess in varying frequencies” (584).
Jordan’s point, ultimately, is that following this line of thought, a group of peoples perpetually
isolated from other populations would eventually come to form its own race and “In this sense, races
are incipient species” (584).
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people from blue-eyed people nevertheless utter the word ‘race’ with a casual
thoughtlessness” (x). Certainly on the one hand, Jones and others appear to be correct:
our conceptions of race do privilege, perhaps illogically or unjustly, certain visible traits
– skin colour, hair type, and eye shape, for example – over others. Moreover, as I explore
in this project, racial identifications may persist even in the absence of the visible
physical features typically used to define race. On the other hand, those traits that we do
cite as racial difference do appear to originate from or aggregate around different
geographical areas, thus confirming, at least as a commonplace, that it is possible to
group people into subsets or categories according to shared visible characteristics. Of
course, neither view of race, each of which I would describe as ‘common sense’,
considers in any meaningful way the allegedly genetic or biological underpinnings of
race.
This thesis does not attempt to reconcile these contradictory views on race nor
does it attempt to provide a singularly decisive conclusion on the alleged factual or
essential existence of race. That race may not be visible but nonetheless persist even in
the absence of any such visible markers (for example, by way of consanguinity or
heredity) confirms the complicated and paradoxical essence of race. Resolving this
fundamental historical paradox of race is an aim far beyond the disciplinary scope of this
thesis.12 It does, however, explore the problematized fact of this paradox by way of an
examination of how race was conceptualized in legal discourse and fiction in a brief but
transformative period of American history – the final years of slavery.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

Perhaps the most useful definition is offered by Thomas Sowell, who sees race as both biological
and social: “Race is not entirely in the eye of the beholder, but it is a social concept with a biological
basis” (1).
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Moreover, while this thesis does not consider whether race is in fact

transhistorical, it is nonetheless fundamentally concerned with its significance. As any
theorist of the issue, from the historical to the scientific, would agree, race has had and
continues to have social meaning, and it is not necessary to determine its factual
existence to investigate its conceptualization, treatment, and deployment. In concluding
that race is socially constructed, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva nonetheless notes that:
… race, as other social categories such as class and gender, is constructed
but… it has a social reality. This means that after race – or class or gender
– is created, it produces real effects on the actors racialized as “black” or
“white”. Although race, as other social constructions, is unstable, it has a
“changing same” quality at its core. (9)
It is in this sense that this project remains in dialogue with, and contributes to, broader or
more comprehensive examinations of race. In the end, though race may or may not be a
knowable reality, it is undeniably real in its effects, for example forming the basis of
policies and actions ranging from explicitly racist calls to reform immigration and past
‘affirmative action’ practices, to the more seemingly benign areas of medical research
and multicultural social programs.13 Whether it is a fact or not, to borrow from the title
of Cornel West’s seminal 1994 book, “race matters”.14

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

As Randall Kennedy summarizes it, “Racial sentiments, moreover, are devilishly difficult to isolate
and quantify in specific instances. In gross, however, the evidence is overwhelming, that racial
attitudes affect judgments pervasively – from the administration of justice to support or opposition to
social welfare programs, to dating and the marriage market, to employment decisions” (Persistence 7).
14

And it matters, excruciatingly so, in the United States, where race continues to be conceptualized as
a critical binary, despite the extensive and ongoing racial mixing. To the extent individuals may be
possessed of black and white racial heritages, the logic of hypodescent ensures they are re-raced as,
primarily or fundamentally, ‘black’.
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What ‘race’ meant to American slavery
This thesis explores the legal formulation of racial difference during the latter
period of American slavery. Broadly conceived, law – legislation, submissions, judicial
opinions – is particularly pertinent to formulations of identity. As Patricia J. Williams
emphasizes in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, because “Laws become described and
enforced in the spirit of our prejudices”, they provide important data on diffuse cultural
beliefs and practices (67). Further, noting the law’s capacity to render the unknown
known and the irrational rational, perhaps in furtherance of our prejudices, Colin Dayan
explains:
… legal persons have no fixed definition, but instead take on changing
capacities variously granted by the state, such as legal rights, freedoms,
duties, and obligations. Jurisprudence responds to the “craving for the
rational” when confronted with what Alexander Nekam regards as the
necessities of “social control and valuation”. To be acceptable, communal
emotions must be endowed with a “rational form”. This incarnation is
granted through “the art of the law.” (25)
Thus, in addition to rendering comprehensible that which remains on the limits of
understanding, the law’s ability and capacity to define also possesses an authority that
endows its definitions with legitimacy.
Importantly, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that skin colour was always
the fundamental reason for American slavery, racial difference did not become the
singular reason and justification for enslavement until relatively late in the institution’s
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history.15 And for that reason, the legal attempts to catalogue, define, and understand
racial difference during a formative period in the concept’s history are particularly
instructive. That noted, while the push to legally define race so as to perpetuate slavery,
including the various and conflicted legal understandings of race that resulted, was
belated, the concept or notion of race was nonetheless always relevant to enslavement.
As Michelle Alexander writes in The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Colorblindness: “Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved,
many were treated as indentured servants” (23).16 But, as Alexander continues, although
blacks may not have been legally enslaved at the outset of American history they, like
Indians, were nonetheless almost always viewed as subordinate to whites:
By the mid-1770s, the system of bond labor had been thoroughly
transformed into a racial caste system predicated on slavery.

The

degraded status of Africans was justified on the ground that Negros, like
the Indians, were an uncivilized lesser race, perhaps even more lacking in
intelligence and laudable human qualities than the red-skinned natives.
(25)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This is an essential point to which I repeatedly return. Following others, such as Thomas D. Morris
and Gross, I argue that circumstances such as race-mixing and abolitionism in the mid-nineteenth
century created a pressure to legally define race so as to justify slavery as well as to clearly demarcate
its boundaries. Although slavery may have always been racially driven, there was little need to legally
define race prior.
16

As Barbara Jeanne Fields writes, “Although African or African-descended slaves dribbled in from
1619 on, the law did not formally recognize the condition of perpetual slavery or systematically mark
out servants of African descent for special treatment until 1661. Indeed, African slaves during the
years between 1619 and 1661 enjoyed rights that, in the nineteenth century, not even free black people
could claim” (104).
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This perception of black inferiority, itself rooted in the belief of a distinct ‘black’ race,
ultimately provided and confirmed the legitimacy of the racialized nature of American
slavery.
Certainly, perceptions (or beliefs, or presumptions, or ‘conventional wisdoms’,
etc.) do not possess legal authority. But as Randall Kennedy notes, “By the time of the
founding of the United States, virtually all slaves were black, although not all blacks were
slaves” (Race, Crime 30).17 And because of this fairly stable racial correspondence to the
positions of master and slave (which inherently presumed a distinct and inferior black
race) – particularly before increased racial mixing posed an explicit threat to slavery’s
distinct racial statuses – there were limited attempts to legally define the distinct and
different races. As Daniel J. Sharfstein notes generally about the historical period of
slavery, “Southern courts and communities did not strictly define the color line because
there was little reason to go beyond slavery’s proxy of racial boundaries, and an
inflexible racial regime only threatened to interfere with the smooth functioning of a
slave society” (Crossing 597). Practically, then, there was not a significant need (or
desire) to legally define racial difference for most of the duration of slavery.
In his comprehensive Southern Slavery and the Law: 1619-1860, Thomas D.
Morris, for example, notes that there was only one statutory definition of “negro” during
slavery:
Exactly how did Southern whites categorize people at law and for what
purposes? It may seem odd but the only effort to define a “negro” in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Daniel J. Sharfstein writes that “Ideas of innate racial difference were already old at the time of the
Founding. Colonial North America had an advanced vocabulary of racial purity and pollution, and
despite continual claims to the contrary, the one-drop rule was hardly unique to the United States”
(Crossing 608).
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statutory law was in the Virginia code of 1849. The whole section was
this: “Every person who has one-fourth part or more of negro blood shall
be deemed a mulatto, and the word ‘negro’ in any other section of this, or
in any future statute, shall be construed to mean mulatto as well as negro.”
(22)

Nonetheless, this singular statutory definition of “negro” did not preclude other attempts
to articulate who was one, particularly where enslavement was concerned. Importantly,
as Morris continues, “There were other efforts to provide descriptions of a ‘negro’ in
legal sources [such as opinions and commentary], but not in statutes” (22).18 However,
while the presumption of racial inferiority always underpinned slavery, the impetus to
articulate slavery as distinctly race-based came in the mid-nineteenth century as that
unspoken presumption was being challenged.
In large part this challenge was the result of disagreement over the practice of
slaveholding: as slaveholders’ authority to own slaves was questioned, particularly by
other whites, slaveholders’ explanation and justification for enslavement became
primarily racial.19 As Fields notes, “… slavery got along for a hundred years after its
establishment without race as its ideological rationale” (114). However, as she continues,
race became explicitly important to slavery’s functioning “… when the denial of liberty
became an anomaly apparent even to the least observant and reflective members of Euro!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

Morris notes that although “negro” may have largely avoided statutory definition, there were
consistently attempts to legislatively define “mulatto” throughout antebellum history (22-23).
19

As David Brion Davis writes: “The greatest single peril to the Southern slavocracy was the possible
disaffection of nonslaveholding farmers and workers followed by an alliance with blacks, both slave
and free. This point underscores the crucial function of racism and racial identity, which succeeded in
maintaining much unity among whites” (Inhuman 185).
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American society… [as racial] ideology systematically explain[ed] the anomaly” (114).
This reification of racial difference as the marker of difference between master and slave
thus came at a particular moment in slavery’s history.20
More specifically, as Ariela J. Gross writes, race became the explanation and
basis for enslavement in the mid-nineteenth century when white Southerners were
required to respond to the pressures of abolitionism:
During the colonial era, and even in the early republic, race had rarely
provided the explicit justification for slavery…

As the institution of

slavery came under increasing attack in the 1830s from Northern
abolitionists as well as from insurgent slaves, Southern white ideologues,
including judges and lawyers, developed a more explicitly racial
justification for slavery. (What Blood 4)
While racial subordination had always been an integral component of American slavery,
it did not become the paramount explanation for, or articulation of, slavery until white
slaveholders were forced to explain the nature and scope of the institution to white
abolitionists.
Further, the increasingly undeniable hypocrisy of maintaining and enforcing
enslavement within a land founded on ideals of freedom, as well as pressure from
abolitionists to end slaveholding, coincided with an exponential increase in the number of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Fields explains that race resolved the conceptual discord created by enforcing enslavement in a land
founded on freedom: “But slavery got along for a hundred years after its establishment without race as
its ideological rational. The reason is simple. Race explained why some people could rightly be
denied what others took for granted, namely, liberty, supposedly a self-evident gift of nature’s God.
But there was nothing to explain until most people could, in fact, take liberty for granted – as the
indentured servants and disenfranchised freedmen of colonial America could not. Nor was there
anything calling for a radical explanation where everyone in society stood in a relation of inherited
subordination to someone else: servant to master, serf to nobleman, vassal to overlord, overlord to
king, king to the King of Kings and Lord of Lords” (114).
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slaves in the first half of the nineteenth century: “Even without significant illegal imports
from Africa or the West Indies, the number of American slaves increased from 1.5
million in 1820 to nearly 4 million in 1860” (Davis, Inhuman 182). Thus, interracial
relationships of all kinds continued from colonial times, and likely multiplied due to the
increased numbers of whites and blacks, including in the form of interracial unions that
threatened the relatively stable racial dichotomies of slavery. As a result, as Gross
discusses, “Southern states initially tried to reinforce black people’s essential identity as
slaves by tightening their manumission laws and making it increasingly difficult for
owners to set slaves free” (What Blood 30).
The commingling of the races, however, proved difficult to restrict. As Walter
Johnson writes:
Throughout the nineteenth century, southern states passed ever-moredetailed laws defining the acceptable limits of drinking, gambling, and
lovemaking along the lines of race and slavery. Those laws attempted to
control sites where black and white, slave and free, bargained and
socialized freely with one another, places where the white supremacist
ideology upon which the defense of slavery increasingly relied was daily
undermined in practice. (Politics 21)
And, as Gross continues, “…even as lawmakers tried to make slave status more
congruent with blackness and freedom more congruent with whiteness, people of all
colors continued to cross racial boundaries – and the law’s efforts to prevent it were
uneven” (What Blood 30).21 Accordingly, what Johnson, Gross, Morris, and others note
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Gross continues in respect of the treatment of interracial unions at law: “Although most states in
both the North and the South had bans on interracial marriage and fornication before the Civil War,
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is that the legal emphasis on race arose at a time when racial distinctions were becoming
troublingly elusive, because of racial mixing or, more troublingly, because the typical,
visual markers of black and white were increasingly difficult to identify.
Indeed, as efforts were made to ensure slavery was fundamentally and exclusively
a racial phenomenon, who was legally black and who was legally white more and more
became a legal concern in the final years of slavery. As Gross observes from her
empirical research, there were “… sixty-eight cases of racial determination appealed to
state supreme courts in the nineteenth-century South. More than half of these (thirty-six)
took place in the last years of slavery – between 1845 and 1861 – and the majority
involved men” (Litigating 120). The racial “justification for slavery” thus occurred at a
time of a significant increase in the population of those who were racially ambiguous.22
And the primary discourse of “justification” of race-based slavery was legal – not
necessarily statutory, but rather in the proliferation of judicial decisions and commentary
attempting to define racial identity.23
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Alabama had no barrier to interracial marriage until 1852, and Mississippi’s statute provided only that
ministers and officials were authorized to celebrate marriages between free whites. Interracial unions
were a kind of blank spot in the law, neither permitted nor forbidden” (What Blood 30).
22

As Mark V. Tushnet writes, emphasizing the racialized nature of slavery was one way to assure
non-slaveholding whites they could not be enslaved, and thereby obtain their support for an economic
system that at times was contrary to their interests: “If the classifications of slave and master were the
only ones available, nonslaveowners could reasonably fear that they would be treated as a subordinate
class. To secure the allegiance of non-slaveowners to the political interests of the master class, they
had to be assured that they would not be as subordinated as slaves. Law could provide such
assurances by drawing rigid lines around the class of slaves, thereby guaranteeing that the lesser
protections that the law gave to slaves would not seep into the law governing nonslaveowners. As
many scholars have noted, the categorizing effect of race had the additional attraction of inserting
nonslaveowners into the highest class in the hierarchy instead of creating an intermediate category for
them. But it was enough for these political purposes to bracket slaves off from nonslaveowners by
some categorizing device” (American Law 38). That “categorizing device” was race.
23

Ian Haney Lopez emphasizes that law produces, at least in part, race which is ultimately socially
constructed: “Law is one of the most powerful mechanisms by which any society creates, defines, and
regulates itself. Its centrality in the constitution of society is especially pronounced in highly legalized
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Accordingly, “one of the legal jobs of race was to decide who could be a slave

and who could not” as it came to operate as an “ordering principle” for slavery (Morris
29).

In particular, race provided the basis and explanation for why only certain

individuals could be enslaved, thereby stabilizing the widening disjunct between
observable ‘racial’ difference and slavery: “As far as slavery was concerned, in the
widest sense a white could not be a slave, a person of color could be, a black
presumptively was, and those who fell between a white and a quadroon might be, but the
evidentiary presumption of liberty was in their favour” (Morris 29). Threatened from
without by abolitionism and threatened from within by racial slippage, race became most
important to justifying slavery when such a justification was most needed.

The scope of this thesis
This thesis thus explores, in those final years of slavery, some of the ways in
which racial difference was legally manipulated. Because definitions of the distinct races
did not possess a substantial legal existence prior to this period, such manipulations
amounted to the production of racial difference. Importantly, this production included
determining the legal significance of race and racial difference. As Ian Haney Lopez
writes in his White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race:
Race is not, however, simply a matter of physical appearance and
ancestry. Instead, it is primarily a function of the meanings given to these.
On this level, too, law creates race. The statutes and cases that make up
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and bureaucratized late-industrial democracies such as in the United States. It follows, then, that to
say race is socially constructed is to conclude that race is at least partially legally produced. Put more
starkly, law constructs race” (7).
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the laws of this country have directly contributed to defining the range of
meanings without which notions of race could not exist. (11)

The legal production of race created it as a thing to be legally determined, stabilized and
with meanings or specific significance even, as I examine, in the absence of the common
sense visible markers of racial difference.
In examining this production of racial difference at law, I do not aim to provide a
comprehensive survey of all law pertaining to slavery during the period. Different states
possessed different, and often conflicting, statutes and decisions on the nature of race,
and assembling them all would be an undertaking too ambitious for a project of this size.
I have, however, selected diverse texts that in themselves reflect the scope of the various
laws in this period. In so doing, it is clear that the variance or differences between the
states’ laws were substantially less than their commonalities and shared reasoning and, as
a result, a broad understanding of how race operated as a legal concept during the period
may be achieved. Further, in pursuit of such a broad understanding, this project takes a
correspondingly broad view of the law, and considers such diverse legal texts as judicial
opinions and legislation. It also considers, to a lesser extent, how such legal texts about
race operated to define and shape the understanding and significance of race generally.
In so doing, it aims for an expansive view of how the legalities of slavery shaped race and
its meanings in the final years of slavery.24
Although this thesis is fundamentally concerned with exploring the legal
production of race or racial difference, it does so largely by turning to literature. Such
interdisciplinary mixing may, at first glance, seem counterproductive. As Kieran Dolin
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As a methodological point, and to borrow from Tushnet: “… I am primarily concerned with the
‘general’ law of slavery… and am less concerned with the local variances except as they illuminate
general propositions” (American Law 9).
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writes, “As distinct linguistic forms of life, law and literature speak different kinds of
sentences: one commanding obedience under threat of punishment, the other inviting
pleasurable recognition and assent” (9). Nonetheless, as Dolin ultimately claims, each
discipline can illuminate the other. In particular, literature may assist with framing,
conceptualizing, and understanding difficult legal issues raised in, but restricted by, legal
discourses. Ian Ward notes in respect of the ‘law and literature’ movement that: “As
Nancy Cook concludes, ultimately law and literature, in its use of terms that are not
immediately ‘legal’, ‘helps identify and clarify important issues in the legal realm that
might otherwise remains clouded’” (26). The literary examination and consideration of
legal problems and issues that may appear foreclosed or settled within legal discourses
has proven particularly important to understanding American concepts of race.
Karla Holloway explains that “Literatures in the United States have consistently
reflected and creatively engaged America’s shifting social judgments on questions of
rights that the law has arguably settled, or at least that the law has sought to provide,
through various rulings, with a substantial judicial framework for resolution” (22).
However, focussing on the way in which race has been, and continues to operate as, a
“legal fiction” (22) in American culture, Holloway emphasizes the creative and
potentially subversive qualities of literature as enabling an important critique of that legal
fiction:
Even though American jurisprudence has shown itself willing to engage,
determine, and amend questions of gender and race, U.S. literatures took
up similar questions but without the necessity that the law has for
resolution and fixity. In fact, literature’s openness to conflict and its
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practiced interest in complexity and ease with the obscure kept the
pretense of legal resolution from being the sociocultural panacea its
regulations would offer. The legal fiction of race and identity was the
liberal imaginary, the terrain of literature. (21-22)25

Given the complex history and precarious nature of racial difference, literature provides a
means to understand and critique the law’s participation in its historical production: it is
literature that provides a glimpse into the American imaginary – including in respect of
legal conceptions of race – wherein often conflicting and discordant thoughts on race and
difference may be considered free from the restraints and demands of legal practice and
enforcement. Accordingly, in each chapter of this project I examine a particular literary
work and a specific legal issue raised in it pertaining to the production and meaning of
racial difference during the last years of slavery.
The first chapter of this thesis examines Frederick Douglass’s 1855
autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, which details his life in slavery in and
around Maryland. Therein I argue that, among other things, Douglass notes that the
maintenance of slavery – the legal subordination of slaves as property – relied on the
presumption that slaves were always committing some wrongdoing, violating some law,
code of behaviour, or standard of conduct. This presumption legitimated slaveowners’
authority, especially in respect of their legal right to discipline their slaves. Moreover, it
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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To be clear, Holloway’s point is that black writers in particular have illuminated and exposed the
complicated legal mechanics of restricting rights and citizenship under the misguided (and simply
incorrect) notion of race. As she notes: “However, in the (fugitive) hands of creative writers, the
principles attached to rights become malleable fictions that depended on the bodies that are constituted
as its primary actors – its characters. This book will argue that black folk made for particularly
complex literary characters precisely because of the way in which their very bodies were out (side of)
law…. While law just kept trying to sort it out, literature – especially that written by black writers –
would out the inconsistencies, explore the lacunae, and weigh the unanticipated accompaniments
embedded in racialized narratives that made a diction of the law” (22).
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permitted owners to legally parcel or assign their authority to others, including in respect
of their right to discipline slaves, pursuant to the contractual relationships that
underpinned the economic imperatives of slavery. Thus, when black was becoming
synonymous with enslaved, this presumption of slave wrongdoing imbued black skin
with the taint of the same. This meaning or significance of black skin, generated within
slavery, extended to non-slave states by way of the 1850 federal Fugitive Slave Act,
which operated as a kind of racial profiling whereby blacks in any state were effectively
legally presumed to be fugitives in contravention of the law. Black skin was thus
produced or conditioned by the law of slavery to signify illegal conduct.
The second chapter turns to Lydia Maria Child’s 1867 A Romance of the
Republic to explore the connection between race and gender within slavery. Romance
tracks the journey of two sisters in antebellum Louisiana, who look and are raised as
white, from their white upper-middle class beginnings to their potentially being sold into
slavery and eventual return to white society. In so doing, Romance considers the factual
slipperiness of race and the corresponding legal attempt to stabilize it. Specifically, to
resolve the inability caused by racial intermixture to distinguish or visually track racial
difference, the law arbitrarily emphasized sex difference as a measure to distinguish
between the races – the child took the condition of its mother. For the protagonist sisters
in Romance, who were raised and self-identify as white (having not been given any
information to the contrary by their family), this amounts to re-racing them as black and
as slaves, on the basis of arbitrary legal definitions of racial difference that precede them.
Further, in highlighting the legal production of racial difference as gendered, Romance
ultimately suggests racial equality cannot be achieved without gender equality.
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The final chapter of this project considers Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson, set in

1850s Missouri where, as the enslaved were appearing whiter, legal determinations of
racial difference had become particularly important.

Where Douglass and Child

problematize the issue of race and its legal significance, they nonetheless accept its
factual existence. Twain, on the other hand, questions its actuality, refusing its very
knowability or measurability, scientific or otherwise. In the end, Pudd’nhead Wilson
considers that in the absence of any discernible sign of race, the law in fact produced it
for the purposes of maintaining or perpetuating slavery.
In selecting these literary texts for analysis from the many that provide valuable
insight on the legal issues explored in this thesis, I have endeavoured to reflect both
geographical and temporal breadth. To be clear, each text takes as its subject matter the
legal significance or definition of race in the waning years of slavery. And, as noted
above, each text takes a different state as its setting, thereby enabling a broader, if
thematic, picture of the legal racial dynamic of those years that would go on to inform
racial issues nationally. But the publication dates of these literary texts cover a span of
roughly 40 years: from 1855 to 1894. Collectively they reflect a critical period in
American history as slavery was abolished, but the racial freedom and equality that ought
to have followed it was undone by ever rigidifying racial distinctions and increasingly
legislated black subordination.

In moving from Douglass’s My Bondage published

during slavery, to Child’s Romance published just after Emancipation, to Twain’s
Pudd’nhead Wilson published near the turn of the century, this thesis considers the ways
in which slavery legally defined race, as well as the significance and legacy of such
definitions, as black equality continued to be elusive as the twentieth century approached.
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It may be trite to say that race is a complicated, historical phenomenon. But this

thesis attempts to disentangle one aspect of that complicated phenomenon by focussing
on its representation and consideration during a brief period within its development in
American history. In questioning how race was legally produced and perceived, and how
it operated during the final years of slavery, this project contributes to historical, cultural,
and theoretical considerations of how law formulates identity and, more specifically, how
and why racial identity was legally configured through law during slavery. Further, in
turning to literature to explore these legal questions, this project contributes to studies
into American literature and history, as well as to interdisciplinary law and cultural
modes of inquiry. What this thesis finally concludes, and what the literary texts it
examines present and support, is that race is largely a legal phenomenon, its continued
existence and meaning produced by, and unknowable without, the various legal attempts
to define it and identify its memberships and significance.
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CHAPTER ONE

The Impudent Slave: Frederick Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom and
the Conflation of Black Skin and Wrongdoing

“No black is ever up to any good.”
-Patricia J. Williams

Introduction
In its August 12, 2013, decision in Floyd et al v. The City of New York, 08 Civ.
1034 (SAS), the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, ruled that
the defendant City of New York was liable for the New York Police Department
violating the Plaintiffs’ rights through its use of an ostensibly crime preventing policy
known as ‘Stop-and-Frisk’.1 As deployed, the policy permitted, and in fact encouraged,
the NYPD to stop and search individual citizens without having probable cause to do so.
The named Plaintiffs in Floyd, each of whom had been subjected to this ‘Stop-and-Frisk’
policy, claimed the NYPD had violated their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The Plaintiffs in Floyd claimed that in addition to Stop-and-Frisk being
unconstitutional, they had been also been unjustly or unfairly targeted by it. Specifically,
they alleged they were stopped and searched on the basis of mere suspicion, contrary to
the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens against unreasonable searches and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Floyd, et al v. City of New York, et al, was, in fact, a federal class action lawsuit brought on behalf of
minorities against the New York Police Department for unlawful stop-and-frisks based on racial
profiling. The named plaintiffs had all been subjected to such unlawful police conduct. USDJ
Scheindlin issued two decisions – one on liability (which is discussed here), the other on remedies.
The City of New York appealed USDJ Scheindlin’s rulings but on January 30, 2014, agreed to drop its
appeal and pursue the court-ordered remedies.
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seizures.2 Further, in addition to claiming their respective subjections to Stop-and-Frisk
were inherently unreasonable, the Plaintiffs also claimed the policy was wrongfully
deployed against them. In particular, the named Plaintiffs, each of whom was black or
Hispanic, alleged that they were targeted by Stop-and-Frisk because of their race,
contrary to the Constitution’s guaranteed equal protection of the law, which prohibits
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, among other things. Accordingly, the
thrust of the Plaintiffs’ case was that the Stop-and-Frisk policy was not being conducted
in a racially neutral manner.
The trial of this matter lasted nine weeks, stretching from March through May of
2013. In her reasons, and prior to turning to her findings of fact at trial, United States
District Judge Scheindlin noted the following facts, among others, were uncontested:
-

Between January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4
million Terry stops;3

-

The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high
of 868,000 in 2011;

-

6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. The
remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law
enforcement action.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Amendment IV of the U.S. Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
3

‘Terry stops’ are a legal practice whereby the police briefly detain an individual on the basis that
individual is suspected of criminal activity (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 1 U.S. 1 (1968). This is a lower
threshold for police detention than probable cause, but such detention is also meant to be brief. A
Stop-and-Frisk incident would be a Terry stop with a search of the individual.
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-

In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black. In 31% the
person was Hispanic, and in 10% the person was white;

-

In 2010, New York City’s resident population was roughly 23% black,
29% Hispanic, and 33% white;

-

In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the
officer recorded using force. The number for whites was 17%; and

-

Between 2004 and 2009, the percentage of stops where the officer failed
to state a specific suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%. (6-7)

As a result, the facts determined at hearing included that blacks were subjected to Stopand-Frisk at a rate double their population while, conversely, whites were subjected to the
policy at a rate of one-third their population.
Given that neither party disputed the claim at trial, the disproportionate targeting
of blacks by Stop-and-Frisk was unsurprisingly borne out in the evidence: focusing on
the expert testimony proffered at trial, USDJ Scheindlin concluded that blacks were
discriminatorily targeted by ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ in a number of ways. The learned judge’s
findings included that “the NYPD carries out more stops where there are more black and
Hispanic residents” and that “Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be
stopped within precincts and census tracts… even in areas with low crime rates, racially
heterogeneous populations, or predominately white populations” (9). Moreover, it was
found that, somewhat paradoxically, for the period from 2004 to 2009, blacks were
determined to be 14% more likely than whites to be subjected to the use of force during
Stop-and-Frisk searches, yet were found to be 8% less likely than whites to endure
further enforcement action beyond the stop itself (9). Further compounding the evidence
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of their differential treatment, blacks were also found to be 30% more likely to be
arrested (rather than merely receive a summons) than whites for the same suspected
crimes (9). As USDJ Scheindlin determined, “together, these results show that blacks are
likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion than
whites” (9).
In response to this largely uncontested evidence of differential treatment, the City
did not deny that blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately targeted by Stop-andFrisk. Rather, the City’s testimony, offered through its experts, invoked “suspect race
description data” which assumed the appropriate racial deployment of Stop-and-Frisk
should correspond to the rates of the races in suspect descriptions provided by victims of
crime, and not racial neutrality or population breakdown (51). Put another way, the
City’s position at trial was that a racial bias in the deployment of Stop-and-Frisk is
appropriate given the racially disproportionate numbers of black and Hispanic criminal
suspects. Indeed, in defence of “the fact that blacks and Hispanics represent 87% of the
persons stopped in 2011 and 2012”, the City entered evidence that “approximately 83%
of all known crime suspects and approximately 90% of all violent crime suspects were
blacks and Hispanics” (51).
USDJ Scheindlin rejected the City’s argument that Stop-and-Frisk’s racialized
targeting was justified by the racial statistics of crime suspects. Rather, the learned judge
held that the legally correct racial distribution of Stop-and-Frisk searches – that is, the
only racially neutral deployment of Stop-and-Frisk – would reflect the racial distribution
of the general population and not that of suspected criminals:
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This [Stop-and-Frisk deployed on the basis of suspect race description
data] might be a valid comparison if the people stopped were criminals, or
if they were stopped based on fitting a specific suspect description. But
there was insufficient evidence to support either conclusion.

To the

contrary, nearly 90% of the people stopped are released without the officer
finding any basis for a summons or arrest, and only 13% of stops are
based on fitting a specific suspect description. There is no reason to
believe that the nearly 90% of people who are stopped and then subject to
no further enforcement action are criminals. (51-52)
The Court thus held that the City’s professed reasons for its clearly racialized application
of Stop-and-Frisk did not, and could not, contribute to crime prevention.
Crucially, then, in her conclusion that “there is no reason to believe that their
[Stop-and-Frisk stops] racial distribution should resemble that of the local criminal
population, as opposed to that of the local population in general”, USDJ Scheindlin noted
a flawed presumption in the City’s position at trial (52). Specifically, and in light of the
fact that the racialized deployment of stops failed to result in crime prevention, USDJ
Scheindlin aptly commented that the City wrongly presumed criminality in respect of
black and Hispanic citizens: “I conclude that Dr. Fagan’s [the Plaintiffs’ statistics expert]
benchmark is the better choice. The reason is simple and reveals a serious flaw in the
logic applied by the City’s experts: there is no basis for assuming that the racial
distribution of stopped pedestrians will resemble the racial distribution of the local
criminal population if the people stopped are not criminals” (51). Effectively, the City
ran Stop-and-Frisk – and attempted to justify at trial its racially differential deployment –
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on the basis that blacks and Hispanics are appropriately presumed guilty of some
potentially criminal activity simply because of their race. Although its reasoning was
rejected by the Court at trial, for the City black (and brown) skin in-and-of-itself signified
the likelihood of criminality, and therefore merited racially specific crime prevention and
law enforcement practices.
The notion that black skin is demonstrative of criminality or potential criminality
is hardly novel to contemporary policing practices or even our current era. In The
Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America,
Khalil Gibran Muhammad notes that social scientists and statisticians endeavoured in the
latter half of the nineteenth century to better understand racial relations in the wake of
black freedom, as well as “at what pace… [blacks] … would enter the modern urban
world as citizens” (20). But as Muhammad continues, this work nonetheless presumed
black inferiority in ways largely beholden to the conceptual underpinnings of the racial
slavery that had just ended.4 Thus, following the racial equality ostensibly provided by
Emancipation, blacks continued to be subordinated. This was achieved predominantly by
conceptualizing them as criminals. Emphasizing national censuses as attempts to render
this new black free life into comprehensible data, Muhammad focuses on the 1890s –
twenty-five years after Emancipation – and forward, arguing black criminality became
the key explanation and justification for perpetuating the subordination of free blacks.5
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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At the core of this disciplinary or conceptual cultural shift was an attempt to understand what free
blacks meant to the broader body politic. As Muhammad eloquently puts it: “The monumental shift
from slavery to freedom meant more than the transformation of slaves into freedmen – the realization
of the hopes and prayers and resistance of four million people; it also meant a paradigm shift in the
terms used to discuss, debate, and deal with them. The slavery problem became the Negro Problem”
(20).
5

Muhammad explains that “With the publication of the 1890 census, prison statistics for the first time
became the basis of a national discussion about blacks as a distinct and dangerous criminal
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Moreover, that explanation and justification was legitimized through social science, the
primary discourse at the turn of the century (and perhaps into our present) for defining
the scope of black identity and its relation to the broader cultural sphere:
Out of the new methods and data sources, black criminality would emerge,
alongside disease and intelligence, as a fundamental measure of black
inferiority. From the 1890s through the first four decades of the twentieth
century, black criminality would become one of the most commonly cited
and long lasting justifications for black inequality and mortality in the
modern urban world. (20-21)
Of course, the notion of black criminality as an explanation for persistent black
subordination inherently legitimated discriminatory thought and practices, and the
naturalness of white supremacy.6 As Muhammad continues, “For white Americans of
every ideological stripe – from radical southern racists to northern progressives – African
American criminality became one of the most widely accepted bases for justifying
prejudicial thinking, discriminatory treatment, and/or acceptance of racial violence as an
instrument of public safety” (4).
This chapter explores the identification of black skin with wrongdoing (if not
criminality per se), tracing it back to American slavery as essential to the subordination
of blacks generally and the maintenance of slavery specifically. In turning to Frederick
Douglass’s 1855 autobiography, which details his time in and escape from slavery, I
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
population… [as it showed]… that African Americans, as 12 percent of the population, made up 30
percent of the nation’s prison population” (3-4).
6

As I discuss, this presumption of black criminality also operated to subordinate blacks in slavery,
even though asserting whiteness as racially superior was not necessarily intended by or explicitly
claimed through it (though it was obviously a result).
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explore how the fact of being enslaved signified some wrongdoing which, in turn,
justified or explained the discipline and punishment of slaves as necessary to preserve the
institution of slavery itself. Moreover, as Douglass notes, this slave wrongdoing, which
was presumed, also precluded slaves from advancing a defence or response to their
alleged wrongdoing by characterizing that too as a punishable wrong. As a result, and
what Douglass illustrates, is that the presumption of their wrongdoing also silenced
slaves.
According to proponents of slaveholding, this ‘silencing’ of slaves was essential
to maintaining or perpetuating the economic basis of slavery. 7 And by the midnineteenth century, as those proponents increasingly emphasized race as the basis or
reason for enslavement, this presumption of slave wrongdoing took on a distinctly racial
character. Once black skin became the definitive mark of enslavement – whether of the
enslaved or the enslaveable – it also came to mean wrongdoing. This conflation or
presumption of black skin and wrongdoing was ultimately exemplified, and reached its
logical conclusion, in the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.8 That Act effectively
presumed blacks guilty of illegal conduct in illegally attempting to escape slavery – of
contravening the Act itself – on the basis of mere allegations of the same (and because it
precluded any substantial response by blacks to any such allegations).

Moreover,

because of its federal scope, the Act extended this presumption of blacks’ illegal conduct,
generated within slavery, into non-slaveholding states.

Thus as race became the

justification for slavery amidst calls for the institution’s abolition, the legal status of black
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As I explore, those who disagreed with slavery also recognized, often reluctantly, this feature of it as
essential to its practice.
8

Fugitive Slave Act 1850, 9 Stat. 464.
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people as property throughout was reified, and the presumption of blacks’ wrongdoing
both established and confirmed their status as (silent) property to be circulated within the
economy of slavery.

The mechanics of plantation authority
Born into slavery in 1818 Maryland, Frederick Douglass ultimately became a key
figure in the abolitionist movement after escaping from bondage as a young man.
Teaching himself to write – in-and-of-itself a transgressive act – Douglass, after
achieving freedom, eventually lectured and published on the horrors of slavery and the
philosophical and moral rights of freedom.9 From a literary perspective, Douglass is
most renowned for his autobiographical Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass,
published in 1845, which detailed his life in and escape from slavery.10 My Bondage and
My Freedom, published in 1855, is his second autobiography – a revised and expanded
version of his Narrative, devoting more narrative space to his participation in the
abolitionist movement.
To provide context for Douglass’s story, as well as to cement his centrality to the
abolitionist movement, the original editor of My Bondage includes in his preface a letter
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Christopher Hager explains about the potential dangers of slave literacy to slaveholding: “Ironically,
many slaveholders ranked among the nineteenth century’s most committed believers in the importance
and liberating potential of the ability to write. They tacitly acknowledged a form of racial equality
that almost no one else did: if African American slaves accepted literacy, they could be expected to
use it more or less as white people did – to communicate with each other and speak their minds. They
especially would use it, southerners feared, to rebel or escape” (31). As Lisa Sisco also notes, “In
many ways, Douglass’s acquisition of literacy is a series of acts of resistance, because his master and
the southern legal code specifically say he shouldn’t be taught to read or write” (19).
10

As Henry Louis Gates writes in arguing Douglass defined the genre of slave narrative: “It was
Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of 1845 that exploited the potential and came to determine the shape
of language in the slave narrative” (83).
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composed by Douglass in response to his editor’s “urgent solicitation for such a work”
(5). Douglass’s letter focuses his text’s aims through a legal metaphor: in seeking to
expose the horrors of slavery to the reader, Douglass intends through his narrative to
place “slavery on trial” in the court of public opinion (7). More specifically, Douglass
characterizes his narrative as evidence to be considered in the public adjudication of the
legitimacy of slavery (while noting that the enslaved are also simultaneously on trial in
that same public forum): “Not only is slavery on trial, but unfortunately, the enslaved
people are also on trial. It is alleged that they are naturally, inferior ; that they are so low
in the scale of humanity, and so utterly stupid, they are unconscious of their wrongs, and
do not apprehend their rights” (7).

From the outset, Douglass suggests that the

subordination of slaves, including how they are legally defined as well as how they are
more broadly understood by the public, is central to his text’s polemical aims.
In focussing on these conceptions of the slave, Douglass emphasizes the
presumption inherent in slavery that the enslaved have committed wrongs. These wrongs
– which are attributed to the fact of their race – result in and justify their enslavement: it
is understood and expected that slaves have committed “wrongs” leading to their
subordinated existence, regardless of such wrongs resulting from slaves being “stupid” or
ignorant. Such race-based “wrongs” are thus essential to the maintenance or perpetuation
of racialized slavery. However, this presumption of slave wrongdoing, at least so far as
Douglass is concerned, is somewhat merited (even if ultimately caused by the greater
‘wrong’ of slavery). As he acknowledges, while a slave his very subsistence often
depended upon stealing the food of others: repeatedly caught within the bureaucracy of
slaveholding, Douglass notes that although he tried to live a moral life within slavery and
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“hated everything like stealing, as such” he “did not hesitate to take food” from his
master when hungry (139). But for Douglass, the legitimacy of such thievery – such
illegal conduct – extended beyond the master-slave relationship.

Rather, Douglass

formulates the need and justification for his thievery within the broader racial hierarchy.
Claiming theft for survival as a slave’s right to be exercised against whites
regardless of whether they owned slaves, Douglass writes:
It was necessary that the right to steal from others should be established ;
and this could only rest upon a wide range of generalization than that
which supposed the right to steal from my master… “I am,” thought I,
“not only the slave of Master Thomas, but I am the slave of society at
large… Since each slave belongs to all ; all must, therefore, belong to
each.” (139-40)
This generalized subordination of slaves – that slaves were the property of all members
“of society at large” – was integral to the conception of slaves as property. As Saidiya V.
Hartman writes: “Since the subjection of the slave to all whites defined his condition in
civil society, effectively this made the enslaved an object of property to be potentially
used and abused by all whites” (24).11 The social inequality of slavery, which defined
slaves as owned or potentially owned by any member of the master class, was essential to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

As Hartman continues, it is perhaps paradoxical to consider the slave in relation to “civil society”
given he is excluded from it. However, this strange social position is precisely the slave’s
designation: “It is a tricky matter to detail the civil existence of a subject who is socially dead and
legally recognized as human only to the degree he is criminally culpable. Yet it is the anomalous
status of the enslaved that determined the specific uses of the slave as object of property and the
relation between citizens and those who can be identified as civil subjects in the most circumscribed
and tentative fashion” (24).
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the specific property relations comprising the institution.12 Crucially, his emphasis on
the general inequality of slavery enables Douglass to articulate a model for slave survival
whereby slave wrongdoing within or against “society” generally – i.e. potential or actual
slaveowners – is necessitated and justified by slavery itself.
Douglass does not limit his examination of slave wrongdoing merely to this
notion of a slave “right” to wrongdoing resulting from the wrongful nature of the
institution. Rather, as he illustrates, whether slaves actually committed wrongdoing was
largely immaterial within slavery.

As he examines throughout My Bondage, the

disciplinary practices of slavery treated slaves as always doing wrong, irrespective of
their actual conduct.13 Presumed, often arbitrarily or capriciously, to have misconducted
themselves – either by way of actual or imagined actions – slaveholders and their
representatives produced slaves as guilty of some wrongdoing.14 Thus, regardless of
whatever slave transgressions against society slavery may have legitimated, their conduct
was always already transgressive as slaves were inherently presumed within the
institution to have committed, or were always about to commit, some wrongdoing. This
unquestioned presumption was essential to preserving slave inferiority and,
correspondingly, preserving mastery within slavery.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As a type of property ownership, this notion of circulation or potential ownership by many is
perhaps unsurprising about slavery. However, it is worth re-iterating that the expression of that
ownership was absolute – to function, slavery was the complete and total legal domination of one
individual by another.
13

As Eric J. Sundquist notes, My Bondage distinguishes itself from the Narrative in that it reflects an
explicit commitment by Douglass to “report in greater detail… that his initial quarrel with northern
white abolitionists came precisely over the question of whether or not he was qualified to interpret the
meaning of his own life” (Introduction 4).
14

By ‘guilty’ I do not mean the strictly legal sense of the word. Rather I mean they were guilty of
contravening the rules or codes of conduct of their plantations (many of which were the same across
plantations).
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Importantly, the practical significance of this presumption included the

administration of slavery, including its operational structure and in particular the
plantation. Notwithstanding Douglass’s noting of the public adjudication of slavery’s
legitimacy, discussed above, he observes in My Bondage that even a public condemnation
of slavery would do little to ameliorate the horrific treatment of the enslaved.
Emphasizing that the plantation as an institution insulated itself from external criticism,
Douglass writes that “To be a restraint upon cruelty and vice, public opinion must
emanate from a humane and virtuous community. To no such humane and virtuous
community, is Col. Lloyd’s plantation [a plantation on which Douglass was enslaved]
exposed” (50). To alter the beliefs and conduct on the plantation would require “humane
and virtuous” influence from without, but the plantation is not “exposed” to any such
influence. This lack of exposure to the kind of virtuous community that would advocate
for slavery’s end would no doubt be due, in part, to its Southern geography where the
correctness of slavery was generally accepted. However, for Douglass, the plantation’s
isolation from virtuous thought, including anti-slavery beliefs, is not simply a response to
or guard against abolitionist thought.

Rather, its isolation is constitutive of its

functioning, essential to its continued operation and existence.
Fashioning the plantation as its own authority required the exclusion of all extraplantation authority:
That plantation is a little nation of its own, having its own language, its
own rules, regulations and customs. The laws and institutions of the state,
apparently touch it nowhere. The troubles arising here, are not settled by
the civil power of the state. (Douglass 50)
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Conceived of as an autonomous space, removed from even “the laws and institutions of
the state”, the plantation was accountable only to itself. In that sense, the plantation
perpetuated its isolation from the virtuous community advocating for slavery’s end. As
Paul Gilroy writes, “The state’s lack of access to the plantation illustrated the plantation’s
general inaccessibility to the varieties of modern, secular political reason to its reform”
(59). Regardless of its potential for reform by way of external pressure, the plantation
insulated itself from outside authority in an effort to render the authority of the
slaveowner unquestionable or supreme on and upon his property.15 But in addition to
outside forces, such as abolitionism for example, pressure against slaveholding came onto
the plantation itself in the form of slave resistance, formal and informal, individual and
collective. To contain such resistance on the plantation – to ensure a master’s power over
his slaves – required reifying slaveowner authority as the singular authority over slaves.
Ira Berlin notes that the maintenance of enslavement required a constant
negotiation of the master/slave power dynamic as a result of conflict within the plantation
itself (5). Dramatizing this constant conflict as essential to slavery, Berlin writes that:
The ongoing contest forced slaveowners and slaves, even as they
confronted one another as deadly enemies, to concede a degree of
legitimacy to their opponent. No matter how reluctantly given – or, more
likely, extracted – such concessions were difficult for either party to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This notion of plantation authority was of course a fiction or an ideological crutch. As Berlin
writes: “The planters’ efforts to seal their plantations from outside influences failed utterly, in large
measure because the requirements of production necessitated at least some slave mobility. Slaves
developed an intricate system of internal communication, and news between plantations moved with
lightning speed. Still, the planters’ efforts to wall off their estates, combined with the near-total
absence of interior towns and the growing size of slaveholding units, increased the density of the slave
population and deepened its identification with the land” (201).
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acknowledge.

Masters presumed their own absolute sovereignty, and

slaves never relinquished the right to control their own destiny… The
refusal of either party to concede the realities of master-slave relations
only added to slavery’s instability. (5)
While the power of masters on the plantation may have been routinely renegotiated in the
ongoing struggle for dominance over their slaves, slave resistance – the very instability of
this power dynamic – had to be contained or suppressed to ensure the continued
functioning of the institution.

But crucial to such containment strategies was to

conceptualize the plantation as an isolated space of its own authority, particularly in
respect of the disposition of disagreements between master and slave. It was the
slaveowner himself that was and had to be the final and only arbiter of plantation
disputes.
That slaveowner authority was defined and maintained as perfect or unassailable
so as to ensure the discipline and subordination of slaves is unsurprising. As Douglass
asserts about owner determinations in respect of his slaves, “… the judgment of the
master must be deemed infallible, for his power is absolute and irresponsible” (85
emphasis added). Emphasizing that there was nothing inherently authoritative about an
owner’s “judgment”, slavery’s perfection nonetheless required treating it as beyond
reproach or scrutiny.

“Infallible” authority, however, did not singularly rest in the

individual figure of the slaveowner. Rather, it rested in the authoritative structures of
ownership within slavery as the nature of the plantation and its production demands
meant that one individual could not oversee or run the plantation entirely and, as a result,
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an administrative delegation of slavowner power was required.16 Focussing specifically
on the role of the plantation overseer – an individual hired by a slaveowner to manage
and, in particular, discipline, a plantation’s slaves – Douglass highlights that such
disciplinary authority was necessarily beyond reproach: “As I have said of the overseer of
the home plantation, so I may say of the overseers on the smaller ones ; they stand
between the slave and all civil constitutions – their word is law, and is implicitly obeyed”
(53). In interposing himself between the slave and the broader legal order, the overseer’s
rule as an extension of the owner’s will was absolute.
It was the responsibility of the overseer to adjudicate and discipline slave conduct.
In respect of allegations of slave misconduct, as Douglass notes, the overseer possessed
the singular authority to hear and address them: “The overseer is generally accuser,
judge, jury, advocate and executioner. The criminal is always dumb. The overseer
attends to all sides of a case” (50). Douglass’s metaphor of a biased, procedurally unfair
criminal trial as the forum through which slave wrongdoing on the plantation was
adjudicated, highlights the manner in which slaves were precluded or refused the
opportunity to respond to allegations of wrongdoing.

But it also illustrates how a

slaveowner’s power consolidated itself by his being the final authority and disciplinarian
on all matters pertaining to the regulation of his slaves.17 And as the slaveowner’s
authority on the plantation was configured as the only appropriate forum in which slave
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16

As Davis describes them in contrast to Northern farms, “the larger Southern plantations were more
like the agribusinesses of the later twentieth century in terms of size, efficiency, and complex
organization” (Inhuman 181). Davis’s point is one reason why the South became economically
successful from slavery in a way the North could not was because the South “… produced an
exportable product for which there was international demand” – cotton (Davis, Inhuman 181).
Further, as Berlin notes, the wealth of the planters led to a distinct ruling society, refashioning
themselves as a “feudal class” (197).
17

As discussed later, this was a (deployment of) power confirmed legal.!
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wrongdoing could be addressed, the disciplinary rights of owners were necessarily
confirmed. The exercise of such disciplinary rights was largely through the owner’s
managerial or delegated authority.
My Bondage’s focus on the role of the overseer in slave discipline underscores the
administrative aspects of plantation production: functioning as a managerial stand-in for
the slaveowner, ensuring the unfettered exercise of the owner’s authority required finality
to overseers’ decision-making pertaining to slaves. This was accomplished by precluding
slaves from appealing their treatment by the overseer to the slaveowner – a fact of slavery
that Douglass finds definitive of its cruelty. Writing that “One of the first circumstances
that opened my eyes to the cruelty and wickedness of slavery, and the heartlessness of my
old master, was the refusal of the latter to interpose his authority, to protect and shield a
young woman, who has been most cruelly abused and beaten by his overseer in
Tuckahoe”, Douglass designates the failure of owners to protect their slaves from the
abuse of overseers as “heartless” and “cruel” (63). Moreover, the refusal to appeal
treatment at the hands of an overseer to the master was rooted in presuming the slave had
committed some wrongdoing to merit such treatment in the first place.
Noting that anyone would be moved by the undeniable physical evidence of the
poor girl’s suffering, Douglass writes that when asked to intervene his “Old master
seemed furious as the thoughts of being troubled by such complaints” (64).

For

Douglass, the “cruelty” of his master is largely a matter of efficient regulation of the
enslaved:
This treatment is part of the system, rather than a part of the man. Were
slaveholders to listen to complaints of this sort against the overseers, the
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luxury of owning large numbers of slaves, would be impossible. It would
do away with the office of overseer, entirely ; or, in other words, it would
convert the master himself into an overseer. (64)

Overseers were thus meant to free owners from the quotidian inconveniences of the
mechanics of production, including discipline. As such, to require owners to adjudicate
disputes between overseers and slaves would be to undermine the power of overseers and
correspondingly burden owners with the very unwanted managerial responsibilities they
were trying to avoid. As Douglass concludes, the preclusion of such informal ‘appeals’
was meant to ensure efficient plantation management: “It would occasion great loss of
time and labor, leaving the overseer in fetters, and without the necessary power to secure
obedience to his orders. A privilege so dangerous as that of appeal, is, therefore strictly
prohibited ; and any one exercising it a fearful hazard” (64).18
This is unsurprising given the economic motivations of slavery.19 As William E.
Wiethoff writes in respect of the role and function of overseers within the mechanics of
plantation production, “By the late 1820s a policy against slave complaints had become
commonplace in plantation management” (135). However, as Wiethoff continues, this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Despite repeatedly noting that the institution of slavery sought to preclude the slave’s right of
“appeal” against overseers, Douglass notes that slaves who managed to make some kind of case
against their treatment could achieve some degree of informal redress: “Nevertheless, when a slave
has nerve enough to exercise it, and boldly approaches his master with a well-founded complaint
against an overseer, though he may be repulsed, and may not even have that of which he complaints
repeated at the time, and though he may be beaten by his master, as well as the overseer, for his
temerity, in the end the policy of complaint is, generally, vindicated by the relaxed rigor of the
overseer’s treatment. The latter becomes more careful, and less disposed to use the last upon such
slaves thereafter” (64). As discussed later in this chapter, the attempt to appeal gave cause for further
discipline against the slave, as ‘appealing’ was wrongdoing in-and-of-itself.
19

For a comprehensive review of how slavery formed the basis for, and refined the techniques of, the
modern capitalist (American) economy, see Edward E. Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told:
Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism. Therein, Baptist explores “The idea that the
commodification and suffering and forced labor of African Americans is what made the United States
powerful and rich…” (xxi).
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refusal to allow slaves recourse to their owner to complain of an overseer’s conduct,
including in respect of allegations of wrongdoing made against them, was also designed
to legitimate the institution of slavery itself:
Unlike the employers and managers of factory workers, slaveowners felt a
duty to justify their business decisions as part of a larger need. They felt
duty-bound to defend a way of life and not merely to make a profit. As a
result they proclaimed “laws” and not merely rules. In a rhetorical parallel
with their legislation, the linguistic tenor of their business politics was
extremely bipolar. At the affirmative pole, planters sought “a perfect
understanding” so that they might manage their work force “absolutely.”
At the negative extreme, slaves were “never” to question their orders.
(136)
Certainly, this demand for slaves’ absolute obedience was made in pursuit of the
economic imperatives of slavery. But it was also crucial to reifying the institution, as
well as the power imbalance within it. In particular, this demand rendered people as
property within the plantation – transforming them into items to be deployed in
furtherance of their owners’ purposes, commercial and otherwise.

Moreover, this

demand for such total and complete slave obedience – or, rather, the unlimited power of
masters – was confirmed at law.

Legal authority: people as property
Later in his life, though while still enslaved, Douglass learns the trade of caulking.
Permitted by his then owner, ‘Master Hugh’, to pursue his own caulking employment
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contracts, Douglass is nonetheless required to provide the bulk of his earnings from those
contracts to Master Hugh. Becoming “…more and more dissatisfied with this state of
things”, Douglass complains of the inherent injustice in forwarding the fruits of his
labour to his owner:
To make a contented slave, you must make a thoughtless one.

It is

necessary to darken his moral and mental vision, as far as possible, to
annihilate his power of reason.

He must be able to detect no

inconsistencies in slavery. The man that takes his earnings, must be able
to convince him that he has a perfect right to do so. It must not depend
upon mere force ; the slave must know no Higher Law than his master’s
will. (233)
To render the slave compliant with the unfair taking of his or her employment earnings
required formulating such taking as correct or proper. But more generally, according to
Douglass, the maintenance or persistence of such an unjust relationship hinged on
extinguishing the slaves’ capacity to question their unjust circumstances. Further, the
slave’s “power of reason” was to be supplanted with his or her owner’s “will”: efforts to
eliminate the slave’s “power of reason” to protest his or her conditions, such as the
refusal to permit appeals to an owner of an overseer’s conduct, were consistent with an
ideology that viewed slaves merely as objects to be circulated within the economy of
slavery. Indeed, formulating slaves as an extension of their master’s will, including in
respect of disciplining slaves, ultimately reflected a conceptual and legal correspondence
between the slave and chattel.20
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Of course, as Douglass writes: “I now saw, in my situation, several points of similarity with that of
the oxen. They were property, so was I ; that they were to be broken and so was I” (155). After all, as
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It is worth noting that the legal notion of “Slaves as ‘chattel’,’ which they were

for most purposes of the time…”, was not uniform or consistent across all states (Morris
61). Specifically, in certain states such as Kentucky, Arkansas, and Louisiana (though
not in Maryland) slaves were conceptualized at law as real estate or real property: “For
one reason or another rules of real property law were applied to slaves in some instances
in over one-third of the jurisdictions that made up the slave South” (Morris 64). While
the distinction within property law between chattels personal and real property was
traceable to the English common law, and carried within it significant legal effects,
ultimately it determined whether the property in issue was movable or not. Defining
slaves as chattel, as in Maryland, meant they were directly the property of their master, as
opposed to merely being an extension of the land he owned (and which the slaves
worked) as in the states where they were defined as real property (Morris 64). As a
result, the distinction was most relevant in disputes pertaining to the disposition of estates
that included slaves. However, as Morris continues, whether conceptualized as real
property or chattel, the fundamental legal status of the slave was an item to be owned21:
Ultimately, of course, whatever rules were applied by statutes or judicial
rulings to slaves, what was crucial was dominion. For this purpose the
concept of property, the notion of a person as a “thing,” was obviously the
central “incident” in slavery. Whether the person was defined as a chattel
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Douglass also notes, slaves were, effectively, chattel: “Horses and men – cattle and women – pigs and
children – all holding the same rank in the scale of social existence… Personality swallowed up in the
sordid idea of property ! Manhood lost in chattelhood!” (128-29).
21

The principle that the slave was in all aspects owned by his or her master – and that there was no
right for slaves beyond the master’s authority – was (legally) determinative of the fact and experience
of enslavement.
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or as realty had no real moral dimension, and it did not raise the status of
the slave.

What it did do was determine what particular legal and

equitable rules, what precise “incidents” of property law, would be used
by judges and chancellors. (80)
While slaves may have been conceptualized as chattel in the majority of states, regardless
of whether they were realty or chattel, to render them in a manner that reflected in all
aspects their master’s complete ownership of them – that is, the effective transformation
of people to property – required a disciplinary apparatus more complicated than that
deployed merely on chattel.
In his remarkable comparative study of slavery, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and
Fall of Slavery in the New World, David Brion Davis notes that the operation of slavery
in the nineteenth-century American South generally required masters to possess unlimited
power over their enslaved, as they would over chattel. Reiterating this ‘chattel principle’
as articulated by slave James W.C. Pennington, Davis writes:
In theory, the Southern slaveholder possessed all the power of any owner
of living chattel property, such as horses, sheep, cows or oxen. We have
seen that Aristotle referred to the ox “as the poor man’s slave”; “the
chattel principle” was probably best defined by the American fugitive
slave James W.C. Pennington:
The being of slavery, its soul and its body, lives and moves in the
chattel principle, the property principle, the bill of sale principle;
the cart-whip starvation, and nakedness, are its inevitable
consequences…. You cannot constitute slavery without the chattel
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principle – and with the chattel principle you cannot save it from
these results. Talk about kind and Christian masters. They are not
masters of the system. The system is master of them. (Inhuman
193)22

However, as Davis continues, “In practice it proved impossible to treat human beings as
no more than possessions or as the mere instruments of an owner’s will, though attempts
to do so were often made, as many former slaves recounted” (194). It was practically
impossible, then, to establish and maintain control over slaves on the fundamental
premise they were chattel lacking volition or intention. Accordingly, the mechanics of
slave discipline required legal regulation more complex than would be necessary if
humans could in fact have been treated as mere chattel.
This difficulty in attempting “… to reduce a human being to salable chattel is
what…” Davis identifies as “the basic ‘problem of slavery’” (Inhuman 35). Like Berlin,
Davis defines the ongoing struggle between slave and master for control over the slave’s
being as definitive of slavery. But for Davis, the struggle (and ultimate inability) to
transform people into property – the source of the “paradox” underpinning enslavement –
lies in the fact that human dignity cannot be extinguished (Inhuman 35). Efforts made to
annihilate the slave’s will or reason were doomed to fail, according to Berlin and Davis,
because of the slave’s enduring dignity. Similarly, in his comparative study of slavery,
Slavery and Social Death, and in relation to Douglass, Orlando Patterson offers a
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As Walter Johnson argues, Pennington’s notion of ‘the chattel principle’ was that the institution of
slavery was organized around the auction block: “Pennington, that is, figured the relation of the slave
trade to the rest of slavery in a way that was both spatial and temporal: the trade was a means of
spreading slavery over space and (adversely) transforming it over time. The trade, he argued, was a
passageway from slavery’s present to its future” (Future Store 1).

!

49

definition of slavery that emphasizes that enslavement required a refusal to recognize the
dignity of the slave: “slavery is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated
and generally dishonored persons” (13).23 It is the ruthless, perpetual, and systematic
dishonouring of individuals that defines enslavement for Patterson. Thus for Berlin,
Davis, Patterson, and others, dignity or honour is an essential aspect of individual
identity, slave or otherwise, and the institutionalized refusal to recognize that aspect of
identity is a constitutive component of enslavement.24
Whether it was dignity or honour in slaves that was irrepressible such that it led to
disobedience or even slave resistance, there was undeniably in slaves a volition and
capacity to act contrary to masters’ orders that distinguished them from other property,
including chattel. As Davis continues:
Although a slave is supposed to be treated like a dog, horse, or ox, as
reflected in all the laws that define the slave as a chattel or thing, the same
laws have had to recognize that slaves run away, rebel, murder, rape, steal,
divulge revolts, and help protect the state from external danger. (Inhuman
35)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23

To be clear, this is a preliminary definition of slavery offered by Patterson, though the remainder of
Slavery and Social Death is devoted to developing that definition. For Patterson, slaves are best
conceptualized most appropriately as dishonoured individuals, who become property. Their key status
is that they are excluded – alienated – from the rights and rites of society generally, and are thus
available to become human property. For Patterson, slaves are present in social sphere but absent
from participation therein. They are socially dead.
24

I do not mean to suggest that dignity and honour are equivalent, though they are obviously related.
The notion of dignity, as I understand its use in the work of Berlin and Davis, refers to the drive for
recognition – a sense of self that merits esteem and correspondingly refuses to be owned. Honour, as I
understand its use in Patterson, includes dignity but also invokes the forms of its (precluded or
refused) recognition. As I discuss later, this suggests an affinity between the legal positions of the
criminal and the slave.
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The maintenance of slavery thus had to grapple with and respond to the fact that slaves
were human and capable of human actions. Further, slaveowners would have been
confronted with the fact of that humanity in their daily encounters and exchanges with
slaves, including in the form of miscegenous relationships. But with few exceptions, the
nature of that legally recognized slave humanity was criminal – contraventions of the
general law of Douglass’s “society” – that could not remain unaddressed within the legal
order.25
Thus, although chattel (or some other species of property) at law, there were
moments when the slave was legally recognized as human. As Hartman writes, these
moments were ones of slave criminality:
Not surprisingly, the agency of the enslaved is only intelligible or
recognizable as crime and the designation of personhood burdened with
incredible duties and responsibilities that serve to enhance the repressive
mechanisms of power, denote the limits of socially tolerable forms of
violence, and intensify and legitimate violence in the guise of protection,
justice, and the reconfiguration of slave humanity. (62)
The recognition of slave criminality – even though it served to legitimize the deployment
of disciplinary power, including in respect of slavery – paradoxically re-signified the
slave as a person, including at law. Indeed, this notion of slave agency, particularly for
wrongdoing, rendered slaves fundamentally and legally different from other forms of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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There were, of course, other recognitions of slave humanity that did not turn on criminality.
Certainly, there were miscegenous relationships, consensual and non-consensual, between white male
slaveowners and black female slaves. Davis also notes that “Virtually every slaveholding state has
had to arm slaves, no matter how reluctantly, in times of crisis” (Inhuman 35). The key point,
however, is that overwhelmingly it was largely in criminality that a slave was legally recognized as
human.
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property. In particular, despite not obtaining any legal benefits of personhood, slaves
were nonetheless held legally accountable as people for their wrongdoing. As Mark V.
Tushnet writes “Everywhere in the slave South, the law imposed criminal liability on
slaves for their actions, justifying this by noting that slaves were human beings with all
the moral responsibility any human being would have” (Slave Law 14).26 Conversely,
despite such legal (and social) recognition of slave humanity or personhood within the
discourse of criminal law and responsibility, little legal recourse existed for slaves to
protect them as people from the abuse of masters, as victims of criminal conduct.
Emphasizing that blacks, whether enslaved or free, lacked protection from
criminal activity perpetrated against them by whites, Randall Kennedy notes that such
absence of legal protection was integral to the subordination of blacks. As Kennedy
writes:
Part of the strategy for denigrating all blacks involved depriving them of
legal protections against conduct that was deemed criminal when visited
upon whites. Hence, in the slave South (the locus of the great mass of the
black population in antebellum America), officials decriminalized
violence inflicted upon blacks to the extent thought necessary to assert and
preserve white supremacy. (Race, Crime 30)
This failure to protect blacks from criminal activity was stretched to its extreme within
the slaveowning relationship as “Throughout the antebellum period, the law shielded
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As Tushnet continues, “Treating slaves as human beings for purposes of holding slaves liable for
the crimes they committed was easy enough, but what about crimes committed against slaves?” (Slave
Law 14). As I discuss, there were legislative restraints against masters. However, given the legal
impediments against slave testimony, as well as an overriding judicial commitment to buttressing
master’s authority, prosecuting instances of crimes against slaves were difficult even when pursued.
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slaveowners from criminal liability for killing a slave if death resulted from violence
administered for the purpose of subduing resistance or imposing discipline” (Kennedy
Race, Crime 30). The legalities of slavery permitted such abusive conduct, identifying it
as necessary discipline for slave wrongdoing. According to Andrew Fede:
The late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century law increased the
scope of white civil liability and criminal liability for slave abuse.
Nevertheless, even this law had a legitimizing effect; it continued to
decriminalize white violence that would have been criminal at common
law, to the extent that the violence at issue was thought to be a
“necessary” or “ordinary” incident of slavery. (61)
By allowing what would otherwise be criminal conduct to discipline slaves, the law
ensured the subjugation of slaves to the unimpeachable authority of mastery.
In My Bondage, Douglass provides a number of anecdotes to establish abuse or
even murder of slaves was not punishable in any legal or even informal way. For
example, noting, “… that killing a slave, or any colored person, in Talbot county,
Maryland, is not treated as a crime, either by the courts or the community,” Douglass
writes of a Mr. Thomas who escaped legal censure after he killed two slaves, one of
whom he “butchered with a hatchet, by knocking his brains out” (94). Douglass further
writes that he had observed Mr. Thomas boasting of these actions, “… saying, among
other things, that he was the only benefactor of his country in the company, and that
when ‘others would do as much as he had done, we should be relieved of the d----d
niggers” (94). This is not to suggest that there was no possibility of legal redress for the
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abuse of slaves. But, as Douglass makes clear, even when community consensus pushed
for legal sanctions for slave abuse, the legal system typically failed to prosecute.
“As an evidence of the reckless disregard of human life – where the life is that of
a slave”, Douglass provides an anecdote wherein the wife of slaveowner Mr. Giles Hicks
murdered Douglass’s wife’s cousin, “a young girl between fifteen and sixteen years of
age” (94). Angered by the girl’s failure to awake in the night to attend to the Hicks’
crying baby, Hicks’ wife murdered and subsequently mutilated the girl’s face. She also
took great pains to bury the girl. Eventually, a coroner’s jury was empanelled, and it was
determined that the girl had been beaten to death by being clubbed with firewood while
she slept. While Douglass is clear that the brutal murder of the girl did cause concern
through the community, he also notes that Hicks’ wife wholly avoids any legal sanction:
I will not say that this most horrid murder produced no sensation in the
community. It did produce a sensation ; but, incredible to tell, the moral
sense of the community was blunted too entirely by the ordinary nature of
slavery horrors, to bring the murderess to punishment. A warrant was
issued for her arrest, but, for some reason or other, that warrant was never
served. Thus did Mrs. Hicks not only escape condign punishment, but
even the pain and mortification of being arraigned before a court of
justice. (95)
Notwithstanding what appears from Douglass’s anecdote to be at least some pressure
from the community to punish the girl’s murder, the legal system fails, or refuses, to
pursue Hicks’ wife.
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Community recognition of a slave’s humanity – whether by way of legal

sanctions that sought to punish slaves’ criminal behaviour or more generally social
concern that they not be abused by their owners – did little to mitigate the repressive
understanding at law that slaves were property. As Fede frames this issue: “… one must
acknowledge that the logic of slave law was the logic of absolute legal oppression of one
person over another. By defining slaves as property, the law stripped slaves of all legal
rights” (10). In fact, the law served to doubly subordinate slaves by holding them
accountable for crimes against society, all the while maintaining them as property of their
masters and bereft of protection from them. As Fede continues:
The concomitant definition of slaves as persons for other purposes was
necessary and it accomplished two ends not inconsistent with this
paramount aim. First, it protected the public interest and the owner’s
interest, and second, it burdened slaves with special legal duties and
obligations that marked the complete oppression of the system.
Consequently, the law created legal duties in slaves while it denied slaves’
legal rights. This is the despotism of the slavery relationship expressed in
legal terms. (10)
At all turns, the slave’s legal identity as property was confirmed, even in moments when
it ought to have been disrupted by the slave’s undeniable humanity. Whether holding
slaves accountable as human perpetrators of criminal conduct, or refusing to recognize
them as human victims of criminal conduct, at all points the legal subordination of slaves
to their masters was reinforced. This was even the case when instances of slave abuse
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were actively prosecuted, as opposed to merely acknowledged within the broader
community but legally ignored.
This tension at law between enabling or ensuring mastery and protecting the
enslaved from abuses of that mastery, was importantly explored in the 1829 North
Carolina Supreme Court decision of State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263. Briefly, the white John
Mann had been accused of criminally abusing Lydia, a slave he did not own but had hired
as labour. At trial, Mann’s defence was that Lydia had not followed his orders and, in her
refusal to submit to his disciplinary authority, her conduct merited his shooting and
wounding her. Finding that Mann’s actions extended beyond any reasonable response to
Lydia’s conduct, the jury in the trial at the lower court found Mann guilty of assault and
battery and he was fined five dollars. Mann appealed the trial court’s decision.
The appellate court’s ruling has interested scholars of slavery because of its clear
elucidation of the fundamental principles of slavery, as well as the court’s ambivalence in
uttering them.27 Overturning the trial court’s decision on the principle that masters could
not be legally sanctioned for actions against their own slaves, Judge Ruffin found, for the
majority, that the contractual relations of temporary ownership, such as Mann’s interest
in Lydia, cannot efface this fundamental principle.

Reasoning that the culturally

“established habits and uniform practice of the country,” for better or worse confirm
slavery’s legitimacy, Judge Ruffin notes that for the institution of slavery in all its forms
and expressions:
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The scholarly significance of the Mann decision is explained by Tushnet: “Scholars have been
intrigued by State v. Mann because Judge Ruffin’s opinion brings into view a large number of issues
that have broad significance for understanding not merely Southern law but Southern slavery and even
law itself” (Slave Law 38).
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The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety ; the
subject, one doomed in his own person and his posterity, to live without
knowledge and without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil
that another may reap the fruits… Such obedience is the consequence
only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which
can operate to produce the effect.

The power of the master must be

absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect. (266 emphasis
added)
Determining, then, that it was necessary to the maintenance of slavery to refuse to find
Mann guilty of excessive abuse, Judge Ruffin held that the very essence of slavery must
be the master’s unlimited dominion over the slave. As a consequence, failure to maintain
the complete “submission of the slave” at all times could only lead to a breakdown of
slavery – the result of which would be the subversion of the institution.28
Importantly, one aspect of the Mann decision is Judge Ruffin’s articulation of the
inherent unjustness and cruelty of the master-slave relationship and the power dynamic it
exemplifies.

In response to the need for absolute mastery to maintain slavery, he

observes:
I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition. I feel
it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every
person in his retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of
things, it must be so. There is no remedy. The discipline belongs to the
state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the
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See William Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice (1853), 122-127, for an
illustration of the “Unlimited Power of Slaveholders” (107).
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rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. (266
emphasis added)

Recognizing, then, that while immorality may define slavery, the Court noted that its
practical continuation necessarily calls for a legal confirmation of the propriety or
correctness of such immorality. This immorality, which cannot be undone given the fact
of slavery’s existence, “…constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and free
portions of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave” (26667). In Mann’s refusal to extend to slaves legal protection from abuse by those who have
some property interest in them, courts were held to not be able to properly intervene in
the relationship between master and slave for to do so would completely undermine the
essence of mastery, which is that the master’s necessary right to final determinations
concerning the slave’s being because the slave is his property. For the Court, the point
was not simply to articulate the institutional necessity of mastery’s rights over slaves, but
also to articulate the only model of slave subordination that could justify and perpetuate
slavery.
In his reasoning, Judge Ruffin’s refusal to criminalize Mann’s abuse of Lydia
demonstrates how the disciplinary apparatus of slavery hinged on a silencing of the slave.
As Judge Ruffin reasoned, to eliminate the slave’s claim of legal protection first requires
eliminating the possibility of recognizing the slave as a legal subject with rights that
extend beyond her master’s will: “We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought
into the discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made
sensible that there is no appeal from his master; that his power is in no instance usurped;
but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God” (267). It is through
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this fundamental denial of recourse to an authority beyond the master that the
“submission” and “obedience” of the slave are rendered “perfect”. Put another way, the
“perfection” of slavery was achieved by rendering slaves silent within the effort to
transform them into property.
As “North Carolina had no protective statute” the Mann decision represents the
reasoning whereby it fell exclusively to “the authority of the courts to uphold indictments
of slaveowners for a common law assault and battery or cruelty as an offense contra
bonos mores” (Morris 190).29 Like North Carolina, Maryland also did not possess any
statutory protections for slaves from the abuse of masters and, to that extent, Mann
provides some context for the legal climate in which Douglass found himself. It is worth
noting that those states that lacked statutory protection for slaves were the minority as
“Most jurisdictions, however, adopted laws, if at all, to punish masters criminally for
cruelty or inhumanity” (Morris 183). However, even in those states that possessed
protective legislation for slaves, and where prosecutions of abusive masters were
pursued, given that mastery was considered and legally treated as absolute it remained
difficult to prosecute masters absent their having taken shocking, non-disciplinary action.
As Kennedy notes, “Although courts did find on occasion that masters committed crimes
by killing slaves, such instances were notably rare. To be convicted, a master had to do
something that was egregiously cruel even by the highly permissive standards of the
slave regime” (Race, Crime 30-31).30
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Of course, as Morris notes, even in those states that did possess some ostensible legislative
protection for slaves from their masters, any claim for protection by the law was necessarily impeded
by “… a serous evidentiary problem. Slaves could not testify against their masters” (184).
30

Kennedy explains: “The law governing other sorts of violence against slaves mirrored the evolution
of the law governing homicide. Over time, slaves were accorded increasing protections against
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This ultimately legal presumption of the master’s absolute disciplinary power

(which, as unchecked, carried with it a presumption of slave wrongdoing) manifested
itself in procedural obstacles that rendered legal remedies for their abuse at the hands of
their masters beyond the reach of slaves. In particular, in trials of slave abuse, slaves
were disallowed from providing any evidence of the alleged abuse, the effect of which
was to treat them as having in fact committed some wrongdoing and were thus deserving
of the abuse they suffered.31 For example, in relation to South Carolina, which did
possess slave protection legislation, Morris notes that although courts and legislators
were aware that precluding slave testimony could result in further slave abuse,
particularly as plantations were distant from one another and a white person may not have
observed the abuse (and therefore be available to testify on behalf of the slave), slaves
were not permitted to provide evidence against their owners (184). Ultimately, however,
this absence of slave testimony – the slave’s legal silence in respect of allegations of
being abused – effectively operated to confirm the correctness or legitimacy of the
abusive actions.!
Perhaps because they were precluded from testifying, but nonetheless
surprisingly, the evidentiary gap created by the absence of the slave’s testimony as to the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
nonfatal assaults. Slaves even received additional protection against sadistic owners; several states
eventually passed laws prohibiting masters from inflicting ‘cruel or unusual’ punishments upon slaves.
Like the law of homicide, however, the law of assault and battery deprived slaves of the protections
accorded to whites” (Race Crime 32-33).
31

As Douglass notes in respect of his master – Master Hugh – seeking prosecution against men who
had assaulted Douglass in front of only blacks, “But [Esquire] Watson insisted that he was not
authorized to do anything, unless white witnesses of the transaction would come forward, and testify
to what had taken place. He could issue no warrant on my word, against white persons ; and, if I had
been killed in the presence of a thousand blacks, their testimony, combined, would have been
insufficient to arrest a single murderer. Master Hugh, for once, was compelled to say, that this state of
things was too bad ; and he left the office of the magistrate, disgusted” (231).
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alleged abuse was filled by presuming the abuse actually happened.32 As Morris writes:
“This [evidentiary] difficulty was dealt with by reversing what is today a benchmark of
Anglo-American criminal justice – the presumption of innocence. The rule was that the
white in charge of a slave who had been abused would be presumed guilty of the offence”
(184). However, as Morris continues, this presumption of guilt was so easily refuted by
the slaveowner that it was effectively immediately reversible: “… the presumption of [the
owner’s] guilt would be nullified by the owner’s oath [to the contrary]” (184). Unless a
slave, who could not testify, could provide “… two white witnesses [who] offered ‘clear
proof’ of the owner’s guilt”, the owner “… would be discharged…” of the claim of abuse
(Morris 184). Accordingly, on the mere testimony of the owner – who may or may not
have witnessed the abuse, and in the absence of any evidence from the slave – the slave
was determined to have behaved in a manner that merited the abuse.

Denied any

meaningful opportunity to rebut the claim, the slave was thus legally determined to have
committed some wrongdoing.
Importantly, the legal framework authorizing the discipline of slaves occasionally
reflected contradictory aims as, throughout the nineteenth century, laws were at times
implemented to restrict or limit masters’ disciplinary power over slaves. But as Davis
notes, whatever the respective legislative intentions may have been, such legal
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In relation to the legal ‘rights’ of slaves (or absence thereof), Kennedy makes the important
qualification that: “The formalities of law should not be confused with what actually happens. Just
because the legal order gave whites, particularly owners, broad leeway to brutalize slaves without fear
of prosecution and punishment does not mean that whites characteristically did so. There were, after
all, forms of social control other than law which regulated whites’ behavior. These included
conscience, regard for reputation, a desire to protect economic investment, and a sense that the overall
protection of the slave system was best accomplished by showing slaves that the master class had a
sense of honor” (Race Crime 33-34).

!

61

restrictions on masters ultimately did not guarantee protection or even ensure survival for
slaves:
By the nineteenth century state laws were supposed to protect slaves from
murder and mutilation. They set minimal standards for food, clothing, and
shelter. They also prohibited masters from teaching slaves to read or from
allowing slaves to carry firearms or roam about the countryside. They
increasingly restricted or in effect prohibited manumission. (Inhuman 193
emphasis added)
Moreover, to the extent slaves’ humanity problematized their legal status as chattel, such
humanity had no positive impact on slaves’ lives. Rather it only provided an opportunity
to legitimate or justify masters’ authority over slaves by authorizing slave discipline as a
constitutive element of slavery. As Morris continues, “These slave codes acknowledged
that bondsmen were human beings who were capable of plotting, stealing, fleeing, or
rebelling, and who were likely to be a less “troublesome property” if well cared for under
a program of strict discipline” (193-94). While slave codes and laws regulating slavery
often appeared on their face to provide some protection to slaves, the disciplinary powers
of masters was effectively unlimited.
Crucially, as articulated in the Mann decision, even when the evidence supported
a finding of abuse, the maintenance of slavery required the legal order to refuse to limit
the scope of masters’ disciplinary authority. This legal allowance of masters’ unlimited
power over their enslaved permitted and authorized masters to discipline slaves as they
alone saw fit. And the inability of slaves to appeal to any extra-plantation authority –
which resonated on the plantation as slaves could not appeal overseers’ conduct to
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slaveowners – was crucial to perfecting this disciplinary power. Essential, then, to the
exercise or deployment of that disciplinary power across all forums was the presumption
of slave wrongdoing.

Presuming slave wrongdoing on the plantation and beyond
In one particularly chilling episode during his time on Col. Lloyd’s plantation,
Douglass writes of the murder of a fellow slave named Denby.33 Working under the
overseer Mr. Gore, who “with the malign and tyrannical qualities of an overseer…
combined something of the lawful master… [and] could torture the slightest work or look
into impudence,” Douglass writes that both Lloyd and Gore were adamant about the need
to demonstrate their authority to ensure the obedience of plantation slaves (91). Knowing
only that Denby offended the overseer Gore in some way, Douglass relays Denby’s
demise. Observing that one day Denby broke away from Gore after Gore administered
“but few stripes” as punishment for his offence, Douglass writes that Denby refused to
return to Gore and endure the rest of his punishment (92). As a result, “It is said that
Gore gave Denby three calls, telling that if he did not obey the last call, he would shoot
him. When the third call was given, Denby stood his ground firmly ; and this raised the
question in the minds of the by-standing slaves – ‘will he dare to shoot?’” (92). The
tragic conclusion of Denby’s resistance to discipline is, of course, his death. After
refusing to exit the creek in which he had taken refuge from Gore’s discipline, “Gore shot
him dead !” (92). While Denby’s murder demonstrates a particularly gruesome example
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Also called “Demby” throughout.
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of the brutality of slavery, it also illustrates how slave discipline functioned to concretize
the power imbalance and corresponding property relations constituting slavery.
In stating that “A thrill of horror flashed through every soul on the plantation”
upon hearing of Denby’s murder, Douglass notes that Gore – who was in the employment
of Denby’s owner Col. Lloyd – was “arraigned” by Col. Lloyd to explain Denby’s death
(93). In his defence, Gore argued that he ultimately had no choice but to kill Denby, for
to allow Denby to live after his explicit public disobedience would be to invite plantation
disorder. Douglass writes that Gore “… argued, that if one slave refused to be corrected,
and was allowed to escape with his life, when he had been told that he should lose it if he
persisted in his course, the other slaves would soon copy his example” (93). In his
confrontation with Denby, Gore’s continuing authority as overseeing manager of the
plantation thus hinged on making an example of Denby to the witnessing slaves.34
Specifically, as exemplified by Gore, to develop a seamless presentation of authority that
in itself would dissuade slave disobedience would require those with the ability to
discipline to do so as they see fit.35 According to Douglass, slave discipline required
adherence “… to the maxim, practically maintained by slaveholders, that it is better that a
dozen slaves suffer under the lash, without fault, than that the master or the overseer
should seem to have been wrong in the presence of the slave” (91). Essential, then, to
this formulation of mastery is that the authority of the master (or his representative) is
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Publically punishing a slave to demonstrate authority was a common plantation disciplinary
technique. As Douglass writes: “It is quite usual to make one slave the object of especial abuse, and
to beat him often, with a view to its effect upon others, rather than with any expectation that the slave
whipped will be improved by it…” (192).
35

As Hartman writes, “In these instances, the exercise of power was inseparable from its display
because domination depended upon demonstrations of the slaveholder’s dominion and the captive’s
abasement. The owner’s display of mastery was just as important as the legal title to slave property.
In other words, representing power was essential to reproducing domination” (7).
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beyond reproach and cannot be incorrectly applied. And as a necessary consequence or
effect of that irreproachable authority slaves were constantly at risk of being found guilty
of some infraction, whether real or imagined.
Pleading “that cowardly alarm-cry that the slaves would ‘take the place,’” Gore
takes the position that failing to kill Denby after threatening to do so would invariably
subvert the entire slave order, “the result of which would be the freedom of the slaves,
and the enslavement of the whites” (93).

Evoking the racialized organization of

plantation slavery, Gore argues that any faltering in the twinned ideological production of
slave wrongdoing/unimpeachable mastery would lead to social disorder. Of course, the
continued subordination of slaves required that mastery in all its forms consistently be
presented as a rigid racial distinction between the (black) enslaved and their (white)
masters.

But as plantation overseer, Gore’s relationship to the ownership rights

underpinning slavery exposes the institution’s investment in the public disciplining of
slaves: the implementation of a uniform disciplinary system among the multiple levels of
authority within slavery, required actively precluding slaves from appealing to one
“master” concerning their treatment at the hands of another. And in disabling slaves
from presenting and protesting within slavery their individual experiences of
mistreatment they were effectively silenced.36 Crucially, for Douglass, such silencing
turned largely on the slave’s assumed or presumed wrongdoing.
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As Jeannine DeLombard explains in respect of the inability to prosecute Gore’s actions as they were
witnessed only by slaves who could not testify: “The enforced silence of the slave witnesses means
that, just as the material evidence of Gore’s crime is rendered invisible by the physical setting in
which it occurs… any testimony evidence of Demby’s murder is similarly effaced by the legal
environment of the South, in which white violence is sanctioned by mandatory black silence” (262).
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As Douglass writes, establishing after discipline that a slave misbehaved was

easily accomplished, particularly as the slave was already presumed to have committed
some wrong:
The slave is sometimes whipped into the confession of offenses which he
never committed. The reader will see that the good old rule – “a man is to
be held innocent until proved to be guilty” – does not hold good on the
slave plantation.

Suspicion and torture are the approved methods of

getting at the truth, here. (203)
However, in addition to being presumed to have committed some wrong, slaves found
any action could be construed as misconduct deserving discipline. As Douglass also
notes:
The man, unaccustomed to slaveholding, would be astonished to observe
how many floggable offenses there are in the slaveholder’s catalogue of
crimes ; and how easy it is to commit any one of them, even when the
slave least intends to it. A slaveholder, bent on finding fault, will hatch up
a dozen a day, if he chooses to do so, and each one of these shall be of a
punishable description. (190)
While this presumption or deeming of slave misconduct legitimated the discipline slaves
received, it also precluded the ability for slaves to argue innocence in relation to such
charges of wrongdoing.

As noted above, both informal and formal appeals of

punishment were disallowed. However, as Douglass continues, the combined effect of
this unlimited power over the slave and the presumption of the slave’s wrongdoing, was
that the very attempt of the slave to establish his or her innocence in relation to

!

66

allegations of wrongdoing was in-and-of-itself an offence. Put another way, there can be
no ‘innocent’ slave.
As Douglass continues to catalogue the various slave actions that may be deemed
misconduct, he notes the slave’s attempt to declare his innocence in response to false
charges is, in fact, one of the greatest slave crimes in slaveholding society:
Does he ever venture to vindicate his conduct, when harshly and unjustly
accused ? Then, he is guilty of impudence, one of the greatest crimes in
the social catalogue of southern society. To allow a slave to escape
punishment, which has impudently attempted to exculpate himself from
unjust charges, preferred against him by some white person, is to be guilty
of a great dereliction of duty. (190)
But the ‘crime’ of impudence was not limited merely to the advancement of protestations
of innocence. Rather, as Douglass writes, it was a ‘catch-all’ offence, that reflected
masters’ capricious determinations of wrongdoing. Whether aware or not, at any time a
slave could be found to have been ‘impudent’ – to have been deemed to have committed
wrongdoing and thereby properly disciplined.
Focussing on an incident he observed early in his time at Col. Lloyd’s plantation
– the whipping of a woman named Nelly – Douglass writes that:
The offense alleged against Nelly, was one of the commonest and most
indefinite in the whole catalogue of offenses usually laid to the charge of
slaves, viz : “impudence.” This may mean almost anything, or nothing at
all, just according to the caprice of the master or overseer, at the moment.
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But whatever it is, or is not, if it gets the name of “impudence,” the party
charged with it is sure of a flogging. (70)

Determining that to the extent “impudence” can be understood Nelly was guilty of it,
Douglass writes “This offense may be committed in various ways ; in the tone of an
answer ; in answering at all ; in not answering ; in the expression of countenance ; in the
motion of the head ; in the gait, manner and bearing of the slave” (70). Caught in an
impossible position whereby their very existence on the plantation could merit
punishment, slaves were subjected to the “caprice” of their owners whom exercised their
right to flog and assault their slaves as they saw fit.37 Discipline for impudence then
enabled the master to punish the slave without any predetermined or knowable cause –
that is, to punish the slave for being a slave – thereby requiring the slave to internalize
through self-vigilance the master’s incontestable disciplinary will. And this marking of
black slaves as consistently guilty or always potentially guilty of some wrongdoing
served to reify their circulation as objects within slavery.
In relation to his autobiography’s pivotal moment – his physical resistance to
abuse from an overseer – Douglass illustrates how the mere accusation of disobedience
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Punishing ‘impudence’ is really about punishing the agency – the humanity – of slaves. That
agency is simply formulated in terms of wrongdoing or criminality, which is not surprising since it
permits a conceptual reconciliation of the slave’s legal status of property with his or her criminal
liability. In this sense, it may be useful to think about it in relation to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.
The key difference, as Leonard Cassuto notes, is that “Unlike Hegel’s bondsman, the American slave
was held captive by a doctrine of black inferiority that encompassed his entire existence. The law
held that whites could never be enslaved… the American system… held a slave regardless of the work
that he did – or did not do – for his master” (241-42). Accordingly, the slave’s intentional move to
crime is the reciprocal or corresponding movement within the dialectic – a recognition of his or her
status as object and embracing, by way of criminality, the only opportunity to force a recognition from
the master of the slave’s agency. As Costas Douzinas notes, crime and criminality are essential to the
unfolding of “the law from abstract right to morality and eventually to the ethical state and
solidarity… [insofar as]… the essence of crime is the criminal’s demand to be recognized and to be
respected as a concrete and unique individual against the uniform coercion of the legal system (27677).
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functioned to silence slaves, thereby transforming them effectively into property. 38
Treated particularly poorly by the overseer Covey, to whom his legal owner Capt. Auld
had temporarily provided him as labour, Douglass notes that he was incapable of
protesting to Auld how Covey had been mistreating him. Focussing on what he believed
to be unjust beatings by Covey – ostensibly punishment for Douglass’s alleged laziness
and defiance – Douglass is clear that Auld would not intervene on his behalf:
He [Auld] first walked the floor, apparently much agitated by my story ,
and the sad spectacle I presented ; but, presently . it was his turn to talk.
He began moderately, by finding excuses for Covey, and ending with a
full justification of him, and passionate condemnation of me. “He had no
doubt I deserved the flogging. He did not believe I was sick ; I was only
endeavoring to get rid of work. My dizziness was laziness, and Covey did
right to flog me, as he had done.” (168)
Assuming that Covey’s accusation of Douglass’s laziness was merited, Auld refuses to
speak to Covey on Douglass’s behalf. However, in addition to presuming the correctness
of Covey’s actions, Auld also refuses to interfere in Covey’s temporary mastery over
Douglass.
As Douglass continues, “After thus fairly annihilating me, and rousing himself by
his own eloquence, he fiercely demanded what I wished him to do in the case !” (168).
Incapable or unwilling to consider that Douglass had been victimized by a mistaken or
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Specifically in respect of the master-slave dialectic, Margaret Kohn notes that Douglass’s
willingness to fight for freedom rendered him free, even if he legally was not: “In choosing to risk
death rather than endure bondage, Douglass felt himself to be free, even though he had not yet escaped
from slavery… Douglass had no reason to believe his physical condition would improve by fighting
back, yet he nevertheless chose to risk his life rather than be subject to ‘brutification,’ Of course, the
victory against Covey did not win Douglass his freedom; he was still a slave. But he gained selfrespect and recognition and thereby set in motion a process which culminated in his freedom” (504).
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cruel “slave employer,” given Covey’s allegations of insubordination Douglass’s
protestations to the contrary are irrelevant for Auld (169). Indeed, as Douglass notes,
mastery hinged on the presumption of the slave’s wrongdoing: “The guilt of a slave is
always, and everywhere, presumed ; and the innocence of the slaveholder or the slave
employer, is always asserted” (168-69).

Moreover, as is established in Douglass’s

narrative, any efforts by a slave to assert his or her innocence – the very attempt to be
acquitted of the presumption of wrongdoing – is in-and-of-itself wrongdoing to be
punished.
In response to Auld’s presumption that Douglass must have committed some
misconduct to necessitate Covey’s discipline, Douglass writes that any rebuttal or
assertion to the contrary would have been impudence and would have led to further
punishment:
With such a complete knock-down to all my hopes, as he had given me,
and feeling, as I did, my entire subject to his power, I had very little heart
to reply. I must not affirm my innocence of the allegations which he had
piled up against me ; for that would be impudence, and would probably
call down fresh violence as well as wrath upon me. (168)
Squeezed, then, into a situation whereby the accusation of wrongdoing operated as the
determination of wrongdoing, Douglass explains how the presumption of guilt extended
beyond the adjudication of slave complaints. Because the charge and determination of
impudence attached to the slave’s denial of wrongdoing, the slave’s abilities to express
him or herself were necessarily and severely restricted within slavery. As Douglass
writes, no punishment for impudence was typically necessary to quiet the slave. Rather,
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the knowledge that impudence warranted punishment was enough to effectively present
slaves from defending themselves. As such, when confronted with an accusation, and
inevitable presumption, that a slave had been disobedient, “The word of the slave, against
this presumption, is generally treated as impudence. ‘Do you contradict me, you rascal ?’
is a finer silencer of counter statements from the lips of a slave” (Douglass 169).
That the guilt of slaves extended beyond a mere presumption, and was in fact
produced by slaveholders, identifies the importance of slave guilt or wrongdoing to the
administration of plantation slavery. And that charges, such as impudence, however illdefined or malleable, ever needed to accompany a master’s incontestable right to punish
his slaves, suggests a desire to rectify a fundamental inability to legitimize discipline
within slavery.

Accusing slaves of the overdetermined charge of impudence, for

example, allowed slaveholders to publicly exemplify, and reify the force of, their
authority. And, as such, plantation administration refused the humanity of slaves to
render them property. This practice and legal principle of refusing to permit slaves to
advance claims of innocence in response to allegations of wrongdoing in and out of the
courtroom, expanded and culminated in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which effectively
presumed blacks to have illegally conducted themselves in contravening it.
Signed into law in 1850, the Fugitive Slave Act ensured slavery became a federal,
inescapable responsibility.39 Specifically, it enabled slave states to extend slaveowner
rights into non-slave states by permitting the retrieval and return of slaves who had
escaped to non-slave states. The Act’s procedure for collecting and returning fugitive
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The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was distinguishable from the earlier 1793 version in that it did not
allow states to pass legislation to preserve or protect the freedom of allegedly fugitive slaves. As a
result, slavery – or more precisely its effect – was wholly pervasive.
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slaves to their owners was rather straightforward: it empowered commissioners of the
federal court, or those vested with the same authority, to issue a warrant that permitted
detention and return of an individual to an owner-claimant who could prove the detained
individual was in fact his fugitive slave. And establishing that the allegedly fugitive
slave was the claimant’s property was remarkably simple. An affidavit filed with the
court in the claimant’s home state describing the slave was required by a federal
commissioner and, if satisfied the description matched the captured individual, the
federal commissioner authorized the return of the fugitive slave to the claimant.
In the context of the Fugitive Slave Act the threshold for claiming an individual as
property was thus surprisingly low. As provided in articles 9 and 10 of the Act, an
individual could be found in violation of the Act on the bare claim of a slaveowner
presented merely by affidavit filed in another state. Moreover, under the Act, there was
no opportunity available to the individual claimed as a fugitive slave to rebut such a
claim as section 6 of the Act refused the admissibility of evidence or submissions from
the allegedly fugitive slave in respect of the claim.40 As a result, the “prima facie
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Article 6 of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act provided: “And be it further enacted, That when a person
held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has heretofore or shall hereafter
escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service
or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized, by power of attorney, in
writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court of the State or
Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person, either by
procuring a warrant from some one of the courts, judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper
circuit, district, or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing
and arresting such fugitive, where the same can be done without process, and by taking, or causing
such person to be taken, forthwith before such court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to
hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof being
made, by deposition or affidavit, in writing, to be taken and certified by such court, judge, or
commissioner, or by other satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate,
justice of the peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath and take depositions under
the laws of the State or Territory from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped,
with a certificate of such magistracy or other authority, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper court
or officer thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the competency of the proof, and
with proof, also by affidavit, of the identity of the person whose service or labor is claimed to be due

!

72

evidence [from the owner claimant] would be sufficient to enslave an accused fugitive”
(Basinger 324).
This impermissibility of slave testimony was only one of a number of procedural
rights refused to slaves claimed under the Act. As succinctly noted by James Oliver
Horton and Lois E. Horton, “The rights and protections of those accused of being
fugitives were further reduced by denying them the right to speak in their own defense,
by making no provision for habeas corpus, and by not requiring that they be represented
by counsel or receive a jury trial” (145). Thus, as a compromise between the North and
the South as to the national significance and rights of slaveholders the Act was
remarkably effective, at the cost of the fugitive’s rights of course. Jeffrey Schmitt
summarizes the lack of procedural safeguards for those accused of contravening the Act
as follows:
The Fugitive Slave Act met southern demands so effectively that it denied
alleged fugitives the traditional legal protections afforded to other northern
citizens and thus essentially create a presumption of slavery in the North.
In hearings before a federal commissioner – who was paid a higher fee
when ruling in favor of the slave catcher – alleged fugitives were denied
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
as aforesaid, that the person so arrested does in fact owe service or labor to the person or persons
claiming him or her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may have escaped as aforesaid,
and that said person escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, a
certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to the service or labor due from such fugitive to the
claimant, and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which he or she was arrested, with
authority to such claimant, or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force and restraint as
may be necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back
to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under
this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and the certificates in this
and the first [fourth] section mentioned, shall be conclusive of the right of the person or persons in
whose favor granted, to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped, and
shall prevent all molestation of such person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge,
magistrate, or other person whomsoever.”
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basic due process rights, such as the right to testify and a trial by jury.
These proceedings were deemed summary and final – no appeal or writ of
habeas corpus was permitted. Moreover, stiff penalties were imposed on
any one who interfered in the rendition. (1319)

In addition to being a legal process unjustly weighted in favour of claimants, this national
statutory scheme for the return of absconded property necessarily possessed a racial
character.
The descriptions and identifications of fugitive slaves in affidavits filed by owners
for return of their property under the Act obviously possessed what would be considered a
‘racial’ character. After all, as Morris notes:
Most slaves in North America were Africans or persons who had African
ancestors. That led to a significant principle of American slave law. As
Cobb put it, “the black color of the race raises the presumption of
slavery.” With one notable exception the general presumption based on
“blackness” was a commonplace of Southern law by the nineteenth
century. (21)41
Indeed, given that it was a legal principle that blackness was a key marker or signifier of
enslavement, the identification of a slave, practically speaking, was visual and included
such phenotypic traits of blackness such as skin colour, a “flat nose and woolly hair”.42
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The exception, for Morris, was Delaware. In State v. Dillahunt (1840) it was ruled that a black
witness in a murder trial was ruled competent on the basis that it was no longer fair to “presume
slavery from color” as a result of the majority of blacks in that state being free (17,000 out of 20,000)
(21-22).
42

Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. 134 (1806). See also State v. Cantey, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614 for the
proposition that only blacks can be slaves (or, rather, that whites cannot).
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Crucially, to the extent that an individual appeared white that individual “was presumed
free, and the burden of proof of slavery rested on the person claiming him or her as a
slave (Morris 26).43 As a result, and in its very simplicity, the presumptive enslavement
manifested in the Fugitive Slave Act spilled over into a general racial subordination
whereby even free blacks could find themselves presumptively enslaved, in particular if
they matched slaveowners’ written claims. As Larry D. Stokes explains:
[A] White could fraudulently claim that a Black was a slave, and there was
very little that a Free Negro could do about it. There always existed the
danger of a free Black being kidnapped, as often happened, and taken into
slavery. A large majority of free Blacks lived in daily fear of losing what
freedom they had. One slip of ignorance of the law would endanger their
slight freedom and place them into slavery. (268)
The fact that free blacks could very easily be caught by claims under the Act reveals the
legislative push to conceptualize and define slavery in purely racial terms.44 Moreover, it
demonstrates the procedural bias built into the Act to ensure claims, however specious,
were established and remedied.
Within the statutory process for claiming a fugitive slave, the slaves themselves –
or blacks who met the affidavit descriptions – were incapable of providing any
substantive defence to a claim of fugitive property. For all intents and purposes then, the
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See, for example, Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 164 (1802).

As I discuss in the introductory and third chapters of this project, blackness and enslavement were
always conceptually conflated. However, the push to legally define blackness (and by extension who
precisely was a slave) did not occur until the final decades of slavery, in particular the 1850s. In any
event, to the extent the Fugitive Slave Act (1850) violated the citizenship rights of free blacks, the
matter was resolved, obviously, in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which held that blacks were not
citizens in any substantive sense any way.
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Act effectively operated to presume blacks of contravening it.45 As Kennedy summarizes
it, “The Fugitive Slave Act profoundly undermined blacks’ sense of security in the North
by making any African-American an accusation away from quasi-criminal legal
proceedings which were tilted heavily in favor of any person alleging a property interest
in a black human” (Race, Crime 84).46 That slaves were not permitted to testify in
proceedings instituted under the Fugitive Slave Act ought not to be surprising. It was
consistent with a legal effort to render slaves chattel within the property relations of
slavery: as noted above, and notwithstanding that slaves could be punished by law for
their criminal activity, slaves were not permitted to testify in respect of abuse perpetrated
against them. However, this refusal to permit slave evidence was part of a broader racial
evidentiary bar. As Kennedy notes, “In all of the Southern states and in several of the
Northern ones, blacks (regardless of their status as slaves or freedpeople) were barred
from testifying against whites” (Race, Crime 37). As a result, “This legal disability
drastically undermined blacks’ security; absent white witnesses, blacks could be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45

Stephen M. Best recognizes the figure of the fugitive slave embodied the tension or conflict within
the law caused by the slave as subject (willfully contravening the law) and object (property under it to
be collected): “The law needs to embrace two incommensurables. In the hand of humanity rests the
‘fugitive’ slave, who, like his or her legal analogue (the fugitive who flees from justice), willfully
eludes obligation. Yet in the hand of interest lies the slave or person who, by definition, has done
nothing to incur his or her debt, since there is no slave in advance of liability who can will a debt:
property in personhood tout court. The figuration of the fugitive as debtor produces a willful subject
against the express legal nullification of willfulness. To be precise, it projects a willful subject when
the will-less is in suspension, fabulates a subject now owned when the owned escapes (to use the
language of the common law) ‘absolute dominion,’ fantasizes a person at the precise moment when
the security of property is subject to greatest question” (81).
46

As Kennedy notes, “Pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Act, approximately three hundred runaways
were returned to bondage between 1850 and 1860” (Race, Crime 84). As Davis further fleshes it out
in nothing that travel to free land was actually quite difficult for slaves seeking to escape: “According
to a very conservative estimate, the number of annual runaways in the 1850s would have exceeded
50,000 (1.26 percent of the 1860 slave population; about 5 out of every 400 slaves). But the vast
majority of these slaves remained fairly close to their farms or plantations and either returned or were
captured within days or weeks. It is probable that between 1830 and 1860, no more than 1,000 or
2,000 fugitives annually made it to the North and achieved freedom” (Problem 235).
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swindled, assaulted, or killed with impunity” (Kennedy Race, Crime 37). Blacks could
also be enslaved even if free. As Kennedy suggests, this refusal to permit slaves to testify
was a result of the racial presumption that blacks would be prone to dishonesty and, as a
result, such evidence ought not be used, particularly in relation to whites and their rights:
“Behind this exclusion was the widespread belief that, as a matter of racial character,
blacks are mendacious and that it would therefore be unjust to use their racially tainted
testimony in circumstances that put at risk the property or liberty of whites” (Race, Crime
37). Thus in addition to the presumptions about and the legal status of slaves (as well as
the disciplinary requirements of slavery) blocking their ability to give evidence, racial
presumptions about blacks, including their propensity for misconduct such as their
inability to be truthful, also informed their preclusion from testifying (Morris 230).
Accordingly, blacks – and in particular, slaves – were placed in an intractable
position: they were presumed to have committed wrongdoing (to have placed themselves
outside the legal order) but were also precluded from advancing any defence to such
allegations, either on the plantation or in the courtroom.

This presumption of

wrongdoing, which in turn silenced them, was essential to preserving the power dynamics
of slavery. But it was also essential to preserving the racial dynamics of slavery, for the
presuming of wrongdoing both informed and imbued the legal meaning of their skin
colour, distinguishing it phenotypically and in significance from that of whites (who were
presumed innocent, free, and competent to testify).
Unsurprisingly, black freedom did not reverse the presumption of black
wrongdoing. In fact, it provided the opportunity to legally re-define black existence as
criminal. As Douglas A. Blackmon summarizes it:
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Beginning in the late 1860s, and accelerating after the return of white
political control in 1877, every southern state enacted an array of
interlocking laws essentially intended to criminalize black life. Many
such laws were struck down in court appeals or through federal
interventions, but new statutes embracing the same strictures on black life
quickly appeared to replace them. Few laws specifically enunciated their
applicability only to blacks, but it was widely understood that these
provisions would rarely if ever be enforced on whites. (53)

Following Emancipation, a host of legislative changes rendered it effectively illegal to
live as black. 47 Emphasizing how these changes operated to realize a kind of reenslavement of blacks, Blackmon continues that in respect of contravening such
legislation “In nearly all cases, the potential penalty awaiting black men, and a small
number of women, snared by those laws was the prospect of being sold into forced labor”
(54). Racial equality following slavery remained elusive as black freedom resulted in a
legal commitment to translating blackness as a marker of enslavement to one of
criminality.
Colin Dayan notes a conceptual affinity between the legal subject of the criminal
and that of the slave. In respect of the post-Emancipation legal push to re-conceptualize
blacks as criminals, Dayan argues that the legal apparatuses of slave subjection and
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By way of examples, Blackmon writes: “Every southern state except Arkansas and Tennessee had
passed laws by the end of 1865 outlawing vagrancy and so vaguely defining it that virtually any freed
slave not under the protection of a white man could be arrested for the crime. An 1865 Mississippi
statute required African American workers to enter into labor contracts with white farmers by January
1 of every year or risk arrest. Four other states legislated that African Americans could not legally be
hired for work without a discharge paper from their previous employer – effectively preventing them
from leaving the plantation of the white man they worked for. In the 1880s, Alabama, North Carolina,
and Florida enacted laws making it a criminal act for a black to change employers without
permission” (53-54).
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criminal discipline informed each other, ultimately blending into the racial subordination
that paradoxically characterized black freedom. Following Patterson’s conception of
slavery as social death, Dayan argues the legal position of the ‘socially dead’ slave was
congruent with that of the convicted criminal who is ‘civilly dead’ – alive but prevented
from participating in the broader civil, political sphere:
In juxtaposing the “social death” of slaves with the “civil death” of felons,
we recognize how statute and case law became more effective than social
custom in effecting rituals of exclusion and in maintaining the racial line.
These legal engines of dispossession, once systematized and firmly
embedded in human affairs, were applicable everywhere and recognized
by everyone. (43)
The systematized dispossession of individuals, as criminals or as slaves, was achieved
through legal mechanisms that operated to define and impose determinations of
wrongdoing and, ultimately, race. And in their authority to proliferate and make such
determinations, those legal mechanisms reflected back to the populace ‘truths’ about
race, wrongdoing, and their conflation.
For Dayan, the unquestioned and insidious nature of such (legal) ‘truths’ about
black skin and wrongdoing is traceable to the legal conflation of black people with
property. The manner in which slave law reconciled the categories of ‘person’ and
‘property’ in the singular figure of the legal slave, required a recognition and disavowal
of the individual that were in constant tension. As Dayan writes:
The legal strategy [to render blacks property] worked first to recognize
slaves as persons only to deprive them of their inherent dignity what they
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would otherwise be due by nature or under God. Slave law thus both
created and contained the subject, as it scrutinized and redefined the
person in law. For this legal non-descript, who had no civil rights to lose,
could be deemed, when it served the needs of the owner, something that
engenders affection and esteem. (44)

Though like the dead, who possess no rights that can be withheld or taken away, the slave
nonetheless existed and was present, to be resurrected at the whims of his or her owner,
only to be conceptually removed from the civil sphere again when the owner deemed it
suitable.
This understanding of the slave as socially dead did not elude Douglass. As he
describes the state of the slave’s existence: “The possibility of ever becoming anything
but an object slave, a mere machine in the hands of an owner, had now fled, and it
seemed to me it had fled forever. A life of living death, beset with the innumerable
horrors of the cotton field, and the sugar plantation, seemed to be my doom” (220). But
as he immediately continues, and reflecting on time he spent in prison for his “intended
flight” (217) from slavery, he explicitly connects this rumination on enslavement to the
punishment of the criminal: “The friends, who rushed into the prison when we were first
put there, continued to visit me, and to ply me without questions and with their
tantalizing remarks. I was insulted, but helpless ; keenly alive to the demands of justice
and liberty, but with no means of answering them” (220). It is this civil death that, like
that of the prisoner, that defined the slave’s existence. All too aware of the unjust
position in which he is placed but actively prevented from taking any steps to rectify it,
the slave, like the wrongfully imprisoned, is deprived of rights or access to justice. But
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this experience of enslavement was racialized, also defining what it meant to be black:
“The racialized idiom of slavery in the American social order depended on the legal
fiction of ‘civil death’: the state of a person who though possessing natural life has lost
all civil rights” (Dayan 44 underlining added). And it is this understanding of blackness,
rooted and indistinguishable from the legal subject of the slave, that provided the
conceptual means to disenfranchise blacks and continued to do so even after slavery had
been abolished.

Conclusion
Douglass, as he explains it in My Bondage, eventually escaped slavery. His
opportunity for freedom came, somewhat ironically, from the unusual freedoms afforded
to him within slavery.48 Thus, in 1838, while in Baltimore and permitted to be away
from his master, he took his chance to escape: “On Monday, the third day of September,
1838, in accordance with my resolution, I bade farewell to the city of Baltimore, and to
that slavery which had been my abhorrence from childhood” (143).

How precisely he

escaped is not divulged so as to keep secret the techniques used by slaves to procure their
freedom. As he writes, “How I got away – in what direction I traveled – whether by land
or by water ; whether with or without assistance – must, for reasons already mentioned,
remain unexplained”. Nonetheless, Douglass had become a fugitive. And it is in actually
committing wrongdoing that he finds liberation, for as Davis explains, “For the fugitive,
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See Davis, Problem 226-32. In respect of Douglass, Davis writes, “His trip, beginning September
3, 1838, exemplified in extreme form the fortuity that had governed Douglass’s early life. It should be
stressed that only a small number of runaways succeeded in obtaining their freedom, and many from
Maryland were either captured at the beginning and then put on the auction block, or were later seized
in the streets of Philadelphia or New York” (230).
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standing on free soil could bring a certain sense of ‘rehumanization,’ of achieving human
capacities that slaveholders attempted to destroy” (Problem 230).
This inversion of the dehumanizing presumption of wrongdoing is essential to
Douglass’s eventual obtaining of freedom. It is also essential to his narrative aims. In
communicating the experience of slavery, largely for abolitionist purposes, Douglass
catalogues the various abuses he endured and observed, but also how slavery operated to
ensnare and perpetuate the subordination of individuals as well as considering why
slavery exists. To be clear, for Douglass enslavement was not fundamentally racialized,
and My Bondage does not theorize racial difference or its epistemology, legal or
otherwise. Indeed, it contemplating why he was enslaved, Douglass concludes it was not
skin colour that was determinative of his fate:
Once, however, engaged in the inquiry, I was not very long in finding out
the true solution of the matter. It was not color, but crime, not God, but
man, that afforded the true explanation of the existence of slavery ; nor
was I long in finding out another important truth, viz ; what man can
make, man can unmake. (69)
Of course, throughout My Bondage Douglass does note the racialized nature of slavery
and freedom, as well as the racialized enforcement of laws supporting such a social
dichotomy. But, as Barbara Jeanne Fields notes, the cultural conception of ‘race’ used by
Douglass was not equivalent to contemporary ones: “Both Afro- and Euro-Americans
used the words that today denote race, but they did not understand those words the same
way” (115).

Nonetheless, and as I explore, by the time of My Bondage and My

Freedom’s publication in 1855, race was in fact becoming the legal basis for slavery, as
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citizens and courts struggled to explain what slavery was and to define who precisely it
affected. And as those legal racial definitions were refined and implemented – informing
our own conceptions of race and racial difference – what black skin meant in slavery
would define what it would mean going forward.
My Bondage demonstrates there were already certain legal connotations to black
skin that would inform and delimit the legal definitions of race that would shortly arise as
slavery sought to maintain itself.

And chief among those connotations was the

presumption of slave wrongdoing – a presumption about blacks produced within slavery
that would obtain legal reality and enforcement after it as black skin came and continues
to mark criminality. This notion has largely characterized, and continues to characterize,
the black experience in America. From the plantation and Fugitive Slave Acts, to Jim
Crow, to Stop-and-Frisk, the racial profiling of black skin as indicative of wrongdoing or
even criminality has been legitimated in statutes and judicial opinions.

What My

Bondage illustrates is that this presumption of wrongdoing was foundational to slavery
itself as it was essential to the practices and legalities of slaveholding that attempted to
render or transform people into property.

!

83
CHAPTER TWO

‘Partus Sequitur Ventrem’: Lydia Maria Child’s A Romance of the Republic and
the Stabilization of Racial Difference

“Reader, my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage.”
-Harriet Jacobs

Introduction
A central concern of Frederick Douglass in his 1855 autobiography, My Bondage
and My Freedom, is his unavoidable uncertainty about his origins.

As Douglass’s

narrative articulates his life within the dehumanizing conditions of slavery – his precise
date of birth, for example, remains unknown to him – the withholding or absence of
fundamental self-knowledge is shown by Douglass to be integral to the subordination of
slaves. To the extent, then, that Douglass’s narrative functions as a kind of ontogenesis
(as well as an illustration of the man escaping slavery), he is required to speculate and
theorize on those elements of his existence unknown to him.
For Douglass himself, a lack of knowledge about his familial heritage is essential
to his enslavement.

In the third chapter of his narrative, entitled “The Author’s

Parentage,” Douglass writes that he knew the identity of his mother, but was uncertain as
to who his father was. Emphasizing the significance of such unknown paternity to his
enslavement, and slavery generally, he writes: “I say nothing of father, for he is shrouded
in a mystery I have never been able to penetrate” (41). However, as he continues, the
very notion of fatherhood is antithetical to slavery and his lack of knowledge on this
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specific point exemplifies slavery’s dehumanizing aims. In particular, Douglass notes
that a slave’s knowledge of his paternity would enable familial networks that would, in
turn, create a sense of belonging or community that would challenge or potentially
subvert slavery’s dominance:
Slavery does away with fathers, as it does away with families, and its laws
do not recognize their existence in the social arrangements of the
plantation. When they do exist, they are not the outgrowths of slavery, but
are antagonistic to that system. (41)
Because the notion of ‘family’ for the enslaved contradicted and could disrupt the
mechanics of slavery, slaveholders endeavoured to prevent slaves from forming or
realizing family units including refusing them the legal recognition of a family unit (as
well as refusing the legal entitlements and consequences that would flow from such
recognition). Critical to effecting such a refusal of family was precluding or preventing
slaves’ knowledge of their paternity.
Despite never conclusively solving the mystery of his father’s identity, Douglass
states that there were rumblings his master was also his father. However, he is quick to
note that even if true such a revelation would be inconsequential:
There was a whisper, that my master was my father ; yet it was only a
whisper, and I cannot say that I ever gave it credence. Indeed, I now have
reason to think he was not ; nevertheless, the fact remains, in all of its
glaring odiousness, that, by the laws of slavery, children in all cases, are
reduced to the conditions of their mothers. (46 emphasis added)
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The irrelevance of a slave’s paternity is thus caused and confirmed by the legal principle
that maternity determines a child’s status with respect to freedom or enslavement: the
legal fact of a child’s enslavement is grounded in, and justified by, the legal status of that
child’s mother. Given that Douglass’s mother was a slave, his status as slave was thus
legally predetermined regardless of who his father actually was. As Douglass continues,
because children follow the condition of their mother – and therefore slaveowners could
breed as well as purchase slaves – slaveowners were often financially motivated to beget
and enslave their own progeny.1 And in emphasizing the ease with which the institution
of slavery could be sustained and perpetuated, Douglass highlights the fundamental
connection between gender and enslavement at the institution’s core: where a conflict
arose over an individual’s status as slave, the status of that individual’s mother decisively
resolved it, regardless of that individual’s paternity or what rights for that individual
ought to have flowed from it.
Indeed, children born from unions of white slaveholding men and black enslaved
women, as Douglass suspected himself to be, were subjected to a strange historical legal
tension. The force of inheritance pursuant to English common law, generally applicable
outside slavery, was patrilineal and ought to have resulted in the freedom of such
children.

However, slavery’s insistence on a contradictory logic of matrilineal

inheritance of slave status ensured such children were enslaved. It was therefore not
possible for a father from outside of slavery to disrupt the transmission of the enslaved
status or identity to his child: “The order of civilization is reversed here. The name of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

“This arrangement admits of the greatest license to brutal slaveholders, and their profligate sons,
brothers, relations and friends, and gives to the pleasure of sin, the additional attraction of profit”
(Douglass 46).
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the child is not expected to be that of its father, and his condition does not necessarily
affect that of the child” (Douglass 41). As Douglass continues, whether free or enslaved,
white or black, the child’s status is restricted entirely to its mother’s:
He may be the slave of Mr. Tilgman ; and his child, when born, may be
the slave of Mr. Gross. He may be a freeman ; and yet his child may be a
chattel. He may be white, glorifying in the purity of his Anglo-Saxon
blood ; and his child may be ranked with the blackest slaves. Indeed, he
may be, and often is, master and father to the same child. (41-42)
This reversal of “the order of civilization” thus amounts to property interests of the
slaveowner being prioritized over any legal interests the father (or his child) may have,
including when the slaveowner himself was the father. To achieve such a prioritization
of legal interests, however, first requires a centralizing and prioritizing of the race of the
child’s mother: because a mother’s legal status within slavery was determinative of her
child’s, her legal racial identity was also determinative of her child’s race.2 And, to the
extent there was any visual slippage between race and enslavement – between phenotype
and legal status – that slippage was stabilized by maternity.
In this chapter, I explore this relationship between maternity and slavery, gender
and race, by turning to Lydia Maria Child’s 1867 novel A Romance of the Republic. A
work of sentimental fiction published two years after the formal end of slavery, Child’s
Romance nonetheless takes as its subject the family unit as it was imbricated within the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As noted in the introductory and third chapters of this project, the legal correspondence between
blackness and slavery is traceable to the founding of the colonies. However, as I also explain, the
attempts to pin down racial difference, in the service of slavery, did not substantially commence until
the final decades of slavery, largely because the racialized presumption of enslavement was being
subverted and challenged by race-mixing and social conduct, as well as by resistance to slavery itself.
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power and property dynamics of slavery.

Specifically, it explores the cultural

consequences of the matrilineal transmission of racial identity during slavery, particularly
in the absence of any observable markers of racial difference.
Romance tells the tale of the Royal sisters – Rosabella and Flora – daughters born
in early nineteenth-century Louisiana to Mr. Alfred Royal, a white merchant, and his
octoroon wife, Eulalia. The narrative opens with the daughters as young adults, their
mother long departed and their doting father experiencing financial difficulties. On his
death, which incites the narrative, his creditors seek the value of his estate which, coming
as a shock to all those involved, also includes his daughters: the Royal parents, as it turns
out, have concealed the legal race and status of the mother, Eulalia, by telling all that she
was of Spanish descent. As a result, the daughters’ legal race remains unknown to them.
Given the entire Royal family, including Rosa and Flora, appear racially white, this racial
deception was easy to effect. Yet despite its ease – or perhaps because of it – the Royals
fail to take the requisite steps to ensure Eulalia’s freedom. At the time Alfred first fell in
love with Eulialia, her father disclosed to him that she was legally black and, as he was
experiencing financial difficulties, proposed Alfred purchase her so they could be
together as well as help him alleviate some of his debt. Thus knowing Eulalia’s racial
heritage, and understanding its legal significance to their romantic relationship, Alfred
did just that. However, although he and Eulalia loved each other, and for reasons that are
unclear, despite knowing he ought to have done so to be legally married, Alfred failed to
manumit her and then marry her in a foreign jurisdiction in which interracial marriages
were permitted. The result is that following his purchase of Eulalia they were never
married and she continued to be his property until her death. Further, because Alfred also
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failed to manumit or free their daughters with Eulalia – who were unavoidably born as
his property – on his death they form valuable parts of his estate.
Romance’s narrative is thus driven by the legal principle that a mother’s legal
identity as slave (and corresponding legal racial identity) is ultimately determinative of
that of her children: thrust on their father’s death into a network of property relations that
would have them enslaved, the girls learn for the first time of their legal blackness. But
in focussing on the repercussions of this legal principle, Child problematizes legal
definitions of race by presenting a narrative of potential enslavement for individuals that
appear, live, and self-identify as ‘white’. Indeed, in exposing enslavement as potentially
unhinged from typical markers of race, such as conduct or skin colour, Child
demonstrates the difficulty in pinning down any singular, quantifiable notion of race or
racial difference, as well as the corresponding difficulty of legally defining that racial
difference. But in identifying a factual slippage or disconnect between ‘blackness’ and
slavery, as well as within any notion of blackness itself, Child also demonstrates how the
law stabilized it, arbitrarily, through maternity.
Accordingly, in this chapter I argue that Romance ultimately explores how racial
difference was perpetuated and, in fact, produced during slavery. In emphasizing the
primacy of matrilineal transmissions of race, Romance demonstrates the centrality of both
gender and the notional family to slavery and racial difference. And through a plot that
entwines, among other things, a clandestine escape from potential enslavement, European
high society, and multiple interracial romances, Romance reveals and subverts the
gendered construction of race at law. But in so doing it must re-iterate the patriarchal
order inherent in marriage, for the Royal daughters’ freedom is achieved, in the last
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instance, through interracial marriages and their re-entry into wealthy white society
wherein they repeat the same racial deception in which their own father ensnared them.
As a result, although Romance does not realize the degree of social racial reform Child
presumably sought, it nonetheless illuminates and grapples with the manner in which
racial difference was understood and produced by way of gender difference. Restrained,
then, by the legal realities it seeks to expose, Romance nonetheless glimpses a radical
vision of both racial and gender equality wherein neither can be realized without the
other.

The racialized limits of the family
Taking as his goal the theorizing of the possibility of intimacy across the racial
divide within slavery, Randall Kennedy writes that “Interracial intimacy played a
prominent role in the development of the free black community during the age of
slavery” as “A substantial portion of that [free black] community was comprised of
individuals who had been born to enslaved mothers and freed by their white fathers, or
born to black fathers (slave or free) and free white mothers” (Interracial 66).3 Because of
the frequency with which interracial relationships between white men and enslaved black
women resulted in children, Kennedy notes that “the court reports of the slave states
furnish scores of similar examples of white men who sought to help their black mistresses
and children escape the deprivations imposed upon them by enslavement and racism”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As I discuss later in this chapter, I do not mean to overlook or disavow the gendered violence that
typically characterized sex across the slavery line. But as I discuss, one can discuss interracial
intimacy as a fact within slavery in an effort to understand the nuances and machinations of racial
ideologies. This is particularly the case in instances where slaveholders sought to free their children
who, contrary to owner intention or desire, were doomed to slavery, as explored in Romance.
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(Interracial 47). Noting that Louisiana courts in particular saw a number of claims by
white men to liberate their mistress and progeny property, the cases Kennedy alludes to
focus on the wills of white males who sought, upon their death, to ensure the freedom of
their mistresses and children.

Presumably because such instances could be legally

understood through established principles of estate law and, in particular as the exercise
of an individual’s right to dispose of his property on his death, “The cases recounted… all
had relatively happy endings” (Kennedy 49). 4 But, as Kennedy argues, while the
emancipation of slaves would have been legally enabled, by way of testamentary
disposition for example, when those slaves were in fact related to their owner such
mechanisms of emancipation would have conflicted with the legal prohibition against
interracial relationships: “In other instances, however, laws designed to discourage
interracial intimacy frustrated efforts on the part of white men to provide for women and
children who were deemed by authorities to reside on the other side of the color line”
(49).
In its plot of concealed racial histories and interracial relationships, Romance
exposes this legal conflict between familial rights and slavery’s legislation as racialized
by situating the Royal family at the intersection of competing racial epistemologies of
personal experience and legal definitions.

On the one hand, Eulialia’s ‘blackness’,

though seemingly negligible and concealed, exists as a legal fact: it is accepted by her
father and Alfred and it is legally transmitted to her children who, unbeknownst to them,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

See Kennedy, Interracial, 48. In particular, Kennedy therein relays the story of Jean-Baptist
Lagarde of nineteenth-century Louisiana which, to some extent, echoes the story of Romance.
Lagarde a white overseer, purchased a slave and reproduced with her. For reasons that are unclear, he
failed to manumit their daughters, though he had intended to send them to France to live with his sister
if he died before he failed to do so. Fortunately, they were ultimately purchased and emancipated by a
friend of Lagarde’s after he died.
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possess it. On the other hand, the Royal daughters are raised to believe in their exclusive
whiteness as their mother’s legal racial identity is kept from them and they, as the
offspring of a wealthy white merchant, have enjoyed the privileges of wealth and
whiteness. In setting up this competition, Child identifies an ambivalence within legal
(re)productions of racial difference. Parentage and genealogy provide definitive legal
proof of an individual’s race: in the absence of biological or behavioural markers of an
individual’s race, legal recourse could be taken to ancestry as evidence of an individual’s
racial identity. However – and perhaps precisely because it provided legal proof of race –
the family unit could also subvert or resist legal definitions of race, as the Royals have
done, by enacting a racial identity different from the arbitrary schema of blood or
genealogy imposed by the law.5 As the Royal family eventually learns, however, any
familial redefinition of its members’ racial identities runs the risk of being erased and
rewritten by the legal classifications it seeks to evade.
Noting that this tension between the family unit’s racial identity and the legal
definitions of race is a common feature of novels exploring resistance to hegemonic
racial categories, Julie Cary Nerad explains that fiction emphasizing parental
redefinitions of race usually gives way to the law’s authority to classify:
As text after text tells us, the parents’ desire to protect their children from
white-supremacist social structures, laws, and ideological race categories
motivates their silence. The parents often plan to reveal their children’s
legal racial identity to them once they have matured. This challenge to the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As I discuss in the third chapter of this project, one legal way to define race was by behaviour. This
permitted individuals to be classified a particular race, contrary to biological or ancestral definitions,
according to how they lived, including where they lived and with whom they associated.
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law’s authority sets the family in opposition to – rather in collusion with –
the nation.

The law, however, ultimately asserts and enforces the

individual’s legal racial classification, usually with dire cost.

The

children, who have formed white (and often racist) identities, frequently
lose them along with the property of whiteness to which they feel entitled.
(818)
Narratives focussing on the familial usurpation of the legal authority to define race
emphasize the failure of the family to maintain its ability to classify as it typically gives
way to legal definitions and schema. Nonetheless, even if such familial redefinitions are
only temporary they exhibit the instability of racial categories as well as the potentially
incommensurable application of such definitions with personal definitions or experience.
For the Royal family, redefining their daughters’ race provides them the
opportunity for self-definition contrary to legal definitions. And by the narrative’s end,
when the Royal daughters finally obtain the opportunity for racial self-definition as
white, that opportunity is less an attempt to escape their legal status as black and more a
return to their previous self-identification as white. Bearing in mind that the Royal
daughters lived, were raised, and had no knowledge that they were anything but white
before the creditors of their father’s estate informed them of and forced them to confront
their legal status as slaves (thereby legally re-racing them as black), it ought to be
unsurprising that they each settle and form families with white men. Moreover, within
those families they repeat with their own children the narrative of familial whiteness with
which they were deceived but exclusively lived.
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For example, Flora conceals from her children with the white Franz Blumenthal

the truth of her, and their, racial identity. Earlier in the text, Flora states that “Rosa and I
were brought up like little princesses, and we never knew that we were colored. My
mother was the daughter of a rich Spanish gentleman named Gonzalez…” (101).
Acknowledging that the truth would eventually be provided to her own children, “it was
not deemed wise to inform them [her children] of any further particulars, till time and
experience had matured their characters and views of life” (287). Nonetheless, the
narrative of ancestry Flora provides to her children defines them as legally white and
encourages them to conceive of themselves as such:
These children were told that their grandfather was a rich
American merchant in New Orleans, and their grandmother a beautiful
and accomplished Spanish lady; that their grandfather failed in business
and died poor; that his friend Mrs. Delano adopted their mother; and that
they had a very handsome Aunt Rosa, who went to Europe with some
good friends, and was lost at sea. (286-87)
This repeated concealing of Eulalia Royal’s legal racial identity allows Flora’s children to
live without the immediate repercussions of their own legal blackness – something Flora
was unable to do upon her father’s death. Flora’s decision to reconfigure her children’s
racial history implements the very same racial conflicts between the law and exclusive
familial definitions that capture the Royal daughters. But in returning to the Royal
family’s ‘white’ racial identity, Flora enables herself, and by extension her children, to
live the Royals’ race – the only one they have known.
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Although at no point in the narrative do they conceive of themselves as black or

slaves, at its end the Royal sisters ‘re-assume’ this original racial identity of white and
publicly assert themselves as such in their return to white society. Their return to
whiteness fundamentally suggests racial difference is constructed: the racial identity the
daughters experienced within their family is, for them, their only racial identity. As
Nerad writes, because of that experience, the re-claiming of whiteness at the narrative’s
end is a return to their authentic racial selves, paradoxically analogizing the daughters to
intentional ‘passers’ – those who knowingly and actively enact a racial identity other than
their own – who typically and inevitably return to their black identity:
Many protagonists, like Rosa and Flora Royal, simply cannot or will not
relinquish the white identity they have always known, although they do
learn more about the needs of post-emancipation African Americans and
attempt to promote the goals of racial uplift from their position as middleclass white women. In this sense, these characters have more in common
with intentional passers who do reclaim a black identity than unintentional
passers who don’t and instead live as white, or they retain the identity to
which they have been socialized. (835)
But to some extent the Royal daughters are not passers.

They have not lived or

experienced a black identity they actively seek to evade (nor do they seek to evade the
white identity that defines their lives). Nonetheless, Nerad’s focus on the sisters’ claim to
whiteness reframes Romance as a narrative of inverted passing and, in so doing,
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highlights that to the extent the Royal daughters have an authentic racial identity it would
be that of whiteness.6
Ultimately, then, the narrative of Romance follows the defining, disruption and
undoing, and eventual reclaiming of the Royal daughters’ whiteness. That racial identity,
which by any measure other than legal ought to be stable and uncontested, is legally
disrupted by their father’s death. As Flora succinctly explains its immediate effects on
them: “… But cher papa died very suddenly; and first they told us we were very poor,
and must earn our living; and then they told us that our mother was a slave, and so,
according to law, we were slaves too…” (101). The consequences of Alfred Royal’s
death thus illustrate the supremacy or primacy of legal definitions of race: while racial
difference may be fundamentally elusive, thereby permitting Alfred Royal to actively rerace his daughters pursuant to his wishes, his failure to reconcile those wishes with legal
requirements leads to the daughters’ potential enslavement. It is this paternal desire to
define race that creates a tension between the Royal family and the law, ultimately
resolved in favour of the latter, which renders the definitive transmission of racial identity
through maternity.
While Romance focuses on the subversive potential of the family to re-define
race, it also exposes the legal limits of that potential: while Royal challenges the legal
definitions of his daughters’ race, his goals are undermined by his failure to legally
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It seems to me the correct way to classify the narrative pursuant to the sisters’ final subversion of
their legal racial identity is as a ‘transracial’ narrative, as I discuss later. The notion of passing,
inverted or otherwise, implies a stability of racial categories and intentional evasion that I do not think
correctly reflects their plight. Rather, while I argue that they identify first and foremost as white, the
Royal daughters’ slippage into blackness lacks intentionality and reveals how the (legal) structures of
racial difference may be incommensurable with personal experience and are, in the last analysis,
arbitrary.
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realize his intentions. Despite loving her and knowing how to do so, Alfred Royal fails to
take the requisite steps to obtain a legal marriage to Eulalia. As he explains to the young
Alfred King early in the narrative:
“… If I had manumitted her, carried her abroad, and legally married her, I
should have no remorse mingled with my sorrow for her loss. Loving her
faithfully, as I did to the latest moment of her life, I now find it difficult to
explain to myself how I came to neglect such an obvious duty. I was
always thinking that I would do it at some future time.” (20-21)
His failure to manumit her despite his knowledge that “marriage with a quadroon would
have been void, according to the laws of Louisiana”, forced Eulalia to live her life with
Alfred Royal without the protection of freedom or marriage (21).
For women involved in interracial relationships, their prospect for freedom
pursuant to those relationships was mediated by two somewhat opposed legal principles.
First, interracial marriages were illegal.7 While sexual relationships between white men
and black women were common, precluding the possibility of marriage between them –
presumably in an effort to curb such expressions of interracial desire – denied the women
any legitimacy or corresponding rights under the law.8 However, and second, the law
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Laws against interracial coupling crucially took marriage, and not sex per se, as their focus. As
Peggy Pascoe explains it: “Although many historians assume that miscegenation laws enforced
American taboos against interracial sex, marriage, more than sex, was the legal focus. Some states did
forbid both interracial sex and interracial marriage, but nearly twice as many targeted only marriage.
Because marriage carried with it social respectability and economic benefits that were routinely
denied to couples engaged in illicit sex, appeals courts adjudicated the legal issue of miscegenation at
least a frequently in civil cases about marriage and divorce, inheritance, or child legitimacy as in
criminal cases about sexual misconduct” (49-50). As Pascoe also notes, “Of the 41 colonies and states
that prohibited interracial marriage, 22 also prohibited some form of interracial sex” (n15, 50).
8

The converse arrangement during slavery – black men with white women – is explored by Kennedy
in Interracial Intimacies (59-66). Among other things, Kennedy notes that in certain states, white
women who elected to marry slaves doomed themselves and their children to a life of servitude. In
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nonetheless permitted the provision of freedom to black women in interracial
relationships. Specifically, they (and any children they might have in such relationships)
would be legally defined as the property of their white lovers and could thereby achieve
freedom through the legal mechanisms available to owners to bestow freedom upon their
slaves such as manumission or estate disposition. Royal’s failure to procure the freedom
of Eulalia is situated at the intersection of these legal outcomes: the prohibition against
interracial intimacy meant he could not marry Eulalia, and his failure to manumit or free
by will their daughters correctly identifies them as part of his estate on his death, to be
subjected to creditors’ remedies regardless of what his wishes may have been.
Alfred’s failing of his family is two-fold: his initial negligence vis-à-vis his wife
is repeated with his daughters. As he tells Alfred King, “… After I lost her [Eulalia], it
was my intention to send the children immediately to France to be educated.

But

procrastination is my besetting sin; and the idea of parting with them was so painful, that
I have deferred and deferred it” (21). And wholly aware of the legal ramifications of
such negligence, Royal is incapable of offering any adequate explanation for these
failures.9 This kind of paternal failure in maintaining the re-raced identities of family
members is a common feature of narratives that seek to subvert the legal imposition of
racial identity on individuals.

As Andrea K. Newlyn writes, “Like a number of

transracial narratives, and a considerable amount of sentimental fiction, Romance stages
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
respect of free blacks and white women, Kennedy notes that “This topic is in need of considerable
excavation…” (66), but suggests that surprisingly there was a white tolerance for this type of
relationship that disappeared after slavery (67).
9

It appears Royal did seek to manumit his daughters a few months before his death. But at that point
he was too deep in debt to have his property exempted from his creditors grasp. As Signor Papanti
explains to Alfred King: “‘… He [Royal] did manumit his daughters a few months before his decease;
but it was decided that he was then too deeply in debt to have a right to dispose of any portion of his
property’” (164).
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the failure of paternal authority. In a plot common to transracial narratives, the dying
father neglects to manumit his wife, leaving his orphaned children slaves” (53).10 This
narrative focus on paternal irresponsibility and failure to exempt children from slavery
forms the substance for Child’s anti-prejudice polemical intentions: Royal’s failure to
manumit at least his children, which must strike the modern reader as horrible
carelessness, highlights the legal problems accruing to miscegenous relationships in
slavery and the children born of them.
That Royal’s negligent handling of his estate allows his intentions to be
overwritten reveals the legal significance of his paternal negligence. Narratives focusing
on the failure of this kind of paternal authority emphasize the legal processes and
definitions of racial difference.

Specifically, Royal’s inaction brings into focus the

importance of maternity to legal definitions of race: while Royal’s legal failings initiates
the girls’ plight, their legal fate is determined through recourse to the maternal definitions
of race. As Newlyn explains:
The staging of [paternal] neglect (and of the repercussions of that neglect)
in Romance reveals a fundamental tension surrounding patriarchy in a
slaveholding economy as paternal authority is superseded by other modes
of exchange and different systems of authority. Transracial narratives thus
make visible the tension between patriarchal notions of genealogy and
bloodlines, and a slaveholding economy that legally mandates that “the
child follow the condition of its mother”. (53)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I discuss ‘transracial’ narratives later in this chapter but, briefly, transracial narratives are
distinguishable from passing narratives in that the former emphasize the ideological structures that
produce racial knowledges over the individual agency emphasized by the latter.
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The void created by the failure to exercise his paternal obligations is, by default, filled by
their mother’s legal status thereby marking the girls as black in his effective absence.

‘Partus sequitur ventrem’: the child follows the mother
In tracing the history of American legal formulations of racial difference,
“Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground
for race without foreknowledge of what would later rise on the foundation they were
laying” (Fields 107). Indeed, as Daniel J. Sharfstein writes, “… the color line was
formally demarcated through a patchwork of statutes and common law rules dating back
to the seventeenth century” (Crossing 604). Fundamental to distinguishing between the
races was the legal principle, first codified in 1662 in Virginia that the child follows the
mother in determining the status of children born of miscegenous relationships: “all
children born in this country shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of
the mother”.11 At the time of such codification legal uncertainty as to how to define
mixed-race individuals reigned throughout the colonies. For example, as Barbara Jeanne
Fields notes, “A law enacted in the colony of Maryland [in 1664] established the legal
status of slave for life and experimented with assigning slave condition after the
condition of the father. That experiment was dropped” (107). In respect of the Virginia
statute, Thomas D. Morris argues that the emphasis on maternity in the 1662 law was
meant to alleviate this uncertainty about the status of children born of miscegenous
relationships and provide a definitive method for classification amidst competing racial
epistemologies: “Clearly, there was uncertainty about the status of persons born of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery, 403.
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miscegenous relationships. The law of 1662 settled it” (44).12 After all, “Paternity is
always ambiguous, whereas maternity is not” (Fields 107).
The conceptual stability provided by matrilineal definitions of racial difference
facilitated the economic motives of slavery.

Fields explains that the principle’s basis

was that “Slaveholders eventually recognized the advantage of a different and
unambiguous rule of descent [from that of paternity, was]… one that would guarantee to
owners of all offspring, however fathered, at the slight disadvantage of losing to them
such offspring as might have been fathered on free women by slave men” (107).13 In
addition to potentially increasing the property and wealth of slaveholders in their slaves,
the principle that the condition of the child follows the mother helped limit slaveowner
liability for their progeny. As Morris notes, the principle was implemented to alleviate
the financial obligations that would accrue to white male slaveholders as parents if they
reproduced with their slaves:
Why was this particular rule adopted? There is no special reason to
believe that the English of the seventeenth century would have been
squeamish about separating a child from its mother. If the English rule –
that status followed the father – was used, the white men who crossed the
color line, however shadowy it might be, would then be liable for raising
the child. (44)
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What the 1662 law “settled” was the slave status of children born to white men and enslaved
women. But, as I explain later, this would also come to settle the legal racial identity of such children
as racial mixing, including across the slavery line, continued.
13

As Fields explains in respect of Maryland’s abandonment of its 1664 paternity-driven statute:
“Nevertheless, the purpose of the experiment is clear: to prevent the erosion of slaveowners’ property
rights that would result if the offspring of free white women impregnated by slave men were entitled
to freedom” (107).
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In resolving this tension between offspring rights and property rights that inhered in
mixed-race children – particularly those born from the master-slave relationship – it was
property rights that proved decisive. As with animal property, the principle of partus
sequitur ventrem – the notion that the child’s identity followed its mother’s – singularly
conceptualized the progeny of slaveowners and their slaves as the accretion of
slaveowner property.14
In the burgeoning colonies, implementing this principle was “A departure from
the English common law tradition linking a child’s status to that of the father…” (605).
But as Rachel F. Moran notes, such divergence from historical principles was attributable
to a desire to ensure property rights sustained themselves, as well as to reify racial
distinctions. In particular, because of the population dynamics within the Chesapeake
area, the 1662 Virginia statute ensured that slavery would continue. Emphasizing the
lack of white women in Virginia would have certainly encouraged this form of crossracial sexuality, and that such relationships were initially legally tolerated, Moran states:
The imperative of consolidating racial boundaries was so great that
Chesapeake authorities were willing to undo the legal tradition of paterfamilias. A long-standing English rule mandated that a child’s status
follow that of the father. Given the initial scarcity of white women in the
Chesapeake, most interracial sex probably took place between white men
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Morris states: “Race was a factor, but it did not necessarily determine the outcome. Rather, the
key rests in the concern for the property rights of the slaveowner. According to English law on chattel
property, the increase of that property belonged naturally to the owner of the property. As Blackstone
put the matter about the mid-eighteenth century, “Of all tame and domestic animals, the brood belongs
to the owner of the dam or mother; the English law agreeing with the civil that ‘partus sequitur
ventrem’ in the brute creation, though for the most part in the human species it disallows the maxim.”
Blackstone, at this point in his work, treated the Latin phrase not as a rule that determined the status of
someone, but as a rule that determined the ownership of something” (45).
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and black women. As a result, the majority of mulatto offspring were free
under the English approach. In 1662, Virginia departed from tradition by
making a child’s status follow that of the mother. (21)

Nonetheless, although interracial marriages were not unlawful in the early colonial era,
“As the institution of slavery was consolidated in the late seventeenth century, marriages
across the color line became anomalous and dangerous exceptions to the emerging racial
hierarchy” (Moran 19).

Just as mixed-race progeny were deemed unable to take

advantage of their partial whiteness, the prohibition against interracial marriage sought to
eliminate any advantages of whiteness that could be transmitted through the family unit.
Specifically, black women were precluded from claiming the freedom that could result
from interracial relationships with white men.
The racial logic common to both the law against interracial marriage and
matrilineal determinations of race was one of hypodescent. As Moran explains it, the
logic of hypodescent inherent in the 1662 rule assured that black people – or those
deemed as such – remained subordinate to whites:
The adoption of a rule of hypodescent kept blacks from transmitting
special privileges to the next generation through interracial sex or
marriage.

This racial tax on offspring precluded them from gaining

official recognition of their white ancestry.

By erasing their white

heritage, the racial classification scheme converted mulattoes into blacks
by a type of parthenogenesis: it was almost as though the child had been
generated by a single parent without intercourse across the color line.
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While sex across the racial divide during slavery often did not carry familial intentions,
even when it did, as with the Royals, there could be no escaping the resulting ‘taint’ of
slavery.15

As Fields observes, this reproduction of slavery ensured the production of

racial difference: “the Practical needs – the needs to clarify the property rights of
slaveholders and the need to discourage free people from fraternizing – called for the
law” (108). The result, and not the cause, of these practical needs of slavery was the
implementation of racial difference: “Race does not explain that law [partus sequitur
ventrem]. Rather, the law shows society in the act of inventing race” (Fields 107). The
legal principle of partus sequitur ventrem thus defined the scope of race pursuant to
slavery, implicitly capturing mixed-race individuals within slavery by re-signifying them
as black.
Despite Virginia’s early explicit legislative commitment to ensuring what
amounted to the strict racial identification of mixed-race children, there was no uniform
statutory adoption of the principle of partus sequitur ventrem across the colonies nor
across the post-Revolutionary states. Nonetheless, as Morris notes, in more informal
ways states routinely implemented and followed the notion that the child’s ‘condition’
follows its mother’s as “They did through judicial rulings… [where] the source for that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I emphasize the prohibition against interracial sex which obviously need not be restricted to sex
within marriage. As David A. Hollinger writes: “The principle [of hypodescent] is widely taken for
granted in the United States right down to the present, and is even defended as a political strategy in
some contexts by organizations speaking for the interests of African Americans. But the principle
originates in the property interest of slaveholders. Children begotten upon slave women by their
owners or by other white men would grow up as slaves, adding to the property of the owners of the
women and preserving the amazingly durable fiction that male slaveholders and the other white males
in the vicinity were faithful to their wives. The principle was sharpened during the Jim Crow era,
when opposition to social equality for blacks was of course well served by a monolithic notion of
blackness, accompanied by legislation that outlawed as miscegenation black-white marriages, but left
less strictly regulated any non-marital sex in which white males might engage with black females”
(1369).
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norm could just as well have been the common law doctrine, which agreed with the civil
law, that to the owner of property belongs the increase” (48).16 Within the early colonial
period – and coinciding with the formal implementation of slavery – owned mothers gave
birth to owned children.17 Of course, as mixed-race children were consistently defined as
the property of their white fathers, those fathers could manumit their mixed-race children
as noted above by disposing of them as property. Indeed, from the early colonial period
to Emancipation, “… white fathers had commonly freed their mulatto children, especially
in such cases as youthful indiscretion when, as adolescents, they had acted out of their
new-found sexuality in the slave quarters and… felt some moral obligations toward their
unfortunate offspring… [or where] the children were the products of long-term, stable
relationships with mulatto mistresses” (Kinney 9). However, while the right to manumit
one’s slaves, including progeny, persisted throughout slavery, that right became
increasingly restricted throughout the nineteenth century as the shifting economics of the
South necessitated more available slave labour.18
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The principle of partus sequitur ventrem was not legislation in all states. As Morris notes, “nearly
one-half of the Southern states, in other words, made no provisions in their black codes to affirm the
notion that the condition of the child followed the mother or to adopt expressly the civil law phrase,
partus sequitur ventrem. This does not mean, of course, that the other states did not use that norm”
(47-48). In those states that did not have a codified commitment to the principle, it nonetheless was
perpetuated at court.
17

This legal principle, of course, continued and ensured the multiplication of property (and
confirmation of rights in that property), as it also legally re-wrote blacks as property (even as it was
required to perpetuate the legal fiction of blackness as in Romance). As Karla Holloway explains it:
“Systems of U.S. slavery meant that whatever relations slave masters would have with enslaved
women, none of them could face a threat to their fundamental rights of property. No indentured
servant’s child not enslaved would inherit the social or legal status of a white father. Because slavery
could be passed on, and because it became distinctive to persons who were not white – in that era
Indigenous Americans or Negroes – its embodiment became as much identity as it was status. Claims
of race and class were sutured to the claims of and nature of property” (32).
18

As Kinney notes, “Between the Revolutionary and the Civil Wars, marked changes took place in the
slave codes and laws intended to prevent racial mixing, called ‘amalgamation’ after the process of
combining mercury with another metal to create a uniform alloy. In the South, especially after the
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The increasing emphasis on racializing to maintain slavery in the years preceding

the American Civil War necessitated a policy shift that made manumission difficult and,
ultimately, impossible. Emphasizing the changes in the mid-nineteenth century, such as
Nat Turner’s Rebellion and the increased reliance on the cotton gin, James Kinney
singles out Louisiana as demonstrative of the states’ movement towards more restrictive
manumission rights. Noting that Louisiana became increasingly hostile to the presence
of free people of colour, Judith Kelleher Schafer summarizes the legislative changes:
“Beginning in the late 1830s and throughout the 1840s, Louisiana lawmakers passed
various acts granting legislative manumission that required some newly freed people of
color (whom police juries had allowed to remain in the state) to post bond to ensure that
they would not become public charges” (7-8). As slavery was becoming a national
concern, Louisiana culture became intolerant of previous legal practices of manumission:
By the early 1850s, however, Louisiana legislators no longer took such a
charitable view of manumission or the resulting increase in the population
of free people of color. By this time slavery had moved to the center of
the national political stage… [as] the willingness of supposedly
respectable people to stop enforcement of the harsh Fugitive Slave law of
1850 infuriated and frightened southerners. (Schafer 8)
These restrictions on manumission were, in large part, achieved by re-iterating and
enforcing the principle of partus sequitur ventrem, thereby hinging racial identity on

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Slave Act of 1807 increased the need to breed domestic slaves, and after 1830 when extensive use of
the cotton gin, Nat Turner’s rebellion, and other factors increased proslavery pressures, the laws
became more restrictive” (8-9).

!

106

maternity. In Louisiana, however, this was not a principle that had defined its legislative
or policy development from the outset.
Specifically, Louisiana’s French civil law tradition historically dictated that the
child’s condition followed its father’s, meaning white men would have transmitted
whiteness with legal significance in their reproducing with black women: “Striking
evidence of the shifting situations between 1830 and Emancipation comes from
Louisiana where, even among the upper classes, miscegenation had been common
because of the shortage of white women. Under the French Napoleonic code, children
took the status of their father, and thus most mulattoes were free” (Kinney 11). 19
However, in their increasingly restrictive laws for mixed-race individuals, this historical
French principle was altered in 1832 to ensure their status followed that of their mothers,
bringing Louisiana in line with the other states: “Under the Americans, however,
Louisiana courts decided in 1832 to enslave the children of slave mothers” (Kinney 11).
Further, in the final years of slavery, the freedom to emancipate one’s mixed-race
children was finally taken away entirely. As Kinney explains, “In addition, numerous
court cases from the 1840s show increased restrictions on legacies to mulattoes, generally
limiting inheritance to one-fourth or less of an estate.

Finally, in 1857, Louisiana

prohibited the emancipation of mulatto children, despite protest from French and Spanish
creoles” (11). Accordingly, prior to 1857 it remained available to white fathers in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In noting that Texas and Louisiana possessed somewhat different legal systems from the other
states, Morris writes: “Louisiana’s legal order was a tangled blend of French and Spanish concepts
and, after 1803, of some aspects of the English legal tradition. Although Louisiana was acquired by
the United States in 1803, its legal structure was not changed completely. The rules and procedures of
English criminal law largely supplanted the civil law of the French and Spanish, but the law relating to
succession to property and transfers and uses of property remained that of the continental civil law”
(8).
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Louisiana, such as Alfred Royal, to manumit their mixed-race children.20 But even prior
to Louisiana’s prohibition on emancipating mixed-race children in 1857, mixed-race
children of white slaveowners were always their property first, and their family second.21
Regardless of these restrictions on manumission laws or the restrictive definition
of partus sequitur ventrem, it was consistently available to slaveowners on their deaths to
free their slaves.

As Schafer notes, such claims were in keeping with Louisiana

legislation which positively permitted the liberation of slaves: “The Louisiana Civil Code
made it legal to free slaves not only during the lifetime of the owner, but ‘by a disposition
made in prospect of death,’ or by last will and testament. Leaving slaves their freedom
by will happened frequently in New Orleans, although no figures exist to specify how
often” (59). In instances where others’ property interests in a slave conflicted with those
of his or her owner, liberation was necessarily complicated. As exemplified by Alfred
Royal, because slaves were fundamentally property, when a deceased’s estate – the sum
total of his property assets – was less than his debts owed to creditors or when a rightful
heir had a claim to a slave the deceased intended to free, the testator’s disposition of
freedom could be subordinated to other interests: “Most of these transactions went
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I do not mean to suggest that manumission in Louisiana prior to 1857 was a simple process. As
Judith Kelleher Schafer outlines, there were a number of legal procedural impediments that made
manumission difficult including requiring jury trials for manumission suits, “defining them as
adversarial procedures against the state” (72).
21

Louisiana’s increasingly harsh laws against slave freedom must be understood as a commitment to
slavery as opposed to merely racial oppression, though the latter was certainly the effect of the former.
As Mark V. Tushnet describes: “The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a state with a large population
of free blacks, was perhaps more conscious than courts elsewhere of the problems of line-drawing,
and it explicitly refused to equate slave law with black law when, in 1856, it held unconstitutional a
statue entitled, ‘An Act relative to slaves and free colored persons’ because both the title and the body
of the act covered two distinct subjects” (American Law 140). Tushnet’s point is that a distinction
must be drawn between ‘black law’ and slave law. While such legal regimes often overlapped, they
were distinct owing largely to the presence of free blacks who would not be subject to even racially
motivated slave law.
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smoothly, as long as the succession’s debts did not exceed its assets after freeing the
slave property and the designated slaves did not deprive legitimate heirs of their rightful
inheritance” (Schafer 59).

Notwithstanding legal mechanisms to free children from

enslavement, the fact of interracial mixing remained problematic at law.
It is within this context of restricted manumission abilities and permitted
testamentary dispositions of freedom that Royal’s failure to free his daughters must be
read.

As explained by Signor Papanti, the family friend and teacher of the Royal

daughters, Royal’s failure to legally emancipate his daughters would inevitably render
them his property regardless of his personal intentions. Subsequent to Royal’s death,
Signor Papanti explains the daughters’ predicament to their teacher, Madame Guirlande:
“At your request,” replied the Signor, “I went to one of the creditors, to
ask whether Mr. Royal’s family could not be allowed to keep their
mother’s watch and jewels. He replied that Mr. Royal left no family ; that
his daughters were slaves, and, being property themselves, they could
legally hold no property. (50)
For Signor Papanti, this discussion with the creditor he is relaying was the first time he
learned of Eulalia’s racial identity and, by extension, of Royal’s inaction.

As he

continues to Madame Guirlande:
I was so sure my friend Royal would not have left things in such a state,
that I told him he lied, and threatened to knock him down…. I was never
more surprised than when he told me that Madame Royal was a slave. I
knew she was a quadroon, and I supposed she was a placee, as so many of
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the quadroons are. But now it seems that Mr. Royal bought her off her
father ; and he, good, easy man, neglected to manumit her…”. (50)

Further, as the reader knows by this point in the narrative, the Royal daughters are part of
their father’s estate, subject to creditors’ remedies upon his death. Indeed, given his
financial troubles, it seems likely Royal would not have been able to procure his
daughters’ freedom by will even if he had sought to do so. And having Royal’s creditors
confirm his suspicions as to Eulalia’s legal status renders apparent to Signor Papanti
Royal’s romantic history and corresponding legal responsibilities: purchasing his
eventual wife so they could pursue their romantic relationship, Royal only half-meets the
requirements to obtain her freedom. Failing to manumit Eulalia results in their children
never transcending the status of her property absent their own manumission, despite his
best attempts to formulate their racial identity pursuant to his own wishes.
Moreover, Royal understood the legal consequences of failing to manumit his
daughters. As Papanti continues:
“He [Royal] of course knew that by law ‘the child follows the condition of
the mother,’ but I suppose it did not occur to him that the daughters of so
rich a man as he could ever be slaves. At all events, he neglected to have
manumission papers drawn till it was too late ; for his property had
become so much involved that he no longer had a legal right to convey
any of it away from creditors.” (50-41)
Suggesting that Royal perhaps erroneously presumed his wealth and status could
overwrite the racial identity of his daughters, Signor Papanti is unable to provide a
definitive explanation for Royal’s negligence.

Even if the status realized through

!

110

extensive personal wealth would have implied his daughters’ freedom, the fact of his
poor business dealings and resulting indebtedness would have undermined it. More
importantly, in emphasizing the outcome of Royal’s negligence on his daughters, Papanti
frames that negligence pursuant to established laws Royal ought to have known. It is
because he “of course knew that by law” that a child’s status with respect to freedom is
determined by that of the child’s mother that Royal’s negligence is particularly troubling.
Paternal inaction here is not simply a failure to follow one’s presumed familial duties.
Rather, it is a failure to adequately respond to an established and well-known legal
principle.22

Gender inequality in (interracial) marriage
It is precisely this legal principle that is exploited by Rosa’s first husband, and
ostensible saviour from slavery, Gerald Fitzgerald. When the sisters are launched into
potential enslavement on their father’s death, his young friend – Fitzgerald – steps in to
offer the daughters safety. Specifically, he offers to help them avoid their father’s
creditors, and certain enslavement, by secretly fleeing the state. They agree to his plan.
And, as Rosa reciprocates Fitzgerald’s feelings for her, she and Fitzgerald agree to follow
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Holloway explains this principle and its known, practical advantages for (white male)
slaveowners: “Legal investiture in maternal identity allowed critical patterns and codes of conduct to
emerge. It was a pattern that preserved the commercial values inherent in paternity, privilege, and
property. White plantation males could father children from their female slaves with the concurrent
assurance that they would benefit both from an increase in their own property and be free from any
concern that their progeny – whether males or females – would have any heritable claims. In the
United States heritability meant that enslaved mothers had enslaved children and no claim to the value
they represented to their owners. That experiential phenomenon came to be known as “one drop” rule
(of black blood – statutes that were so fiercely nurtured that percentages of blood – blood quantum –
led to a perverse vocabulary of legal identities (mulatto, quadroon, octoroon, and quintroon). Blood
conveyed local sensibilities, carried legal consequence, and protected the propertied value of
whiteness by its attention to even miniscule evidence of the taint of blackness. But the evolving
legalisms that sutured families to histories of color as well as histories of race would continue to be an
entailment” (33).
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propriety and be married. Fully aware, however, that interracial marriages are illegal
(and aware the girls do not realize otherwise), Fitzgerald facilitates their escape from
Louisiana to his cabin in Georgia, where the daughters are to inconspicuously remain
until such time as they can ostensibly re-enter society. What quickly becomes clear to
Rosa and Flora in Georgia, however, is that they are at Fitzgerald’s mercy.23 From their
youth, spent sheltered and under their father’s care, to their eventual marriages and
entrance into society, Rosa’s ‘marriage’ to Fitzgerald most acutely reveals the nexus
between gender and race within slave society – a nexus that defines the Royal sisters’
struggle.
The Royal sisters legally belong to Fitzgerald by virtue of his machinations:
paying the Royal estate creditors, who believe the sisters are missing, under the pretence
of clearing up his old friend Alfred Royal’s debts, Fitzgerald becomes the sisters’ owner.
After moving them into his home – and living as a family in which he is ostensibly
married to Rosa – Fitzgerald on one of his trips away to attend to business marries the
white socialite Lily Bell, with whom he returns. Understanding that her own ‘marriage’
to Fitzgerald was a sham and never properly effected, and that as his property she has
been rendered powerless and at his mercy, Rosa confronts him telling of her hate for him.
Although he becomes immediately regretful of his response, Fitzgerald wastes no time in
clarifying that Rosa is not his wife or even romantic partner but, rather, his property:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Importantly, there was no manumission in Georgia. As narrated in the text: “There are greater
obstacles in the way than she [Rosa], in her experience was aware of. The laws of Georgia restrained
human impulses by forbidding the manumission of a slave. Consequently, he must either incur very
undesirable publicity by applying to the legislature for a special exception in this case, or she must be
manumitted in another state” (186). This was correct. As Morris notes, “After a decade of bitter
controversy among the members of the Georgia court, the state legislature, in 1859, adopted a law
prohibiting all postmortem manumissions whether ‘within or without the State’” (379).
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[Rosa]: “No Mr. Fitzgerald, you have fallen below hatred.

I

despise you.”
His brow contracted, and his lips tightened. “I cannot endure this
treatment,” said he, in tones of suppressed rage. “You tempt me too far.
You compel me to humble your pride. Since I cannot persuade you to
listen to expostulations and entreaties, I must inform you that my power
over you is complete. You are my slave. I bought you of [sic] your
father’s creditors before I went to Nassau. I can sell you any day I choose;
and by Jove, I will, if –”. (143)
While Rosa and Flora are legally his property, Fitzgerald’s legitimate marriage to Lily
emphasizes to Rosa both the reality of her legal status and the corresponding illegality of
her marriage to Fitzgerald. But, as racial difference provides the legal basis and reason
for Fitzgerald’s ownership of the girls, it is gender difference that enables his scheme of
ownership. Where slavery permits Fitzgerald to claim the girls as his property, it is
marriage, or the notion of it, that enables his vision of owning them.
This vision of owning the girls revolves around his desire to romance both Rosa
and Flora, all the while keeping them in seclusion. Prior to his marriage to Lily and
pleased with his arrangement of having the girls sequestered at his Georgia estate,
Fitzgerald “would laugh and say: ‘Am I not a lucky dog? I don’t envy

the

Grand

Bashaw his circassian beauties. He’d give his biggest diamond for such a dancer as
Floracita; and what is his Flower of the World compared to my Rosamunda?” (84). In
fact, at his introduction to the daughters he notes to Alfred Royal himself that “If I were
the Grand Bashaw, I would have them both in my harem” (12). Such comparison to a
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Turkish sultan’s harem is not wholly misguided. After all, Fitzgerald aims to keep the
girls secluded from the world so as to continue his efforts to be have sex with both of
them. However, Fitzgerald’s invocation of a Turkish harem suggests the essence of the
sisters’ oppression is primarily due to their gender and not their race.

Indeed, it

highlights the problematic relationship between those two aspects of their identity. As
Carolyn L. Karcher writes:
His [Fitzgerald’s] emulation of a Turkish sultan whose prize harem slaves
were Caucasians involves keen ironies. The reversal of cultural roles
recalls that whites were once enslaved by the dark-skinned peoples they
now despite, and the adoption by a Christian of Islamic practices makes a
mockery out of the argument that slavery served to Christianize the
African. Only one of the Grand Bashaw’s privileges continues to elude
Fitzgerald – a plurality of wives. Before long, he takes the last steps
towards translating his fantasy into reality, first by demanding sexual
favors from Flora, ultimately by acquiring a legal bride. (90-91)
Although race may be the mechanism by which Fitzgerald comes to legally own the
Royal girls, his motivations for doing so are primarily sexual. Thus, while his ‘harem’ is
a product of the intersection of gender and race, it is gender inequality that is first and
foremost its effect. Further, because of Rosa’s insistence on marrying Fitzgerald to
legitimate or render acceptable their time together in escaping from New Orleans,
Fitzgerald’s ‘harem’ is fundamentally a sexist, rather than a for-profit venture.
As noted above, Romance contrasts the girls’ lived experience of whiteness with
the legal defining of race through maternity. In so doing, Romance centralizes the role of
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the family in the production of race, in both a formal legal capacity and in a more
informal – and potentially subversive – domestic sense. But as the family unit may
enable freedom from racial oppression, it implements a patriarchal order that cannot be
escaped. As Karcher astutely notes, the Fitzgerald house mimics the Royal household in
form and, to some extent, substance: in both homes, the sisters are kept from the outside
world, ostensibly for their benefit. Fundamentally, that congruency is premised on their
racial identity. Where their father had sheltered them from the truth of their legal racial
identity in an effort to avoid the possibility of enslavement, Fitzgerald invokes that
possibility as a reason to keep them sheltered. Although both patriarchs look to insulate
the sisters from slavery, what operates as benign paternalism in the Royal household reappears as sinister oppression in the Fitzgerald manor. But, while Fitzgerald’s devious
intentions seem wildly removed from the peace of the Royal household, the strictures of
patriarchy remain the same in both homes and vary only in degree. As Karcher writes,
pursuing Fitzgerald’s metaphor of the Turkish harem:
In the Royal household patriarchy had worn a benign face, and the
patriarch’s true relationship to his womenfolk had lain hidden. In the
Fitzgerald household, the meaning of patriarchy is spelled out.

The

patriarch discloses the face of the slavemaster, and the protective husband
steps forward as the Grand Bashaw. (91)
The only free domestic life available to the sisters echoes the domestic life in which they
were raised (albeit in a more sinister manner). But even at the prospect of escaping racebased slavery – which Fitzgerald offers – the sisters nonetheless find themselves
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property, suggesting they are constrained by, or that there is a conflation of, the
oppressive structures of slavery and patriarchy.
Indeed, the narrative is ripe with conflations of women with property within the
context of ostensibly intimate or loving relationships.

For example, in response to

Fitzgerald’s plan to shuttle herself and Flora away in secret so as to avoid their father’s
creditors, Rosa and Fitzgerald have the following exchange wherein her literal status as
his property is foreshadowed and couched in his sexual desire for her:
“But if your plan should not succeed, how ashamed you would feel
to have us seized!” said she.
“It will succeed, dearest. But even if it should not, you shall never
be the property of any man but myself.”
“Property !” she exclaimed in the proud Gonsalez tone, striving to
withdraw herself from his embrace.
He hastened to say: “Forgive me, Rosabella. I am so intoxicated
with happiness that I cannot be careful of my words. I merely meant to
express the joyful feeling that you would be surely mine, wholly mine.”
(61)
Similarly, the acquaintance of Mrs. Delano (Flora’s assumed mother who enables her
entrance into white society following her escape from slavery) and abolitionist Mr.
Percival suggest later in the text that Fitzgerald’s treatment of the sisters as property is as
a result of a gender balance inherent in marriage. Intimating that the indecency inherent
in maintaining human property could infect even those relationships external to slavery it
is noted that: “‘If she has ceased to interest his fancy, very likely he may have sold her,’
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said Mr. Percival; ‘for a man who could entertain the idea of selling Flora, I think would
sell his own Northern wife, if the law permitted it and circumstances tempted him to it.’”
(222)
Of particular significance is a brief but illustrative exchange between Mr. Percival
and another of Mrs. Delano’s acquaintances – the Southern gentleman, pro-slavery Mr.
Green. In commenting on his time in Italy with Fitzgerald, Mr. Green says to Mrs.
Delano and Mr. Percival that:
“…But at the Blue Grotto, wonderful as it was, we didn’t quite drive away
Fitzgerald’s blue devils, though it made him forget his vexations for the
time. The fact is, just as we started he received a letter from his agent,
informing him of the escape of a negro woman and her two children ; and
he spent most of the way back to Naples swearing at the Abolitionists.”
(274)
Of course, Green does not realize he is referring to the plight of the Royal sisters
themselves. His ignorance is further dramatized as “Mr. Green, quite unconscious of the
by-play in their [Flora’s, Mrs. Delano’s, and Mr. Percival’s] thoughts, went on say, ‘It is
really becoming a serious evil that Southern gentlemen have so little security for that
species of property’” (274). In response, Percival exposes the reach of the notion of
ownership in people: “‘Then you consider women and children property ?’ inquired Mr.
Percival, looking up from his book” (274). Percival receives no meaningful response to
his question as Green, instead, takes offence at someone of Percival’s station being an
abolitionist.24
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The remaining exchange between Percival and Green emphasizes that slavery is wholly unjust and
cannot be contextualized within class or racial dynamics in an effort to make it just: “‘I should
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Perhaps the most compelling example in the text that establishes gender is the

primary cause of the sisters’ subordination – and not singularly race – is the manner in
which Lily Bell’s legitimate marriage to Fitzgerald parallels the sisters’ own plight. Lily,
the daughter of a wealthy Boston merchant, falls in love and marries Fitzgerald while he,
unbeknownst to her, has maintained the Royal daughters sequestered at his Georgia
estate. Shortly after their marriage, Fitzgerald and Lily return to Georgia and commence
their life together, with Rosa hidden away and remaining unknown to Lily. However,
despite Lily’s unawareness of Rosa, as Karcher notes, “Yet she [Lily] will learn that her
fate is inextricably intertwined with Rosa” (92).
From the outset Fitzgerald’s relationship to Lily echoes his relationship to Rosa:
indeed, to some extent, he has purchased Lily from her father. As we learn, although her
family is respected and had been wealthy, her father had fallen into debt and Fitzgerald
‘obtains’ Lily from him by way of funds for debt repayment. Echoing Royal’s actual
purchase of Eulalia and Fitzgerald’s actual purchase of the Royal sisters, Fitzgerald’s
relationship with Lily is coloured as one of ownership. Moreover, Lily’s role as mother
of the Fitzgerald heir, also named Gerald, is mirrored and ultimately usurped by Rosa’s
own role as mother to Fitzgerald’s child.

Unwilling to damn her own child with

Fitzgerald to possible slavery, Rosa surreptitiously switches her infant with Lily’s. No
one, including Lily or the boys, learns of the switch until the boys are grown, and the
opportunity comes for Rosa to advise Lily’s ‘son’, Gerald, that she is in fact his mother.
The boys, who appear nearly identical, are thus raised and socialized as their racial and
class opposites.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
consider my birth and position great misfortunes, if they blinded me to the plainest principles of truth
and justice,’ rejoined Mr. Percival” (274-75).
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Importantly, Lily’s whiteness and its advantages cannot protect or insulate her

from the far-reaching effects of slavery, and the fact of racial difference generally is
foregrounded in her relationship to Fitzgerald. Tying their lives together well beyond
being merely ‘married’ to the same man, Rosa’s baby switch forces Lily and the Bell
family to confront the arbitrariness of racial distinctions within slavery. Further, it mires
them in the horrific property relations underpinning slavery, contrasting the laws of
inheritance with the matrilineal transmission of race. Demonstrating how the callousness
of a slaveholding society perverts even the most loving families, Lily’s father refuses to
provide an inheritance for ‘her’ son (who has been revealed to him as black as a result of
Rosa’s switch), or for Lily’s actual son (raised by Rosa, who though legally white has
been raised to believe he is black and has taken a black wife). As Mr. Bell states to
Rosa’s spouse Alfred King:
“… A pretty dilemma you have placed me in, sir. My property, it
seems, must either go to Gerald, who you say has negro blood in his veins,
or to this other fellow, who is a slave with a negro wife.”
“But he could be educated in Europe also,” pleaded Mr. King;
“and I could establish him permanently in lucrative business abroad. By
this arrangement –”
“Go the Devil with your arrangements!” interrupted the merchant,
losing all command of himself. “If you expect to arrange a pack of
mulatto heirs for me, you are mistaken, sir.” (393-94)
The racial deception that so infuriates Bell is effected, of course, because the two boys
are phenotypically similar – their racial difference is not observable. But in addition to
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the switch again emphasizing the arbitrariness by which racial distinctions are drawn and
believed to exist, Child links its persistence to gender inequality.

Namely, racial

difference and its meaning are inextricably entwined with the subordination of women
within the family unit: Fitzgerald’s effectively purchasing Lily from her father for
marriage contextualizes their white familial reproduction within the broader, legal fact of
racial difference. This is particularly so as their family is reconfigured by Rosa’s babyswitching without their knowledge, which captures them in a narrative of racial
transmission without their consent, as exemplified in Bell’s property potentially and
eventually being disposed of under typical and legal testamentary practices to either a
‘biologically’ black (but culturally white) or a culturally black (but ‘biologically’ white)
heir. Romance imbricates the (re)production and extension of racial difference within the
family unit which is itself (re)produced and knowable only through gender inequality.

Undermining prejudice
From their sheltered beginnings in the Royal household as the daughters of a
Louisiana businessman, Rosa and Flora are plunged into potential enslavement,
surreptitiously transported out of Louisiana to other states and eventually Europe, and
ultimately find happiness in relationships and family with old family friends, Alfred King
and Franz Blumenthal respectively, as they return home. Throughout, and despite their
contested legal racial identity, the Royal sisters self-identify as white: they were raised as
such, live most comfortably among white society on both sides of the Atlantic, and
eventually return to white society in America. Further, and crucial to the narrative
discrepancy between the Royal sisters’ legal racial identity and their lived, self-identified,
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whiteness, is the fact they appear white. By any marker other than legal definition, the
Royals are white.
Cassandra Jackson broadens the critical significance of the Royal sisters’
whiteness, focussing on the use of mixed-race characters in post-slavery fiction as
enabling explorations of the national character. Extending beyond merely commenting
upon the relationship between distinct races, mixed-race characters allowed for an
examination of the legal definitions of race and freedom that bound all citizens:
While I agree with [Hazel] Carby that the increasing frequency of these
figures during this era is a reflection of institutionalized racism, I want to
propose that by the time that post-Reconstruction writers were producing
mulatto fiction, mixed-race characters already functioned as complex
cultural signs of the contradictions posed by a nation that had constructed
its essential identity as free in the midst of slavery and racial exclusion.
(4)
Mixed-race characters had regularly been invoked by writers during slavery, and
following slavery they continued to provide provocative material by which the legacy of
slavery, and its impact on the future of the nation, could be explored. As Jackson
continues: “Mulatto figures had long provoked consideration of the ways in which racial
ideology shaped national policy and social and political relationships” (4). Of course,
following the Civil War national policies about race were completely changed, but it is
within the context of these changes that Romance was published.
Following the Civil War the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution heralded the arrival of racial equality.

The Thirteenth Amendment,
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implemented in 1865, declared slavery abolished. 25 And, in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment promised racial equality. 26 In particular, section 1 of that amendment
provided citizenship and equal protection under the law to all individuals born in the
United States.

As a result, the two amendments constitutionally disallowed any

abridgements or limitations to the citizenship guaranteed to all citizens, including
prohibiting racialized slavery. And yet, despite these laudable legislative steps, severe
racial inequality persisted. As Douglas A. Blackmon explains it, culture lagged behind
law: “The Civil War settled definitively the question of the South’s continued existence
as a part of the United States, but in 1865 there was no strategy for cleansing the South of
the economic and intellectual addiction to slavery” (41).27

This “addiction” among

whites to racial subordination in the form of slavery persisted in the form of racial
discrimination without slavery.28 As Karcher succinctly summarizes it: “Both the major
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Amendment XIII, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
26

Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides: “All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”
27

Blackmon explains that in response to black freedom, southern whites militarized and organized in
an effort to alienate and subjugate the newly freed blacks. Given the climate within and immediately
slavery, this should be unsurprising: “In the first decades of that span, the intensity of southern whites’
need to reestablish hegemony over blacks rivaled the most visceral patriotism of the wartime
Confederacy. White southerners initiated an extraordinary campaign of defiance and subversion
against the new biracial social order imposed on the South and mandated by the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which abolished slavery. They organized themselves into
vigilante gangs and militias, undermined free elections across the region, intimated Union agents,
terrorized black leaders, and waged an extremely effective propaganda campaign to place blame for
the anarchic behavior of whites upon freed slaves” (42).
28

Norman A. Redlich explains this ‘addiction’ as a desire among southern whites to re-capture after
Emancipation the racial hierarchy that was stable during slavery: “The period following the Civil War
was one of psychological adjustment in the North and South to the dramatic social changes worked by
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successes of the era – the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of the black man –
and its failures – the substitution of peonage for slavery in the South; the persistence of
virulent racial bigotry and discrimination, relegat[ed] blacks to the status of a permanent
underclass throughout the nation…” (81).
Romance, published at the dawn of Reconstruction, looks back to slavery-era laws
and policies to understand the generation of difference that proved foundational to the
racial discrimination of slavery and post-slavery black subordination. As Karcher notes,
the novel examines slavery’s formulation of racial difference to contemplate equality
following it. But it is within this broader sphere of racial discrimination, as opposed to
racialized slavery, that Karcher situates Child’s polemical intentions.

In particular,

Karcher emphasizes Child’s abolitionist past as well as her more expansive aim of
combating prejudice after slavery.29 And to combat that prejudice – to enable a revisioning of a racially equal America – Child uses the trope of interracial marriage.
Citing Child’s personal correspondence, Karcher writes:
Heading the list of the discriminatory statutes and practices for which she
had castigated her fellow northerners was an “unjust law” forbidding
“marriages between persons of different color.” Thus it seems fitting that
Child should have made interracial marriage her chief metaphor for the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the war and its aftermath. The vanquished South began justifying its effort in the war, and the great
loss of life it incurred, by developing a mythology about Southern culture and the cause of state’s
rights” (485).
29

Drawing from Child’s letters, Karcher notes: “As Child confided to her friends, her intention was to
address the issue of racial prejudice, which she had long recognized as crucial for the American
people to tackle if they were undo the evil of slavery and fulfill the egalitarian promise of their
national creed. ‘Having fought against slavery till I saw it go down in the Red Sea,’ she wrote, ‘I
wanted to do something to undermine prejudice; and there is such a universal passion for novels, that
more can be done in that way, than by the ablest arguments, and the most serious exhortations’” (82).
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egalitarian partnership of America’s diverse races to which she summoned
her compatriots in A Romance of the Republic. (82)

Superficially, Child’s use of marriage to conclude the narrative simply conforms to the
standard practices of the romance genre.

However, her use of interracial marriage

bespeaks a particular vision of racial equality: as gender is integral to racial difference,
her reliance on interracial marriage glimpses a link between racial equality and gender
equality, suggesting the former cannot be achieved without the latter.
Romance closes with both Royal girls marrying white men. Rosa, after being
deceived by her false marriage to Gerald Fitzgerald – and having given birth to their child
– moves to Europe, where she re-invents herself as an opera singer. Concealing her racial
identity from the world, she marries the kind white Louisiana businessman Alfred King,
an old family friend who knows the truth of her racial identity and who has loved her for
a number of years. Similarly Flora, who also conceals her legal race, marries the gentle
white Franz Blumenthal, her father’s clerk who also knows the truth about her and seems
to have loved Flora his whole life. Eventually, both couples and their children return and
settle close to each other in Louisiana. The narrative, then, which commenced with the
sisters being informed of their status as property (and the corresponding fact of their legal
racial identity and threat of being sold into slavery), closes with their marriages to white
men and entry into white society. It is interracial marriage that resolves the sisters’ legal
dilemma and restores them to their original identities.
Yet despite Romance’s transgressive plot of racial deceptions and interracial
marriages, as well as Child’s well-known personal aims to undermine prejudice and
racial discrimination, contemporary critics of the novel have argued the text’s subversive

!

124

potential is limited. In particular, critics have suggested that Child’s vision of racial
progress is fundamentally tempered in two ways. First, it is argued that the Royal sisters
ultimately choose to live as ‘white’ in their marriages. Understanding the sisters’ legal
racial identity of black as their authentic or true racial identity, critics have argued that
Child re-iterates the racial hierarchy of slavery by having the daughters disavow that
authentic or true racial identity of blackness in favour of living whiteness. Second, and
related, in relying on marriage and family to enable racial equality, it is argued that Child
installs a patriarchal understanding of gender, as exemplified in the gender inequality
inherent in marriage, as a solution to the race problem explored in the narrative.
Karsten H. Piep, for example, summarizes this perceived shortcoming in
Romance as follows:
Yet her [Child’s] reliance on the traditional plot conventions of romance,
centering on the adventures of genteel bourgeois characters, may have
contributed to preventing Child from envisioning a postbellum society in
which whites and blacks meet as equals… [T]he interracial marriages in
Child’s novel become a metaphor for the possibility of restoring social
order and averting further civil strife. (172)
But, as Piep continues, the manner in which interracial marriages are effected or realized
in the text limits the extent to which they achieve or demonstrate racial progress:
And even though the marriages between Rosa and King and between Flora
and Blumenthal represent a clear break with social taboos, A Romance
insists that amalgamation and the complete absorption of blacks into the
white mainstream are the only practical means of ensuring the continued

!

125
existence of an American society whose core principles are threatened by
the immoral and potentially destructive institution of slavery. (172)

For Piep and others, the novel’s reliance on the trope of interracial marriage is racially
progressive insofar as it explores transcending the racial divide in a loving way.
However, any prospective racial equality achieved through interracial marriage is
tempered by the gender inequality inherent in marriage. Interracial marriage in the text
does not subvert racial or gender hierarchies but, and especially given the Royal sisters’
self-identification, rather reiterates them, repeating the order of post-Civil War society
forming the basis of the discrimination Child targets.30 And it is this “duality [between
progressive ideals and repetition of hegemony that critics suggest] lies at the heart of
Child’s A Romance of the Republic…” rendering it a text that capitulates to the very
power structures it aims to criticize (Karcher 83).31
While such criticism of Romance is rightfully grounded in an attempt to explain
the scope and limitations of Child’s vision of racial equality, it implicitly repeats as stable
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Further, to be clear, the nature of interracial marriage for Piep is one of blackness being lost in its
absorption by whiteness. As a result, the seemingly subversive deployment of race is in fact a
repetition of the status quo: “The novel’s primary aim, then, is not so much to undermine as to
preserve the foundations of the republic’s war-torn social order, for its romantic resolution serves to
reaffirm the inherent justice and superiority of white middle-class norms and values. Although based
upon a firm belief in the nominal equality of blacks, Child’s idealized vision of America’s postwar
society still leaves the traditional hierarchies of class, gender, and race largely intact” (173).
31

As Karcher writes: “Of course interracial marriage represents a subversion, rather than a fulfillment,
of the romance plot’s traditional function – to re-establish the harmony of a social order threatened
with disruption. While adhering to the convention of symbolically reconciling class antagonisms
through marriage, the marriage in question violates one of the society’s primary taboos. Nevertheless,
to the extent that it ratifies the central institution of patriarchy and upholds the norms of the dominant
race, interracial marriage does not fundamentally challenge a social order that subordinates women to
men, people of color to whites, and the working class to the bourgeoisie. Instead, it merely provides a
means of gradually absorbing people of color into the white middle-class mainstream” (82-83).
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the categories of identity the text struggles to undermine.32 Specifically, the critical
notion that Romance merely recapitulates the slavery and post-slavery racial hierarchy
overlooks the manner in which it nonetheless disrupts or questions the historical
production of racial knowledge. Moreover, the entwined criticism that, as an inherent
feature of the romance genre, patriarchy is inevitably repeated as a solution to the identity
problems raised in the text, is fundamentally correct. However, such criticism fails to
adequately account for or appreciate the text’s revelation of how gender is essential to
racial difference or how such understanding of racial difference was foundational and
traceable back to racialized slavery. To be clear, the novel does advance racial equality
through gender compromise: rather than a complete reformulation of the meaning of race
and gender following slavery, Child’s plot of interracial marriage does re-install by way
of marriage the patriarchal structures that enable such conceptual distinctions.
Nevertheless, the text’s subversive potential is maintained, if not wholly realized, in its
elucidation of the intersection between gender and race. As such, though it fails to
provide a program or model for complete reform, Romance’s conceptualization of this
intersection is radical in that it glimpses the potential for social reform even if such
potential cannot be practically realized.
Criticisms that Romance re-constructs the racial hierarchies it presumably aims to
undermine emphasize what they view as the assimilationist policies inherent in Child’s
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As Piep writes: “Ultimately, then, presumed racial inferiority – clad in evolutionary terms as the
lamentable but undeniable backwardness of the black populace as a whole – once more afforded a
pretext for the restriction of African American participation within a renovated society bent on
maintaining its color-based social hierarchies” (171).
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vision of interracial marriage.33 Particularly problematic for these critics have been the
final scenes of the novel that suggest black subservience as a pre-condition to racial
harmony. Following Emancipation, and re-settled in their ‘new’ white identities, the
Royal sisters find their future in their families’ shared destiny. Gesturing towards a
potential new America in Reconstruction, the narrative closes with a “tableau” of the
newly reformulated Royal family, enjoying their freedom and each other within a racially
egalitarian America:
This playful trifling was interrupted by the sound of the folding-doors
rolling apart; and in the brilliantly lighted adjoining room a tableau
became visible, in honor of the birthday. Under festoons of the American
flag, surmounted by the eagle, stood the American flag, stood Eulalia, in
ribbons of red, white, and blue, with a circle of stars round her head. One
hand upheld the shield of the Union, and in the other the scales of Justice
were evenly poised. By her side stood Rosen Blumen, holding in one
hand a gilded pole surmounted by a liberty-cap, while her other hand
rested protectingly on the head of Tulee’s Benny, who was kneeling and
looking upward in thanksgiving. (440)
Amidst the tattered flag of the Union’s triumph stands Rosa’s and Flora’s daughters –
Eulalia and Rosen, respectively – themselves ostensibly emblematic of the new post!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33

Eric Lott identifies that even antislavery advocates like Child still fell prey to assumptions about the
fundamental difference of black people from whites, for example in their patronizing belief in the
innate goodness of blacks: “Nor was the antislavery movement exempt from such condescension.
Awkward attempts to rewrite what were believed to be natural differences into special racial
capacities resulted in notions of racial ‘variety without inferiority,’ as Lydia Maria Child, editor of the
National Slavery Standard, put it: ‘Flutes on different keys… will harmonize the better.’ Although
the idea was to move ‘feminine’ values to the cultural center, such arguments relied on the black
inferiority they sought to displace. Karen Sanchez-Eppler has suggested that this tendency derived in
part from the final asymmetry of white women and blacks in such rhetoric” (33).
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slavery America, in turn holding symbols of that America’s promises of justice and
freedom. Yet, that tableau of prospective equality, featuring the mixed-race children of
the Royal sisters and their respective white husbands, is tempered by its inclusion of
Benny, the son of the Royals’ sisters’ faithful servant Tulee, who is featured in a
submissive position and subordinate to the visibly white girls.
Piep for example argues that Benny’s physical subordination within the tableau
exemplifies Child’s limited vision of racial equality: “Though recently freed, the racially
unmixed black child [Benny] still kneels down. And while the patronizing hand of his
social superior prevents him from rising up, he assumes the devout posture of puerile
thankfulness” (172). Although all the children are legally black, only Benny’s blackness
is observable. For Piep, such racial positioning within the tableau mimics Child’s vision
wherein blackness remains subordinate to (apparent) whiteness post-slavery. As such,
the equality Child envisions is unavailable to Benny:
After the revelries are over, destiny, it seems, will shine much brighter on
the fair-skinned children on top than the black boy on the bottom of this
new, albeit more benign social hierarchy. Commenting upon the apparent
color-coding that permeates the tableau, Jean Fagan Yellin writes that “as
in pre-Emancipation versions of the double emblem, this assignment of
the role of liberator to the light-skinned girl and the role of grateful,
kneeling ex-slave to the dark child suggests an endorsement of white
superiority that contradicts egalitarian claims.” (Piep 172)
Here, Benny’s submissive posture is read as an imaginative failing of the text. Romance
may cross racial lines, it is argued, but difference, and its significance, persists.
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Similarly, Dana D. Nelson argues in her introduction to Romance that:
A Romance of the Republic works to eliminate categories of racial
difference, to show that “blacks” can be like “whites.” But what it fails to
allow – a positive evaluation of cultural or social configurations different
from those of the white middle and upper classes – effectively prevents the
novel from holding out a radical promise for racial tolerance or
understanding. (vii)

For Nelson, the failure of the text to imagine a positive black cultural contribution stems
from white inability to accommodate and accept cross-racial differences:
In other words, the novel is not able to imagine a new society that could
countenance the rich cultural variety produced by intersections of African
cultural heritage in slave quarter communities across the South. It can’t
imagine “white” liking anything about “black” culture. Its contributions
to cross-racial understanding are blunted because the novel fails to
imagine social cross-cultural relationships to complement romantic crossracial ones. (vii)
Child’s model of racial reform, according to this line of criticism, amounts to a less
hostile imitation of slavery-era black subordination. And, according to Piep, Nelson and
others, it is precisely because Child’s vision of equality hinges on assimilation that her
vision of racial equality is necessarily compromised, including within the trope of
interracial marriage.
Debra J. Rosenthal notes that, conventionally, nineteenth-century American
novels advocating reform of racial policies typically do so by proposing assimilation.
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When miscegenation is a factor in the realization of that proposed assimilation, it
typically takes the form of the raced individual acquiescing to the white lover’s wishes.
Thus, “in conciliatory conceptions of miscegenation, the Native American or black
surrenders him- or herself in the arms of the white lover, thereby deflecting anxiety about
the dark other taking up arms” (Rosenthal 7).34 While miscegenation novels do offer
racial progress, the nature of that progress is not an equitable refashioning of relations
between the races, but rather the absorption of blacks into white culture or the implicit
benign dominance of whites over blacks. That her readership was comprised almost
exclusively of white women emphasizes the difficult position in which Child’s aims
situated her: wanting to present a provocative plot that would inspire anti-prejudice
sentiment, but also wanting to adhere to the romance form and its generic conventions,
Child’s vision of assimilation as racial progress is perhaps to be expected. That noted,
critical reconciliation of the text’s transgressive plot of miscegenation and its seemingly
conservative closure of assimilation – which emphasizes the text’s subversive limits – has
focussed on the willingness of the Royal sisters to live as white.
Knowing that they are legally black, and potentially slaves due to the legal
consequences of their father’s failings, the sisters’ decisions to marry white men and
mask their legal race has been viewed by critics as an implicit inability by Child to
imagine for the Royal sisters a (black) freedom that would equal white freedom. At the
core of assimilation-emphasizing interpretations of the text is the narrative fact that the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rosenthal’s broader point is that novels about miscegenation typically take two forms, where
assimilation seems the only viable form of racial progress: “Because the existence of white and
nonwhite bodies in close proximity so vexed people in both the North and the South, representing
such closeness fictively inevitably took on political dimensions. Novels with miscegenation themes
tend to fall into two overlapping categories: those that, often in ideologically unsuspect ways, defend
the status quo and those that advocate social transformation, usually via assimilation” (7).
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Royal sisters choose to live as white. Therefore, any positive or happy racial progress for
the sisters is necessarily compromised or tainted by their implicitly privileging and
preferring whiteness to blackness – i.e. they pass as white. The notion of passing, of
course, reveals the constructed nature of racial difference: because racial identity may not
be observable, the notion that an individual may perform a racial identity alternative to
their ostensibly biological one signifies race as a cultural or social phenomenon (as
opposed to a scientific or biological expression). In the act of passing, the problems
inherent in identifying racial difference as phenotype is exploited by individuals who are
legally black but live in society as white so as to reap the benefits that accrue to
whiteness.

The concept of passing, then, hinges upon the individual’s intention to

deceive the social order by refusing his or her deemed racial identity. Indeed, Romance
addresses the kind of deception inherent in passing in its refusal to agree that is what the
Royal sisters have done.

In response to the allegation by Mr. Green that she has

attempted to “pass such a counterfeit on society” in respect of presenting Flora as her
(white) daughter, Mrs. Delano states:
“I have attempted to pass no counterfeit on society,” she replied,
with dignity. “Flora is a blameless and accomplished young lady. Her
beauty and vivacity captivated me before I knew anything of her origin ;
and in the same way they have captivated you…”. (277-78)
Mrs. Delano, who functions as a stand-in for Flora’s mother, refuses to concede the
primacy of Flora’s legal racial identity or that Flora is somehow evading or departing
from her true ‘black’ self. Sympathetic to the sisters’ plight, and understanding them to
be for all intents and purposes white, Mrs. Delano continues that “I have learned not to

!

132

estimate people and things according to their real value, not according to any merely
external accidents” (278).
Reading the Royal sisters’ ‘final’ whiteness then as advocating assimilation
overlooks the manner in which the narrative destabilizes racial knowledge and
identification. Specifically, Romance problematizes the notion of passing in two ways.
First, the will to racial deception typically present in passing is lacking. While the
novel’s evocation of interracial marriage results in the Royal sisters capitulating to white
patriarchal notions of femininity there is, practically speaking, no deceptive intent on
their part. Appearing white and having lived their lives as white, the Royal sisters’
decision to live as white is not the evasion of their authentic racial identity but, rather, a
return to it. Second, and related, the notion of passing paradoxically iterates a stability to
race that Romance struggles to undo. While the act of passing reveals a slippage between
the phenotypic markers of race and their social meanings, the concept of passing as an
evasion of one’s racial identity implicitly requires a stable racial identity to evade.35 Of
course, that stable racial identity is legal – the sisters’ ‘true’ race invoked by critics is a
legal one. Nonetheless, criticism that Romance envisions equality through passing or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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While I argue that the critical notion of ‘passing’ implements racial stability at the level of
interpretation, it is also present within the passing novels themselves. Julie Cary Nerad points out that
passing novels often carry a theme of racial uplift, suggesting that characters who pass as white ought
to self-identify as black and commit to racial progress. Failure to do so often results in those
characters suffering some kind of punishment: “Framed in biological terms, passing (regardless of
intent) is usually understood as perilous for the passer’s ‘true’ black identity and thus in conflict with
her responsibility to both her African American family and the race. Social conventions frequently
punish individuals who fail to fulfill this responsibility” (815). As such, as Nerad continues, the desire
to advance racial reform within the novel undermines its aims by ultimately emphasizing the
biological truth of race: “However, by supporting the tenets of racial uplift and punishing passers who
reject the black race, some passing novels minimize their subversive potential by associating racial
responsibility with the single drop of black blood, thus reinscribing the association between racial
identity and biology” (815-16). Of course, in Romance, there is no racial uplift per se, and the novel
is distinguishable in that sense.
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through racial deceptions elides how the narrative fundamentally subverts racial selfidentification. Beyond merely suggesting that racial difference is socially constructed,
Romance emphasizes the primacy of those structures, interrogating precisely how racial
difference is produced and imposed.
Newlyn argues that Romance is not a passing narrative but a transracial one.
While both narrative forms generally aim to subvert race, their techniques to do so are
different: passing narratives emphasize individual intention to subvert or deceive racial
categories, whereas transracial ones focus on the social institutions that produce race and
thus demonstrates an inherent instability within racial definitions. As Newlyn defines
them:
Unlike passing narratives, which focus on a character’s racial (or other)
crossing and culminate in the restoration of a “real” racial identity,
transracial narratives are concerned less with the performing subject or the
restoration of stable racial identities; what these narratives call attention to
instead are the performative structures of racial and gender identity
themselves. (45)
Thus, while both passing and transracial narratives emplot individuals living differently
from their legal racial status, distinguishing them permits critical consideration of
narratives that do not seek to racially define their characters but, rather, to illustrate their
movement across races.
In particular, in transracial narratives the ensuing racial confusion is not due to
individual agency but an inability of racial definitions to adequately fix and delimit
individual racial identity:
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In transracial narratives, crossracial embodiment appears divorced from
subjective agency – it is not individuals who transgress the norms (as in
passing texts), but the norms which govern the process of transgression
and reincorporation. Racial crossing occurs, then, because of prevailing
political, sociojuridical, and economic rules and imperatives, mandates
that are conspicuously external to the subject herself. (Newlyn 45)

It is precisely because the Royal sisters have lived and conceive of themselves as white –
and are black only at law – that Newlyn argues Romance highlights the structures of
identity formation rather than the characters’ subjective intent to deceive.

Because

transracial narratives emphasize the structures and strictures of racial knowledge as
opposed to subjectivity or individual desire, they are not driven by the individual’s racial
journey or realization to the same extent as passing narratives. As such, “… unlike
passing texts, which focus on and culminate via the disposition of individual identities,
what is important is not the fate of specific individuals but the structural mandates
regulating racial identity within a slaveholding economy” (Newlyn 52). Criticism of
Romance focussing on its imaginative limits implicitly understands the narrative to be
one of passing and, as a result, emphasizes the narrative’s closure at the expense of
overlooking its development.36
While the sisters do appear to choose to live as white, despite their knowledge of
their contrary legal racial identity and their personal understanding of the unjustness of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Nerad also emphasizes the social structures producing race in Romance, characterizing it as a novel
of “unintentional passing”: “A Romance thus illustrates another common trope in unintentional
passing novels: despite a recognition that the preceding generation of parents failed in its (national and
racial) responsibility to its children, these grown children repeat their parents’ actions and do not tell
their own children that they are legally black” (823).
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slavery, the narrative more broadly explores how racial knowledge is produced and,
because it is arbitrary, how it is stabilized.37 In summarizing her life, Flora emphasizes
that whiteness was her singular racial experience and ultimately it was the law that forced
the recognition of her blackness:
“… Rosa and I were brought up like little princesses, and we never knew
that we were colored. My mother was the daughter of a rich Spanish
gentleman named Gonsalez. She was educated in Paris, and was elegant
and accomplished. She was handsomer than Rosa… But cher papa died
very suddenly; and first they told us we were very poor, and must earn our
living; and then they told us that our mother was a slave, and so, according
to law, we were slaves too. They would have sold us at auction, if a
gentleman who knew us when papa was alive had n’t [sic] smuggled us
away privately to Nassau…”. (101)
Framing the revelation of her blackness as a result of the property interests vested in her
person, Flora is nonetheless clear: in her life prior to this legal definition she was white
and had no reason to think otherwise.
At its core, then, Romance emphasizes the arbitrary legal definitions of race
imposed on the characters over their disavowal of a ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ racial identity
about which they never knew. In their learning of the law that has redefined them as
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As Holloway writes about the ways in which literature has engaged the familial reproduction of race
through law: “Literature certainly engages these issues of color and status, especially in the passing
and tragic mulatto narratives, but instead of accepting a nuanced legal resolution, literature explores
and resurrects the complications of identitarian-dependent fictions…. These vocabularies and
practices represented the facts of social and legal customs and were clearly evident in the rule of
society, and the processing of laws forced as much attention to color as they created ways to disclaim
it” (33-34).
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black – contrary to any other marker or mechanism of racial identity – the
incomprehensibility of their situation is put into stark relief:
Their friend [Madame Guirlande] hesitated. “Remember, you have
promised to be calm,” said she. “I presume you don’t know that by the
laws of Louisiana, ‘the child follows the condition of the mother.” The
consequence is, that you are slaves, and your father’s creditors claim a
right to sell you.”
Rosabella turned very pale, and the hand with which she clutched a
chair trembled violently. But she held her head erect, and her look and
tone were very proud, as she exclaimed, “ We become slaves! I will die
rather.” (54)
Reading the text as ultimately confirming a racial ontology and hierarchy generated
within slavery (and persisting past it) implements a stability or knowability to race that
the text tries to undo.
In addition to the (racial) experience of the Royal sisters, this undoing of race and
its appearance is further exemplified in the brief narrative near the end of the text of
George Falkner.

In Massachusetts, Lily Bell’s father helps apprehend two fugitive

slaves – George and Henny. Unbeknownst to Bell, George is in fact the son of his
daughter, Lily, and her husband Gerald Fitzgerald – he is the baby that Rosa switched for
her own with Fitzgerald, but who was presumed lost at sea after Rosa took him with her
on her European travels. A dispute arises between Bell and the abolitionist Percival over
the right to claim George as a fugitive slave, as the abolitionist Percival disagrees with
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the lack of procedural rights available to blacks to protect them from wrongful or illegal
enslavement:
“But,” urged Mr. Percival, “that a man is claimed as a slave by no
means proves that he is a slave. The law presumes that every man has a
right to personal liberty, and it is proved otherwise ; and in order to secure
a fair trial of the question, the write of habeas corpus has been provided.”
(315)
Notwithstanding the legal inequities against blacks within slavery, the issue quickly
becomes one of knowledge of racial difference underpinning slavery and the legal
apparatus perpetuating it, including fugitive slave laws. As they continue:
“It’s a great disgrace to Massachusetts, sir, that she puts so many
obstacles in the way of enforcing the laws of the United States,” replied
Mr. Bell.
“If your grandson should be claimed as a slave, I rather think you
would consider the writ of habeas corpus a wise and just provision,” said
the plain-speaking Francis Jackson. “It is said that this young stranger,
whom they chased as a thief, and carried off as a slave, had a complexion
no darker than his.” (315)
Race is thus unhinged from the effect of slavery.

In potentially subjecting the

biologically white George Falkner to re-enslavement, Child establishes the absurd reach
of slavery to unilaterally and without question define as slaves, and thereby black, those
individuals who have no connection, ancestrally or behaviourally to the institution or its
racialized foundation.
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Critics who thus read Romance as confirming a racial ontology and hierarchy

generated within slavery (and persisting past it into the new Republic guiding the
behaviour of its racialized citizens) must implement a racial determinacy the text tries to
resist. Moreover, the familial re-formations that close the narrative allow the Royal
sisters’ whiteness and corresponding happiness do not resolve the epistemological
uncertainty around race inherent at the beginning of the text but, rather, recycles it. Flora
and Rosa do not live as black. But there is no reason for them to do so and the narrative’s
conclusion illustrates a disjunct between race and individual identity – between the
dynamic lived aspect of race and the static legal definitions that arbitrarily hinge on
ancestry – that extends beyond any resolution of the girls’ predicament. On the one hand,
where the novel opens with the Royal sisters being plunged into potential enslavement,
their decision to live as white is a return to their racial identity. On the other hand, racial
resolution through the family unit paradoxically re-enacts the precise dilemmas that
initiated their plight. As Nerad explains it referencing the sisters’ re-entry into white
society: “I would argue that the inheritance they [Rosa and Flora] restore is not a false
one. They restore the paternal inheritance lost through Alfred Royal’s failed business
ventures. Thus, just as Rosa and Flora make their debut in the novel as white, they bow
out as white” (823).
Although the closure of the novel appears to restore racial and broader social
order by re-installing the Royal sisters into the bourgeois sphere as white (with Benny as
their subordinate), they claim what was and ought to have been their familial inheritance
– racial and perhaps otherwise – even if their legal racial identity quietly follows them
into the new Republic. Moreover, while the sisters’ lived whiteness allows them to avoid
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their legal enslavement, it emphasizes the problems inherent in knowing race, situating
their existence within the slippage between white and black. And because that slippage is
stabilized by the mechanistic deployment of a legal definition of race devoid of a
phenotypic basis – i.e. partus sequitur ventrem – the narrative’s closure of the sisters’ reinstitution of the family unit echoes the significance of the family unit to the (arbitrary)
production of racial difference.

Conclusion
In its consideration of interracial intimacy, Romance for the most part focuses on
loving relationships. This is historically inconsistent with the kind of sex that typically
crossed the slavery line. As Kennedy notes, “There was probably more black-white sex
during this period than at any other time (thus far) in American history. Most of it was
unwanted sex, stemming from the white males’ exploitation of black women…”
(Interracial 41).38 However, as Kennedy continues, there were also instances of loving
relationships across the racial line, as fictionalized many times in Romance, and
considering their existence need not undermine recognizing the gendered violence that
typified black-white sex during slavery:
We can be sensitive to the plight of enslaved women, however, and
still acknowledge that consensual sex, prompted by erotic attraction and
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As David Brion Davis summarizes the violence that typified interracial sex during slavery: “White
planter society officially condemned interracial sexual unions and tended to blame lower-class white
males for fathering mulatto children. Yet there is abundant evidence that many slaveowners, sons of
slaveowners, and overseers took black mistresses or in effect raped the wives and daughters of slave
families. This abuse of power may not have been quite as universal as Northern abolitionists claimed,
but we now know that offenders included such prestigious figures as James Henry Hammond and
even Thomas Jefferson. The ubiquity of such sexual exploitation was sufficient to deeply scar and
humiliate black women, to instill rage in black men, and to arouse both shame and bitterness in white
women” (Inhuman 201).
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other mysteries of the human condition, has occurred between
subordinates and superiors in even the most barren and brutal settings.
Evidence of consensual sexual intimacy within the confines of bondage is
found in the unusual solicitude shown by certain masters toward slaves
with whom they had sex and by whom they sired children. Freeing a slave
mistress of the offspring of such a union, acknowledging paternity of or
assuming financial responsibility for a slave’s children, marrying a former
slave – all of these are potentially telltale signs of affection. (Interracial
45)

As Kennedy notes, we know from a variety of sources that there were seemingly caring,
intimate relationships between slaveholders and their slaves. Certainly, we know from
the court documents and legislation that there were instances where slaveholders sought
to liberate their progeny-property, presumably out of some sense of paternal obligation or
even affection. In considering these relationships and what they reveal about the familial
dynamics of slavery and their clash with the broader property regime, we obtain a clearer
understanding of the scope and nature of interracial relationships within slavery as well
as of how and why racial difference was produced during slavery.
Interracial sex, including interracial intimacy, revealed the limits of social racial
definitions. As Winthrop D. Jordan explains in his seminal White Over Black:
The relationship between miscegenation and society was intricately
reciprocal. While miscegenation altered the tone of society, the social
institution of slavery helped reshape the definition of miscegenation from
fusion of that which was different to fusion of higher and lower; hence
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slavery was of course responsible for much of the normative judgment
implied in the concept of miscegenation. (475)

For Jordan, as slavery and racial subordination imbued miscegenation with social
meaning, miscegenation in turn impacted the social meaning of racial difference and
slavery. In particular, miscegenation both in its exercise and its proclaimed illegitimacy
reiterated that racial difference was a fact. That fact of racial difference rested on a belief
in its existence: “… as both slavery and miscegenation rested, in the final analysis, upon
a perception of difference between the races…” (Jordan 475).39 It is this perception of
difference that Romance examines.
The story of the Royal sisters is one of potential enslavement disconnected from
racial difference measured by any standard – phenotypic, behavioural, or experiential.
What Romance illustrates is that even in the absence of any “physiognomic fact” of race
the ideological commitment, and legal reality, of racial difference ruthlessly persisted. It
did so by way of established legal principles – partus sequitur ventrem, in particular –
that ensured race, however tangentially or imperceptibly, existed and remained definitive
of enslavement. In so doing, Romance illuminates the significance of racial difference
and how it was conditioned by slavery’s racial categories and understandings: race,
particularly in the final years of slavery as experienced by the Royal sisters, was the
unquestionable Southern explanation for slavery.

Given conflicting rights and

inheritances arising from interracial sexual relationships within slavery, the arbitrary and
historically legally inconsistent principle that the condition of the child follows its
mother’s sustained slavery and its apparatus of racialized power relations. But that
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Jordan roots this “perception” in “physiognomic fact” (475). Child, of course, refuses such
biological fact in her exploration of the persistent perception of racial difference.
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principle to some extent extracted slavery from racial difference as the cause for slavery,
rendering racial difference instead its effect, as Romance suggests. Of course, what
Romance also suggests is that slavery’s property relations re-inscribe race as a legal
operation, even where it seems by all other measures that racial difference is absent. In
focussing on the family (or, at least, sexual reproduction) as the site of reproduction of
slavery and racial difference, Romance establishes racial difference (and slavery) as selfperpetuating, an arbitrary legal principle designed to ensure the continuation of an
institution on which it is based and which confirms its existence. It is this insidious reach
of slavery and its legal underpinning of racial difference as determined and perpetuated
by maternity that Romance examines.
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CHAPTER THREE

“By a Fiction of Law and Custom”: Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson and
the Creation of Racial Difference

“If inequality treated by the law alone is so hard to eradicate, how is one to destroy that
which also seems to have immovable foundations in nature herself?”
- Alexis de Tocqueville

Introduction
In my earlier chapter on Frederick Douglass’s 1855 autobiography My Bondage
and My Freedom, I discussed how the identification of black skin with wrongdoing was
generated within slavery. Specifically, I examined how the order and efficient operation
of the plantation presumed slaves had committed some wrongdoing that necessitated and
legitimated their constant discipline. The deployment of this presumption and resulting
discipline of slaves was routinely confirmed as legal: in an effort to render slaveholders’
authority over their slaves as perfect, or at least incontestable by slaves, courts typically
refused to interfere with the exercise of slaveholders’ disciplinary powers. Importantly,
as black skin became the ideological reason and basis for enslavement, the presumptive
wrongdoing of slaves became conflated with black skin. As a result, and as exemplified
in the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, black skin, whether that of free or enslaved, came to
signify wrongdoing or even illegality.1
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As I discuss, following slavery, the racial divide rigidified as legal decisions and legislation
proliferated in an effort to define the races, as exemplified in the Jim Crow-era. This push to
distinguish the races carried with it a refinement and implementation of the legal measures to
criminalize black presence.
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My chapter on Lydia Maria Child’s 1867 novel A Romance of the Republic

investigates that novel’s complicated understanding of the intersection between race and
family within slavery.

In its narrative of the Royal daughters’ journey from their

sheltered existence of white upper class Southern society to potentially being sold into
slavery and back again, Romance elucidates the manner in which racial difference was
sustained and perpetuated within slavery. Because the Royal daughters appear, and were
raised as, white, Child illustrates the slipperiness of racial distinctions, particularly in
respect of phenotype.

Moreover, as Child emphasizes, when an individual’s racial

identity was uncertain as a result of such markers of race not corresponding with that
individual’s claimed legal racial identity, that uncertainty was resolved by a legal
principle that determined and defined racial identity matrilineally.

Accordingly, an

individual’s racial identity was that of his or her mother’s, irrespective of that
individual’s appearance, conduct, or claims otherwise.2
In this chapter, I turn to Mark Twain’s novel, Pudd’nhead Wilson, which provides
a productive counterpoint to My Bondage and Romance on the problematic nature of
legal and practical constitutions of race within slavery. Where Douglass takes racial
difference as a fact, albeit to consider its cultural significance, and Child re-iterates the
legal stabilization of racial difference even as she subversively questions its ultimate
knowability, Twain in Pudd’nhead Wilson refuses any ontology of racial difference,
biological or otherwise.

Rather than simply condemning the institution of slavery

without questioning the racial difference that came to legally define it, Twain explores
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Of course, phenotype was not determinative of the mother’s racial identity either so, as in Romance,
women who did not appear nor live as black may have birthed black children by white men, simply as
a result of legal definition. The conclusion of such reasoning was eventually manifest in the ‘one-drop
rule’.
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the legal production of racial difference for the express purpose of enslavement. Thus
where Douglass and Child ultimately accept racial difference and its legal significance,
Twain refuses any stable epistemology of race, thereby refuting any meaningful legal
definition of the same. This chapter, then, focuses on Twain’s fictional examination in
Pudd’nhead Wilson of the legal and cultural knowledge of racial difference within slave
society.
Published in 1894, Puddn’head Wilson is a strange blend of multiple intersecting
plots set within a Missouri slaveholding town that, although resolved in the narrative’s
final scene – a dramatic courtroom reveal of a murderer’s true, racial identity – require
some disentangling. 3

It begins with the arrival of David Wilson to the sleepy,

slaveholding town of Dawson’s Landing, Missouri, in 1830. On his arrival, Wilson’s
planned career ambition is to practice law, but that ambition is ill fated when he
immediately alienates some of the town’s more influential citizens. When he and those
citizens hear a dog irritatingly barking in the distance, Wilson wryly notes that he wishes
he owned half of the dog so he could kill his half. The other citizens completely
misunderstand his joke. Rather, taking his comment literally, they conclude Wilson does
not understand basic conceptions of property and ownership in respect of a single animal
– nor even the consequence that killing half an animal would kill it entirely – and as a
result they deem him foolish – a ‘pudd’nhead’.
At roughly the same time as Wilson seals his fate with the town’s elite, and
elsewhere in Dawson’s Landing, a slaveowner threatens to sell a young slave mother
named Roxana, as well as her fellow slaves, down the Mississippi river as punishment for
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For a much clearer review of the plot, as well as a consideration of Pudd’nhead Wilson’s
significance to law and literature studies, see Richard Posner’s Law and Literature, 25-28.
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a minor theft on his property. Eventually relenting on his threat, the slaveowner orders
life on the plantation to resume as before. Nonetheless, Roxana remains haunted by the
contingency of slave existence, particularly as it may affect her child. Frightened that she
and her child could so easily be ‘sold down the river’ at any time to a much harsher slave
existence, Roxana resolves to rescue her son from such a fate. Importantly, Roxana and
her son are both phenotypically white. As they are described: “She was a slave, and
salable as such. Her child was thirty-one parts white, and he, too, was a slave, and by a
fiction of law and custom a negro” (9).
In a plot reminiscent of the infant switching in Romance, Roxana takes advantage
of her son’s whiteness, his youth, and his nearly equal age to their master’s son, Tom, and
switches the infants to save her son – the appropriately named Valet de Chambre – from
slavery. The switch remains unknown to the community and the children themselves.
Even the master does not discern his child is not his own. The narrative then moves
forward twenty years and finds the switched heirs of mastery and slavery as men. As
grown men, Roxana’s son, the ‘black’ master Tom, is selfish and cruel; the master’s son,
the ‘white’ slave, Valet, is docile and passive, but decent and capable.4 As a result of his
bad habits, including incurring gambling debts, Tom takes to disguising himself to steal
from the town’s residents.
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Importantly, Lawrence Howe notes that “… Pudd’nhead Wilson invokes racial stereotypes not in
order to endorse them as the stable language of truth but to illuminate the breakdown of the masterslave opposition in the portrait of Tom. The theme of doubling is not, then, simply some Twaininan
quirk but an ambiguity inherent in the reversible stereotypes of aristocrat and Negro that Tom
embodies” (502).
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During this period, Italian twins also arrive at Dawson’s Landing.5 The twins find

themselves victimized by Tom’s thievery shortly thereafter, as he disguises himself and
steals from them a jewel-embroidered dagger. Tom’s theft of the dagger is significant.
Because of his debts and his unwillingness to wait for the death of his wealthy uncle, who
has raised him and is one of the town’s most influential citizens, Tom comes to murder
him with the twins’ dagger.6 And because the murder weapon is found, and is known to
belong to the twins, they are accused of and charged with the murder of Tom’s uncle and
subjected to a full trial.
Wilson acts as the twins’ legal representation at trial, and ultimately obtains their
exoneration. But he does through his own evidence – private records of the fingerprints
of the town’s residents he has accumulated over the years for his own experiments with
the new science of fingerprint identification. In the courtroom demonstration of his series
of Tom’s fingerprints at the twins’ trial, including those taken when Tom was an infant
prior to Roxana’s infant switching and those taken after the switch, Wilson establishes
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In early drafts of the text, the Italian twins are conjoined. There are traces of this early conception of
them as conjoined in the published text, most clearly in their self-narrative of having been used as a
sideshow attraction when younger.
6

It is worth noting that Tom’s is wearing ‘blackface’ as his disguise when he sets about to steal from
his uncle (when his uncle awakens to find Tom stealing he tries to stop him and is murdered by Tom):
“Then he [Tom] blacked his face with a burnt cork and put the cork in his pocket” (93). Eric Lott has
noted in his discussion of Twain’s Huckleberry Finn that “Twain’s response [to minstrel shows]
marks a real (and perhaps typical) attraction to and celebration of black culture. Indeed, in Following
the Equator (1897) he notes his love of beautiful black bodies and his disgust for white ones. But
when such observations do not fall into derision, they are clearly the patronizing obverse of it, and at
the very least signify an unexamined investment in exoticism” (31-32). As a corrupt, but
phenotypically (and raised as) white person, Tom’s blackface in this criminal moment is significant.
It does not suggest Twain diverged from the simplistic (and perhaps condescending) view of blacks
Lott identifies. But it does suggest that Twain views race, to the extent it exists in Pudd’nhead
Wilson, to be composed of learned behaviours (or at least cultural). After all, Tom’s misdeeds are not
the product of his (minor) blackness, but rather the result of having been indulged because of his
whiteness. Moreover, Tom’s wearing of blackface further complicates the matter by suggesting the
behaviours attributed to, or defined as the expression of, race – or, rather, the way understanding of
certain behaviours are racialized (such as the view that blacks were inherently criminal) – are
ultimately fictitious or perhaps deceptive.!
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that Tom’s fingerprints are on the murder weapon. Those records also reveal the fact of
the baby switch and, by extension, Tom’s legal racial identity.

However, Tom’s

blackness is not merely incidental to his having been identified as murderer. Rather, it
situates any punishment for Tom within slavery’s network of property relations.
Specifically, the novel closes with the court conditioning Tom’s punishment for
murder according to his recently regained status as slave: the court dictates that Tom’s
punishment ought not compromise his value as property, and the court directs he is to be
sold to satisfy the estate creditors who were cheated by Roxana’s earlier infant switching.
Thus, after presenting switched racial identities within slavery, which ultimately results
in the murder, the narrative reconciles its disparate plots with a conclusion that “restore[s]
racial order” through the court’s re-assigning of the original names and social positions to
Tom and Valet (Gair 204). Consequently, the tension between the narrative’s opening of
racial subversion and its closing’s apparent capitulation to the hegemony of race has been
troubling for some critics. On its surface, the narrative appears to reinforce as correct the
racial hierarchy within slavery.
Certainly, Pudd’nhead Wilson appears to foreclose the possibility of subverting
‘race’ within slavery.

Myra Jehlen, for example, argues that the novel’s plots

fundamentally restrain Twain’s imaginative potential, exemplifying a broader trend
within his works “which frequently end… in the refusal, or inability to imagine a
significant change” (154).7 In so arguing, Jehlen notes that the critical dilemma within
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Jehlen’s point here is that Twain’s oeuvre is characterized by an ambivalence towards the potential
of black male power, such that in Pudd’nhead Wilson Twain is required to return the black murderer
to slavery without explicitly confirming the social value of slavery: “There is nothing joyous in
restoring the status quo of Dawson’s Landing. Twain may have been reluctant to see black men
acquire the power of whites and may have viewed their bid for a share of power as outright
usurpation. He did not vindicate white society. This is a familiar dilemma in his works” (54).
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the text arises from the inability to reconcile a subversive reading of the narrative with its
final reification of slavery-era logic. As she continues, this critical “stalemate here seems
particularly frustrating: change must be defeated yet nothing of the established way of
life appears worth preserving” (54).

Similarly, Christopher Gair writes that Twain

ultimately reiterates the racial difference he presumably set out to subvert, suggesting the
novel “illustrates the extent to which a writer as sensitive as was Twain to the subtleties
of his culture’s racial discourses remains unable entirely to escape the logic of such
[racialized] language” (205).

Viewing Twain as locked into merely repeating the

hegemonic and restrictive terms of racial difference, critics such as Jehlen and Gair
suggest that “Twain veers between an ability to read through those ‘fictions of law and
custom’ that support the racial hierarchy and an inability to do anything but reinscribe
them” (Gair 205).8
While such readings of Pudd’nhead Wilson are correct to emphasize that the
narrative’s emplotment of Tom’s re-enslavement re-iterates the legal logic and
significance of racial difference within slavery, I argue that Twain’s demonstration of the
relative interchangeability of master and slave reveals the constructed nature of racial
difference and artificiality of race as a system of classification. As such, I interpret
Twain as inquiring into the production of racial difference at law.

In his tale of
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Gair ultimately situates the novel’s writing within the cultural longing for slavery era racial relations
despite its conclusion being clear that Wilson’s triumph at its close exemplifies the lack of racial
equality following slavery: “Written at a moment when nostalgia for antebellum plantation codes was
gaining credence – and only a few years before the publication of hugely popular plantation novels by
Thomas Nelson Page and others – Pudd’nhead Wilson partially shares the conservatism of such texts
and, finally, will not permit Roxy’s power to survive. Instead, as the friendship between Judge
Driscoll and Wilson seems to signify, a new alliance between traditional white Southern does and new
legal and scientific Northern ones reimposes old bonds… In his conclusions, however, Twain is
unambiguous: the power accrued by David Wilson, placed at the heart of the developing economy of
Dawson’s Landing, comes at the expense of the freedoms and opportunities promised to the
emancipated slave and the immigrant after the Civil War” (205).
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indistinguishable infants ultimately deemed racially different, Twain suggests that there is
no measurable criteria by which essential racial identity can be definitively determined.
Moreover, Wilson’s final courtroom dramatics, wherein the law ‘correctly’ re-races those
before it, reveal that the markers of racial difference the law invokes as authoritative are,
in fact, arbitrary. While its conclusion may appear to capitulate to the demands of
slavery, Pudd’nhead Wilson ultimately suggests that racial difference itself is arbitrary:
any legal determination or adjudication of that difference is not premised upon a stable
ontology of race that precedes its legal determination but is in fact constituted by it. In
approaching the text as an interrogation of the legal foundations of racial difference
within slavery, this chapter considers Pudd’nhead Wilson as finally subversive, exposing
the failings and epistemological limits of race as a system of knowledge. As such, rather
than citing the novel’s troubling conclusion of re-enslavement as an implicit affirmation
of the legal racial hierarchy, I argue that it destabilizes the very notion or reality of racial
difference at the site of its production and, by extension, confounds the possibility of a
legal order or institution premised upon race.

Racial subordination after Emancipation
Criticism grappling with Pudd’nhead Wilson’s exploration of the legal
manipulations of racial difference have fruitfully interpreted the text within the time of its
writing. By the time of its publication at the end of the nineteenth century and despite
their supposed freedom from slavery, blacks found themselves still subordinated in new
and often violent ways. Indeed, as Susan Gillman notes, the 1890s was “… a decade that
saw not only an epidemic of lynchings but also the beginnings of newly enacted Jim

!

151

Crow laws defining the ‘Negro’s place’ in a segregated society” (88). As such, Gillman
concludes that, “the novel may thus speak even more pointedly to the growing racism of
its own era of the 1890s than to the race slavery abolished thirty years earlier” (88).
Contextualizing the narrative within the anti-black animus of the 1890s has proven
helpful in elucidating the text’s complicated legal and racial dynamics. In particular, the
manner in which citizenship was bifurcated along racial difference post-Emancipation
has assisted critics in understanding the doublings and dualisms that form the substance
of the narrative.9 On the one hand, the formal aim of Emancipation was racial equality.
And the corresponding constitutional amendments sought to ground the positive laws of
the United States in that new, explicit principle of racial equality: by a federal
commitment to overcome the historical subordination of blacks, these legislative steps
attempted to now re-conceive blacks as citizens when they were once property.10 On the
other hand, despite these legal pronouncements of equality, substantive disparities
persisted between blacks and whites following Emancipation, particularly in the South,
by way of laws and theories designed to confirm the perceived reality of racial
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As Khalil Gibran Muhammad summarizes the transition of black enslavement to black freedom:
“This latest crisis [on how to scientifically comprehend black fitness for citizenship and participation
in this broader political sphere] had begun in the 1860s. In a moment equivalent to a historical blink
of the eye, four million people were transformed from property to human beings to would-be citizens
of the nation. Only a decade before, few white Americans other than abolitionists had anticipated that
black people would become the legal equivalents of white people. In those outrageously heady days
of the 1850s when slavery debates still raged, colonization schemes were still being hatched, and
white optimism still percolated for black extinction if emancipation had to come, the possibility of
living among and abiding black judges, politicians, and schoolteachers was, for many, unimaginable”
(16).
10

Summarizing the constitutional aspirations of equality following the Civil War and the
Emancipation Proclamation, Akhil Reed Amar writes that: “First, in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment
ended slavery forever. Then came the Fourteenth Amendment… ratified in 1868, making all persons
born in America – blacks no less than whites, women no less than men – full and equal citizens, and
pledging to protect all fundamental civil rights against state and federal encroachment” (351).
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difference.11 Ultimately, the cumulative effect of such laws and theories was to render
any black citizenship secondary or subordinate to that of whites.
In his seminal To Wake the Nations: Race and the Making of American
Literature, Eric J. Sundquist argues that the very concept of American citizenship within
slavery – whole, but exclusively white – was bifurcated during Reconstruction and Jim
Crow-era policies, where a legal racial hierarchy within equality was sought.

As

Sundquist explains, Twain’s turn-of-the-century fictional return to slavery in Pudd’nhead
Wilson suggests Reconstruction’s increasingly institutionalized racial difference to have
been an effect or echo of racialized slavery:
… it [the novel] corresponds to an array of dualisms making up the
contemporary American racial trauma: theories of miscegenation and
“blood” contamination that polarized the races and both divided and
blurred mixed-race identity;... and pervading all, the dual layering of
antebellum and post-Reconstruction (or Old South and New South)
ideologies, the recreation of the dynamics of slavery in new masquerade
that Twain adumbrated here… by imposing upon antebellum dramatic
action an allegory of the 1880s and 1890s. (232)
Arguing the text emphasizes that the material legacy of slavery extended beyond its
practice or legality, Sundquist considers Pudd’nhead Wilson as a phenomenon of doubles
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As C. Vann Woodward writes in The Strange History of Jim Crow, the comprehensive
subordination of blacks following Emancipation was legally achieved through statutes – ‘Jim Crow’
laws – which “constituted the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon
the subject. In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement the segregation codes were
comparable with the black codes of the old regime… That [segregation] code lent the sanction of law
to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and
drinking. Whether by law or by custom, that ostracism extended to virtually all forms of public
transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately
to unreal homes, morgues, and cemeteries” (6).
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– races, temporalities, and individual identities – that is essential to its racial critique. In
particular, Sundquist writes that, as a tale about slavery written after the fact, Twain
“reiterates the moral structure of slavery (in the time frame of the plot) and of postbellum
racism and segregation (in the implied allegorical time frame of the narration)” (To Wake
226). As such, rather than finding the narrative confirms the racial logic of slavery,
Sundquist characterizes it as a manipulation of the epistemological ‘certainty’ of race
during slavery so as to comment on the tortuous legal lengths pursued after slavery to
maintain it. In defining postbellum America as a social order of “dualisms” generated by
this commitment to a rigid epistemology of racial difference, Sundquist argues that the
novel ultimately explores America’s historical production of race.
In arguing that Pudd’nhead Wilson exposes (the persistence of) racial difference
as fundamentally a problem generated within slavery, Sundquist frames such argument
with the time of the text’s writing and, in particular, with the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): the novel distils “the dilemma over
national discrimination against blacks that would reach its authoritative constitutional
expression two years later in the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Plessy v.
Ferguson…” (To Wake 227).12 Exploding the contradictions inherent in the court’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

Although Pudd’nhead Wilson was published two years before the decision in Plessy, Sundquist
suggests Twain would likely have been familiar through the press with its facts but, in any event, it
was the culmination of a cultural logic already existing: “Although the Court’s landmark ruling in
favour of the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ was not handed down until 1896, Homer Plessy’s case
had been pending since January 1893, after being carried up from the Louisiana State Supreme Court
to the high court on a writ of error. Despite the manifold thematic and figurative entanglements
between Plessy v. Ferguson and Pudd’nhead Wilson, it is not necessary to argue that Twain had
specific knowledge of the case as it came before the Court. It is quite likely for several reasons that he
did; but more critical is the fact that Plessy brought to a climax the series of Supreme Court decisions,
legislative maneuvers, and developments in sociological theory that had already created the
atmosphere in which Twain’s wrenching text was composed” (227-28).

!

154

reasoning in Plessy, wherein difference within equality permitted inferior treatment,
Sundquist writes:
Like Pudd’nhead Wilson, a text preoccupied with problems of legal rights,
evidence, codes of authority, and the interplay of “natural” and artificial
laws, and culminating in a melodramatic burlesque of a trial that sets right
subverted racial roles and boundaries, Plessy v. Ferguson was at once a
mockery of law and an enactment of its rigid adherence to divided, dual
realities. (To Wake 237)
The Plessy decision itself, released in 1896, solidified the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine as
consistent with the constitutional amendments that were to ensure black freedom and
equality following slavery.
Briefly, the Plessy decision tested the limits to which the post-slavery Thirteenth
and Fourteenth constitutional amendments would put blacks on equal footing with
whites. In response to Louisiana passing in 1890 the Separate Car Act,13 which required
separate train cars for blacks and whites, Homer Plessy – a free, mixed race ‘octoroon’
nonetheless legally black under Louisiana’s laws – challenged the law (with some
assistance

and

encouragement

from

the

Citizens’

Committee

to

Test

the

Constitutionalism of the Separate Car Act, a group dedicated to having the law repealed).
In 1892, Plessy purchased from the East Louisiana Railroad Company a first class-ticket
for, and boarded the white car of, a train headed from New Orleans to Covington. As he
intended, and with planned assistance from the rail company who sought to have the law
repealed for financial reasons, Plessy took a seat in the whites-only car where he was
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Statute of Louisiana, Acts of 1890, c. 111.
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promptly arrested by rail officials for violating the Act.14 Both the trial court and the
Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the Act as constitutional. Plessy then pursued his
claim to the United States Supreme Court where he was, again, unsuccessful. In finding
that the Separate Car Act was constitutional – and that Plessy, who at 1/8th black and
7/8th white was phenotypically white but nonetheless legally black and therefore legally
required to ride in Louisiana’s black rail cars – the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
held that it was ultimately not the role of the courts or the law to ensure substantive racial
equality.15
Specifically, the majority in Plessy held that the formal, legal declarations of
equality cannot alter the ‘biology’ of race nor can they alter the historical social or
cultural practices surrounding it. Moreover, the Court held it was not its role to shift
culture or social perception to meet legislative aspirations. Writing for the majority,
Justice Brown explicitly remarks that the law cannot fairly be expected to overcome
natural differences among people or their response to them:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation… If one
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The penalty for violating the Separate Car Act by sitting in the wrong car was a fine of $25 or jail
time of 20 days.
15

To be clear, Plessy is ultimately an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment claim. At the outset, the
Court dispensed with the Thirteenth Amendment claim noting that the noting of racial difference in
legislation cannot possibly amount to the involuntary servitude abolished by the Thirteenth
Amendment: “A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races
– a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races and which must always exist so long as
white men are distinguished from the other race by color – has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not understand
that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection”
(543).
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race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same place. (551-52)

In its reasoning, the majority first presumed that racial difference is biological or essential
(and, effectively, observable). As a result, and second, the majority presumed that any
cultural response to such an essential, physical reality is beyond the law’s jurisdiction to
alter. Thus, pursuant to the majority’s reasons, the practice of distinct and segregated
racial dealings was both natural and legal: for Justice Brown, who wrote the majority’s
reasons, such racial segregation was wholly consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment,
notwithstanding its declaration of racial equality.
After determining the Thirteenth Amendment was not applicable to Plessy’s claim
in respect of the Separate Car Act’s unconstitutionality (determining, effectively, that the
Act did not re-institute the involuntary servitude prohibited by that amendment), Justice
Brown observes that:
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of
things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
commingling of the two races up on terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
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recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the
exercise of their police power. (544)16

Confirming the constitutional correctness of segregation, and thus bringing “to fruition
the long assault on the Fourteenth Amendment that had begun with the Slaughterhouse
Cases of 1873,” Plessy confirmed the natural and legitimate historical prejudices against
blacks were immune to substantive efforts for racial equality, for example through racial
integration (Sundquist, To Wake 237).17 Indeed, in his assessment of the basis of Plessy’s
claim, i.e. that the maintenance and enforcement of racially segregated cars is consistent
with racial equality, Justice Brown notes that only a cross-racial willingness to
intermingle – achieved naturally or voluntarily and not as a result of legislative demands
or requirements – could possibly lead to equality:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Justice Brown continues by providing an ostensibly non-contentious and previously determined
legal form of racial segregation: “The most common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid
exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race
have been longest and most earnestly enforced (544).
17

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), decision is actually a consolidation of three similar
cases from Louisiana – The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company; Esteben et al v. The State of Louisiana et al; and
The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans. v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company – were the U.S. Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Briefly, in response to health concerns pertaining to the waste
disposal of slaughterhouses in New Orleans, in 1869 the Louisiana legislature passed An Act to
Protect to the Health of the City of New Orleans, to Locate the Stock Landings and Slaughter Houses,
and to Incorporate the Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, which
permitted New Orleans to create the Crescent City Livestock Landing which would centralize all
municipal slaughterhouses. The Act thus provided Crescent City with a monopoly over the butcher
trade, forcing existing butchers to close and re-open shop under Crescent City’s purview. The various
plaintiffs alleged the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly in respect of the equal
protection it guaranteed, claiming the Act provided a small group of individuals control over the
butcher industry to the unfair, arbitrary detriment of everyone else. The lower courts found the Act
complied with the Fourteenth Amendment and ruled in favour of Crescent City. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held the Fourteenth Amendment impacted only federal, and not state,
citizenship. As a result, and given it was state legislation, the Act did not and could not violate the
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. Of course, although enacted in response to Emancipation, it
should be noted that the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability is not restricted to issues of racial
equality, as exemplified in the Slaughter-House Cases.
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The [plaintiff’s] argument also assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the
negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races… [but]… if
the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and
a voluntary act of individuals. (551)

Insisting, then, that court enforcement of racial integration would not (and likely could
not) lead to racial equality – and moreover that individuals cannot be legally manipulated
into perceiving the races as equal – Justice Brown formulated the provision of separate
services for the races as commensurate with equality: racial segregation wherein each
race was assured similar conditions, such as separate but similar railway cars, would, in
fact, be racial equality.18
The majority did not simply adjudicate Plessy’s claim. Rather, they went beyond
it, re-formulating Plessy’s argument against segregation as paradoxically iterating the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For the Court, claiming that the issue is one of preclusion of the races’ political rights (as opposed
to the natural and fair separation of the races), to the extent legislation did not interfere with the
portending of such rights it was compliant with the Fourteenth Amendment, provided it did what it
said it would do. Reasoning by analogous precedents, Justice Brown writes: “The distinction between
laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two
races in schools, theatres and railway carriages has been frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, it was held that a law of West Virginia limiting to white male
persons, 21 years of age and citizens of the State, the right to sit upon juries was a discrimination
which implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of the right of the colored
race, and was a step toward reducing them to a condition of servility. Indeed, the right of a colored
man that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty and property, there shall be no
exclusion of his race and no discrimination against them because of color has been asserted in a
number of cases. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; Bush v. Kentucky,
107 U.S. 110; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565. So, where the laws of a particular locality or the
charter of a particular railway corporation has provided that no person shall be excluded from the cars
on account of color, we have held that this meant persons of color should travel in the same car as
white ones, and that the enactment was not satisfied by the company’s providing cars assigned
exclusively to people of color, though they were as good as those which they assigned exclusively to
white persons. Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445” (545-46).
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black inferiority that equality, including its purported realization through ‘separate-butequal’ segregation, is meant to overcome. Specifically, and on behalf of the majority of
the Court, Justice Brown notes that:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it. (551)
Re-casting Plessy’s argument against segregation (and for integration) as suggesting one
of blacks preferring the company of whites (or at least refusing to endure the company of
other blacks), and therefore suggesting the inferiority of blacks to whites, it is implied
that the social meanings and values of race are constructed. According to this reasoning,
black protest against ‘separate-but-equal’ forms of equality necessarily marks or signifies
blackness as subordinate to, or inherently less equal than, whiteness.19 Thus even as the
Court framed the significance of racial difference as a social or behavioural issue (only to
deny the law’s ability to alter its course), it nonetheless grounded its reasoning in the
perceived reality or essential nature of racial difference. Although the Court in Plessy
defined separated races in similar circumstances as consistent with equality, such
separation presumed the existence and knowability of racial difference.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Stephen M. Best explains that the Court’s recourse to “counterfactual” reasoning to consider
Plessy’s claim – a ‘what-if’ method of reasoning – enables them to elide the historical realities of
racial subordination in favour of a formal approach to the law, the past, and race: “Testing the
plaintiff’s social imaginary, his vision of an alternative present – and finding it wanting – the Plessy
court confirmed why the current present is the only present possible. It is on the grounds (if we might
call it that) of the counterfactual’s ontological modesty that courts required to guarantee equal
protection of the laws found an alibi for historical responsibility, that the law improvised a detour
around historical causes, around the ‘event’ of emancipation” (228).
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Sundquist notes that Plessy echoes the slavery-era Supreme Court decision of

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), in its unqualified acceptance and statement
that “a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races and which must always
exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color” (543). In
particular, Dred Scott laid the conceptual groundwork for legal racial segregation in its
holding that black Americans were a distinct racial group, legally ineligible for
citizenship because of the “… customs and traditions that had created dual legal systems
for both southern and northern blacks” (Sundquist 236). Dred Scott, of course, ultimately
held that blacks during slavery, whether free or enslaved, were not and were never
contemplated by the Constitution’s framers to be American citizens and, as a result, they
did not possess any of the rights granted or protected under that document. It is this
legacy of racialized inferiority that Plessy re-iterates.
Scott’s legal claim was ultimately one for freedom.

Having been born into

slavery in Virginia at the turn of the century, in 1820 Scott’s then owner took him to
Missouri where he was purchased by Dr. John Emerson. Emerson subsequently took
Scott to Illinois (which was a free state having only recently prohibited slavery in its
constitution), and then moved to the Wisconsin Territory (wherein slavery was also
prohibited under the Missouri Comprise), taking Scott with him. Eventually, Emerson
settled in Louisiana, where he was married, and sent for Scott and his wife Harriet (whom
Scott had married in Wisconsin). On their way to Louisiana and Emerson, Scott and
Harriet’s daughter was born on the Mississippi, between Iowa and Illinois. Although on
reaching Louisiana the Scotts could have sued for their freedom on the basis they had
been taken to free territories by their owner, or at least for their daughter on the basis she
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had been born in a free territory, they did not, and they continued to serve Emerson and
his family. In 1838, the Emersons relocated to Missouri, taking the Scotts with them. On
Emerson’s death in Missouri in 1843, his widow Eliza inherited his property, including
the Scotts, and she continued to use them as slaves. Scott finally attempted to purchase
from Eliza freedom for himself and his family, but she refused and he was forced to sue
for it in 1846.
By the time the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision, Scott’s suit had moved
up and down the Missouri courts, eventually switching to the federal jurisdiction.20
Finding 7-2 in favour of the defendant, the majority of the Court, in reasons written by
Chief Justice Taney, framed Scott’s suit as one of standing – namely whether blacks,
whose ancestors were brought to the United States as slaves, possessed all the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution including Scott’s action of suing in federal court.21
Finding that blacks did not, and given Scott’s racial heritage and history of being owned
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Scott first brought his suit to the Missouri court in 1846. It was dismissed on a technicality –
specifically that he had failed to establish by way of witness that he was in fact Emerson’s widow’s
slave. Nonetheless, the trial judge granted a new trial. Emerson appealed this to the Supreme Court
of Missouri but was unsuccessful. At the new trial, which did not commence until 1850 as a result of
unrelated matters, Scott called witness testimony to establish Emerson’s ownership of him and his
family, and was successful under Missouri precedent. The widow Emerson appealed the trial court
ruling to the Supreme Court of Missouri while, at the same time, she transferred ownership of Scott to
her brother, John F.A. Sanford as she had moved to Massachusetts. In 1852, the Missouri Supreme
Court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the Scotts were slaves and to the extent their
claim for freedom was having been on free soil, they ought to have brought that claim when they were
in those states. Scott sued again in 1853, this time in federal court on the basis his new owner –
Sanford – was a New York resident. The trial judge directed the jury to resolve the question of Scott’s
freedom by way of Missouri law and, as a result, they found for Sanford. Scott then appealed that
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court (who, by error, misspelled the defendant’s name as Sandford).
21

As Chief Justice Taney writes: “The question is simply this: can a negro whose ancestors were
imported into this country and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the
rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen, one of which
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of United States in the cases specified in the Constitution?”
(403).
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was not in issue, it was found Scott had no standing to sue for freedom and the Supreme
Court dismissed his suit.22 For the majority of the Court, it was inconceivable that the
framers of the Constitution would have intended for blacks to be citizens under it.23 This
was because black presence in the states had been attributable largely to slavery:
No one of that [African] race had ever migrated to the United States
voluntarily; all of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise.
The number that had been emancipated at that time were but few in
comparison with those held in slavery, and they were identified in the
public mind with the race to which they belonged, and regarded as a part
of the slave population rather than the free, it is obvious they were not
even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were
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“And, upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion, that, upon the
facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of
the Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts, and consequently
that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is
erroneous” (426-27).
23

In respect of the Declaration of Independence, Chief Justice Taney writes that: “But it is too clear
for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the
people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as understood in that day, would
embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of
the sympathy of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
received universal rebuke and reprobation” (410). In respect of the fifth section of the ninth article of
the Articles of Confederation, Chief Justice Taney writes that: “Words could hardly have been used
which more strongly mark the line of distinction between the citizen and the subject – the free and the
subjugated races. The latter were not even counted when the inhabitants of a State were to be
embodied in proportion to its numbers for the general defence. And it cannot for a moment be
supposed that a class of persons thus separated and rejected from those who formed the sovereignty of
the States, were yet intended to be included under the words ‘free inhabitants,’ in the preceding article,
to whom privileges and immunities were so carefully secured in every State” (418-19).
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conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in
every other part of the Union. (411-12)24

Chief Justice Taney supported this originalist interpretation of the Constitution with a
review of the slavery laws of England and then of the States, noting that “… when we
look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to
believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be extended to them [blacks]”
(412).25
In finding the fact and practice of enslaving Africans meant the framers could not
have viewed them as equal to whites, Chief Justice Taney drew a physical distinction
between blacks and whites – that of race – justifying the conflation of blackness with
property:
They [the framers] spoke and acted according to the then established
doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no
one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from
the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were
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As Andrew P. Napolitano summarizes the manner in which the majority opinion in Dred Scott
dismissed Scott’s claim: “The Court’s holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford was that blacks were not
considered (and were not intended to be considered) as citizens under the Constitution. They could
not claim any of the rights and privileges the Constitution guaranteed and secured to citizens of the
United States… Thus, because Dred Scott was not a citizen, he could not sue in the federal courts and
diversity jurisdiction – which allows federal courts to hear cases between citizens of different states –
was inappropriate” (60).
25

As Best explains the logic of this originalist interpretation: “For ‘originalists’ such as Andrew
Jackson, John C. Calhoun, and Roger Taney (author of the ‘Opinion of the Court’ in Dred Scott, intent
involved the psychological motives of the founders – it was implicated in their very personalities and
desires. The ‘original intent’ of the Constitution achieved its force only through the instrument of
textual perspicuity, which the originalists access through reference to the instrument’s language at the
time of its ratification and which they would defend rhetorically through reference to the ‘letter of the
law’ and the ‘plain meaning’ of its words (the ability of the document, in common parlance, to ‘speak
for itself’). The meaning arrived at by any subsequent court would be an expression, in their view, of
the voluntariness, mutuality, and reciprocity – of the ‘consent’ and the exercise of ‘popular will’ – that
gave rise to the Constitution itself as a legal instrument” (40).
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never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of
the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.
(410)26

In affixing enslavement to black skin (or at least formulating it as an unavoidable
consequence of race), Chief Justice Taney rendered constitutional the perpetuation of
race-based slavery. As Sundquist explains it:
Taney’s argument was not, strictly speaking, biological, but it blurred the
biological into the constitutional in an even more unsettling and
philosophically rigid way. The legal justification of racial inferiority, that
is to say, was constructed and discursive; the law of slavery was branded
into African American beings by “indelible” marks… having been already
“impressed” on blacks at the time the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution were drafted…. (To Wake 236)
Because blacks were already fated to enslavement at America’s founding, that
enslavement is implicitly protected by the Constitution, while blacks, who were
simultaneously found to not be citizens under it or at all, were not.27 This fate of legal
racial subordination echoes in Plessy.28 Because in Plessy black skin already signifies
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Sundquist explains it, “Despite casting his opinion in terms of a natural racial hierarchy, Justice
Taney rested his notorious opinion about African American noncitizenship on customs and traditions
that had created dual legal systems for both southern and northern blacks” (To Wake 236).
27

Holloway explains the racialized nature of citizenship as being generated by the Constitution:
“Although ‘three-fifths’ is a fraction [that first constitutionally described the quantity of personhood in
blacks but was eventually] made whole with full personhood and citizenship, citizenship does not
endow one with a completed humanity. Citizenship is the way in which law recognizes – or does not
recognize – persons. And it does so with a peculiarity of language that points to the origins of our
considerations that divided humans into different classes by race” (52-53).
28

Chief Justice Taney employs something of a ‘floodgates’ argument in respect of states’ rights if
blacks were citizens under the Constitution. Noting that such a finding would either deprive states of
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difference – a difference ripe with cultural meanings generated within slavery available
only for legal recognition and not re-definition or reconsideration – any substantive
interpretation of the broad constitutional commitments to racial equality was avoided. In
its purely formal understanding of the Constitution and its amendments, Plessy implicitly
re-iterated an historical understanding of the Constitution generated within, and
perpetuating race as the reason for, slavery.
This capitulation to, and application of, slavery-era judicial understandings of
black skin was of course incongruent with post-slavery black freedom. As Catherine
O’Connell notes about slavery’s persistent mark on black skin following Emancipation:
“… one of the ironies of the race cases of the 1890s was the reliance on antebellum case
law as precedent, even though the post-Civil War constitutional amendments should have
made it irrelevant and obsolete” (118).29 It is within this cultural climate – the postEmancipation legal re-installation or re-iteration of blackness as an insurmountable
marker of difference that authorized and legitimated dual and distinct citizenships along
racial lines – that Pudd’nhead Wilson was written. And it is against this “… ‘dual’
citizenship that in effect allowed the reconstitution of aspects of chattel slavery,” that the
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their rights to define citizenry (or, if they disobeyed, render the Constitution worthless), he writes:
“And if persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and of the United States, they would be
entitled to all of these privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict them,
for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal
Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and laws
of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the States could limit or restrict them, or place the
party in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning, and could have no
operation, and would give no rights to the citizen when in another state” (423).
29

There is a limit as to how far it can be argued that Plessy was an attempt to undo legislative
freedoms for blacks. As Michael J. Klarman explains it, Plessy was a decision that was still consistent
with established legal principles and doctrines: “… contrary to popular belief, these rulings were not
blatant nullifications of post-Civil War constitutional amendments designed to secure racial equality.
On the contrary, Plessy-era race decisions were plausible interpretations of conventional legal sources:
text, original intent, precedent, and custom. They can be criticized, of course, but not on the grounds
that they butchered clearly established law or inflicted racially regressive results on a nation otherwise
included to favor racial equality” (9-10).
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text is perhaps best approached (Sundquist To Wake 233). However, as Sundquist also
notes, “A full understanding of… [Pudd’nhead Wilson]… must therefore trace the
intricate relationship between Twain’s fascination with questions of psychological and
racial doubling, and the pervasive dualisms in race theory and the laws of segregation”
(To Wake 233). To comprehend the polemical aims of Twain’s “novel of racial crisis”
requires an analysis of the dualities that comprise the text – citizenship and temporality,
as well as individual and racial (Sundquist To Wake 233). It is in the manner in which it
deploys these dualities that Pudd’nhead Wilson subverts and undermines legal racial
knowledge.

The uncanny limits of racial difference
Pudd’nhead Wilson opens with an introduction to the town of Dawson’s Landing,
“half a day’s journey, per steam-boat below St. Louis” in 1830 (3). Characterized as “a
slave-holding town, with a rich slave-worked grain and pork country back of it”, the town
is “Growing” and guided by the “First Families” of Virginia who maintain the town’s
“code” of honour and respectability (4). After introducing a handful of these revered
leaders of the community – “chief” among them, Judge Driscoll, Tom’s uncle who Tom,
as his false heir, will eventually murder – the narrative presents “Mr. David Wilson, a
young fellow of Scotch parentage” (4-5). Learning that Wilson had studied law and had
come to Dawson’s Landing to “make his fortune”, it does not take long for Wilson to
stymy his career aspirations:
He [Wilson] had just made the acquaintance of a group of citizens when
an invisible dog began to yelp and snarl and howl and make himself very
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comprehensibly disagreeable, whereupon young Wilson said, much as one
who is thinking aloud –
“I wish I owned half that dog.”
“Why?” somebody asked.
“Because, I would kill my half.” (5)

As noted above, Wilson’s seemingly innocuous remarks – his “thinking aloud” – doom
his professional future in Dawson’s Landing (5). Because the citizens are incapable of
recognizing his ironic wit his comment generates plenty of controversy.30
As the conversation evolves among the citizens who overhear his “fatal remark,”
what becomes clear is their immediate disdain for Wilson’s perceived ignorance (5).
Because he is instantly characterized by those citizens as ignorant or uneducated,
including in respect of presumably basic principles of property ownership, Wilson is
deemed to be unaware that his killing his half would kill the entire dog. Emphasizing
that both ownership interests in the dog were inextricable, one citizen notes that if Wilson
kills his half, he would kill the other half and, by extension, “be responsible for that half,
just the same as if he had killed that half instead of his own” (6). The citizens’ confusion
grows. As another citizen summarizes it:
“… If he [Wilson] owned one half of the general dog, it would be so, if he
owned one end of the dog and another person owned the other end, it
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The actual irony of the exchange is that it is the townspeople whose sophistication is stunted: it is
the townspeople’s inability to understand irony or humour that leads them to conclude Wilson is
foolish. Importantly, though, the power or ability to impose such a label is unilateral. It is only the
townsfolk elite that can label Wilson as foolish and not the other way around. Given the number of
them, and their prestige and history within the town, it is unsurprising the town alone possesses the
ability. In opening the narrative with this act of misunderstanding and labeling, Twain foregrounds at
the outset the ideologies and ideological power of the townspeople (as well as how those ideologies or
notions operate as ‘truths’ even in spite of their erroneous foundations or presumptions).
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would be so, just the same; particularly in the first case, because if you kill
one half of a general dog, there ain’t any man can tell you whose half if
[sic] was, but if he owned one end of the dog, maybe he could kill his end
of it and – ”. (6)

As others debate the possibility of actually owning half a dog, as well as the
repercussions of trying to exercise such a property right by killing one’s half, the
discussion ultimately degenerates into such confusion and incomprehensibility that their
only recourse is to conclude Wilson a “perfect jackass… a pudd’nhead” (6).
Because Wilson’s joke hinges upon shared ownership of a single object, it
highlights the presumptions of individual autonomy that reify personal possession and
relations of ownership: Wilson’s joke unsettles the assumptions of individuality and
autonomy that bind individuals into a community. Specifically, in expressing his interest
in the dog as one of shared ownership, Wilson suggests a mode of ownership wherein
multiple property interests converge in one object, but would nonetheless allow complete
expressions of individualized ownerships.

The citizens’ entirely literal reading of

Wilson’s remark is the inevitable result of their failure to comprehend plural ownership
in an indivisible object.
While Wilson’s joke appears minor, a significant amount of text within the
narrative is devoted to it: it is important, and importantly troubling, to the town. As Evan
Carton explains it, Wilson’s joke exposes to the citizenry the limits of ownership. In
particular, Wilson’s remark:
… challenges the legalistic distinctions and the proprietary or titular
claims that underlie the ordered existence of Dawson’s Landing. It rejects
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the model of community (or of representation) as formal organization,
plotted and particularized by discrete bestowals of names and titles, and
substitutes a model of community as integrated and dynamic creature of
the ongoing enterprise of communication. (Carton 84)

For Dawson’s Landing, title, ownership, and property are social expressions of
autonomous individuality. But Wilson’s remark disrupts this logic by implying the
individual is conceived of as autonomous only by virtue of being integrated into, or
dependent upon, the community. And because the constituents of Dawson’s Landing
refuse to acknowledge that individual ownership necessarily exists with the broader
network of (social) property relations, they dismiss Wilson as absurd.

Rather than

concede that legal ownership is a relational phenomenon, the citizenry insist that
individual ownership precedes its legal recognition and is, therefore, only confirmed by
the law. Thus, as Carton continues,
The townspeople cannot afford to recognize their intuitive grasp of
Wilson’s meaning. They agree that the whole dog would die but conclude
that Wilson could not have intended this; to conclude otherwise would be
to admit his vision of a community in which the individual cannot assume
full possession or control of property and events yet must accept full
responsibility for them. (84)
Realizing that “Either Wilson’s remark, then, or the fundamental assumptions of
Dawson’s Landing must be unintelligible… [the] townspeople make the choice that will
not unseat their reason” (Carton 84).31
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As the narrative describes the townspeople: “But irony was not for those people; their mental vision
was not focussed for it. They read those playful trifles in the solidest earnest, and decided without
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Wilson’s oblique joke on the limits of ownership strains the distinctions between

individual and community, and between legal rights and the limits of their exercise. But
it is not so much his joke that troubles the townspeople but, rather, Wilson himself. As
described in the text, “the group [those citizens who were present for his joke] searched
his face with curiosity, with anxiety even, but found no light there, no expression that
they could read. They fell away from him as from something uncanny, and went into
privacy to discuss him” (6 emphasis added). But Wilson’s perceived uncanniness is not
simply that he reveals the limits of the conventional ideologies of the town, but also that
in doing so he is inscrutable. Derek Royal explains that:
In almost every case, Wilson’s words and actions do not lend themselves
to an authoritative reading, leaving the townspeople with nothing more
than a foggy series of words – something uncanny, a cipher, a witch, a
pudd’nhead, a fool – to account for his indecipherability. As a text, he
elides the interpretation of Dawson’s Landing…. (420)
Royal emphasizes that Wilson resists the authorities that comprise and unify the town.
And the cause of Wilson’s uncanniness is that in such resistance he makes explicit the
implicit epistemologies on which the town’s authorities are based. Specifically, Wilson
exposes the arbitrariness of the distinctions and divisions that comprise the town –
distinctions the town takes as literal, natural or unquestionable, including the ostensibly
absolute nature of private property. Since “what he performs, in essence, is a delineation
of the cultural and political boundaries within the town, much in the way that the First
Families of Virginia once outlined honor and the aristocratic foundations of slaveholding
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
hesitancy that if there had ever been any doubt that Dave Wilson was a pudd’nhead – which there
hadn’t – this revelation removed that doubt for good and all” (25).
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society”, Wilson subverts the very epistemologies of identity – group, individual, legal,
political – by revealing their limits (Royal 424).32 And it is precisely Wilson’s laying
bare the conceptual limits of the town’s founding philosophies that renders him
“uncanny”. Importantly, Wilson’s uncanniness is not merely a character trait or quirk.
Rather, it is exemplary of the narrative generally.
In his 1919 essay, “The Uncanny”, Sigmund Freud defines it as a “feeling” that
“… belongs to the realm of the frightening, of what evokes fear and dread” (123).
Aiming to provide a theory that would explain why certain works of art evoke “fear and
dread”, as opposed to being just generally “frightening”, Freud proposes two lines of
inquiry that lead back to the same definition. Both his multilingual etymological inquiry
into the “uncanny” and his cataloguing of narrative devices that evoke it conclude that the
uncanny “is that species of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known
and had long been familiar” (124). The uncanny, however, is distinguishable from being
merely frightening because it suggests the “unknown and unfamiliar” (125) which has
long been thought “surmounted” (154).

In its multiplicity of evocative forms, the

uncanny strains the limits of what is known:
The most extraordinary coincidence of wish and fulfillment, the most
baffling repetition of similar experiences, in the same place or on the same
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Representing the elite of Southern aristocracy, the First Families of Virginia – the F.F.V. – are the
self-titled upper class families of Dawson’s Landing who can trace their roots back to the initial
colony of Virginia: “In Missouri a recognized superiority attached to any person who hailed from Old
Virginia; and this superiority was exalted to supremacy when a person of such nativity could also
prove descent from the First Families of that great commonwealth. The Howards and Driscolls were
of this aristocracy. In their eyes it was a nobility. It had its unwritten laws, and they were as clearly
defined and as strict as any that could be found among the printed statutes of the land” (58).
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date, the most deceptive sights and the most suspicious noises… It is thus
solely a matter of testing reality, a question of material reality. (154)33

What is clear is that experiences of the uncanny arise from a question or “testing” of the
known or “reality”.
Of particular assistance to any exploration of the uncanny in Pudd’nhead Wilson,
with its narrative of switched master and slave, is Freud’s example of doubles as a
primary technique in the narrative realization of the uncanny. In his reading of E.T.A.
Hoffman, whom he deems “… the unrivalled master of the uncanny in literature,” Freud
writes that the use of two characters that are largely indistinguishable may evoke the
uncanny:
[One of]… the most prominent of those motifs that produce an uncanny
effect… involve the idea of the ‘double’ (the Doppelganger), in all its
nuances and manifestations – that is to say, the appearance of persons
who have to be regarded as identical because they look alike.

(141

emphasis added)
While the narrative deployment of effectively identical characters may be unsettling to
the reader, it becomes uncanny when the distinctions between those characters begin to
be effaced such that one character bleeds into the other:
This relationship is intensified by the spontaneous transmission of mental
processes from one of these persons to the other – what we would call
telepathy – so that the one becomes co-owner of the other’s knowledge,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Freud’s point here is that for those who believe they have adequately “surmounted” the “animistic
convictions” of the past – religious and superstitious beliefs – the feeling of the uncanny is always
explained through a scientific explanation of reality. I take this to mean, however, that the experience
of the uncanny persists even in the modern era of scientific rationality.
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emotions and experience. Moreover, a person may identify himself with
another and so become unsure of his true self; or he may substitute the
other’s self for his own. The self may thus be duplicated, divided and
interchanged. (Freud 142)

For Freud, it is not simply the interchangeability of characters that is uncanny but also the
disintegration of the boundaries and borders between those characters that renders
doubles. Further, as Freud argues, like the switched heirs of mastery and slavery in
Pudd’nhead Wilson, “Finally there is the constant recurrence of the same thing, the
repetition of the same facial features, the same characters, the same destinies, the same
misdeeds, even the same names…” (142). It is Pudd’nhead Wilson’s blurring of the
autonomous and clearly distinguishable identities of master and slave, of black and white,
that makes it uncanny, as it strains the “material reality” of racial difference in Dawson’s
Landing and beyond. And in demonstrating the ease with which those positions are
subverted, Twain interrogates the very knowability of who is, and who ought to be,
master and slave.
Mid-way through the narrative, when Roxana informs Tom that he is, in fact, her
black son, Tom’s immediate refusal to believe her gives way to a confusion and
uncertainty about himself. The shock of learning that the only racial identity he had
known, that of whiteness, is not correct leads Tom to question his identity generally: “For
as much as a week after this, Tom imagined that his character had undergone a pretty
radical change. But that was because he did not know himself” (45). Resulting in his
uncertainty as to how to behave among his white friends and associates, this revelation
leads Tom to grapple with his ‘new’ racial identity. For example, blaming his newfound
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inability to assert himself at meals with his ‘family’ as a result of “the ‘nigger’ in him…”
Tom’s behaviour is altered by the secret he now harbours:
His ostensible “aunt’s” solicitudes and endearments were become a
terror to him, and he avoided them.
And all the time, hatred of his ostensible “uncle” was steadily
growing in his heart; for he said to himself, “He is white, and I am his
chattel, his property, his goods, and he can sell me, just as could his dog.”
(45)34
Like the dog Wilson wished he half-owned at the beginning of the narrative, Tom finds
himself the object of property. But uncertain how to respond to those who love him but
unknowingly own him, Tom comes to resent them for their rights in him.
While Tom finds himself changed as a result of his ‘new’ or actual racial identity,
such change is not absolute. Upon learning of his blackness:
In several ways his opinions were totally changed, and would
never go back to what they were before, but the main structure of his
character was not changed, and could not be changed… Under the
influence of a great mental and moral upheaval his character and habits
had taken on the appearance of complete change, but after a while with the
subsidence of the storm both began to settle toward their former places.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Carton explains that Twain’s grammar implicitly recognizes the tension between race as essential
and performative in the figure of Tom whose opinions of self change when he discovers he is black:
“Tom doubtless understands ‘nigger’ to be a concrete referent to a biological fact. The reader,
however, avails himself of the ironic alternative, an alternative that Twain stresses for us by placing
‘nigger’ between quotation marks. It is not, of course, Tom’s genetic make-up that his attitudes
suddenly reveal, nor is it a biological identity that ‘nigger’ signifies. A mere fabrication of pernicious
social convention, ‘nigger’ does not really refer at all: it constitutes only a sign… that wields the
symbolic power with which it has been invested…” (89-90).
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He dropped gradually back into his frivolous and easy-going ways and
conditions of feeling, and manner of speech, and no familiar of his could
have detected anything in him that differentiated him from the weak and
careless Tom of other days. (45)

At first stunned by the revelation of his true racial identity, Tom alters his behaviour in
response to his previously unknown blackness. Finding himself at first changed, Tom
skulks around town, disconnected and alienated from the slaveholding community in
which he once confidently moved.35
To some extent, his meekness is entwined with race – as though he was acting (or
perhaps properly behaving as) black, incapable of knowing which race he is as the
experiences of each bleed into each other. As noted in respect of his interactions with his
uncle, which foreshadows Tom’s eventual murder of him:
He [Tom] dreaded his meals, the “nigger” in him was ashamed to
sit in at the white folks’ table, and feared discovery all the time, and once
when Judge Driscoll said, “What’s the matter with you? – you look as
meek as a nigger,” he felt as secret murderers are said to feel when the
accuser says “Thou art the man!” Tom said he was not well, and left the
table. (45)
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Interestingly, Tom finds his appearance sickening after Roxana’s racial revelation. As noted, “The
‘nigger’ in him went shrinking and skulking here and there and yonder, and fancying it saw suspicion
and maybe detection in all faces, tones and gestures. So strange and uncharacteristic was Tom’s
conduct that people noticed it and turned to look after him when he passed on; and when he glanced
back – as he could not help doing, in spite of his best resistance – and caught that puzzled expression
in a person’s face, it gave him a sick feeling, and he took himself out of view as quickly as he could.
He presently came to have a hunted sense and a hunted look, and then he fled away to the hill-tops and
the solitudes. He said to himself that the curse of Ham was upon him” (45).
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But this new meekness and self-reflection does not persist. Rather, as Tom learns, he can
conceal his legal racial identity and assume the behaviours enjoyed when he thought he
was white.

Tom thus vacillates between performing the knowledge of his secret

blackness and performing his original whiteness, before finally assuming the latter
position entirely. And his ability to move between distinct identities dictated as such by a
conceptualization of racial categories presumed distinct within slavery highlights the
novel’s complicated approach to race.
George E. Marcus notes that the text’s evocation of doubles and crossed identities
is a narrative technique specifically attuned to the problems inherent in self-definition.
Focussing on Tom’s interiorized psychic split on realizing his true racial identity, Marcus
notes that Tom psychically grapples with two irreconcilable identities, signalling a
fundamental division in Tom’s being between his public and private personae:
[Twain]… used the specific tactic of a doubled self to demystify the
essentialism of racial identity in a society where the operation of racial
classification was overlaid upon a more basic ideology of autonomous
individuals (race is correspondingly hard and fast in a society in which the
individual self is hard and fast…). (197)
For Marcus, racial difference in the text is a product of the arbitrary markers of individual
identity, which includes racial identity, such that breaking down an individual’s racial
identity signals a breakdown of individuality itself. As he continues, in the novel “…
race [is] a kind of allegorical vehicle for probing the injury generated by the American
habits of social classifications, combined with the powerful cognitive hold of the unified
self construct – that is, race as a story through which another more profound story of self
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can be told…” (198). For Marcus, the symbolic order of racial difference is an entry
point for Twain into the complicated conceptual mechanics of identity formation,
enabling the opportunity to subvert the nineteenth-century prevailing ideology of
individual autonomy upon which such community systems, such as ownership in
Dawson’s Landing, are premised.
It is because of “… the incompleteness with which he [Twain] treats this topic
[race],” that Marcus suggests racial difference is a secondary concern of the text (199).
While Marcus is correct in suggesting the text fundamentally explores the limits of selfdetermination and individual autonomy, his relegation of race to a corollary thematic
concern of the text somewhat overlooks how individual identity in Dawson’s Landing is
inseparable from racial identity. That is, in subordinating race in his interpretation of the
text, Marcus implicitly accords race a categorical stability the novel fundamentally aims
to undo.

While the text questions presumptions of individual autonomy, it more

importantly suggests that such notions of autonomy and identity are produced through
racial difference. That is, the very achievement of individual autonomy in Dawson’s
Landing – an ideology necessarily predicated on a commitment to rigid racial distinctions
– is deconstructed by the narrative in its laying bare the legal production of race as
identity.36
In that sense, Pudd’nhead Wilson itself is evocative of the uncanny. As Nicholas
Royle explains it, the uncanny is fundamentally a psychic phenomenon.

But to
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For a thorough analysis of the psychoanalytic foundations and implications of the concept of the
uncanny, see Mladen Dolar’s, “‘I Shall Be with You on Your Wedding Night’: Lacan and the
Uncanny”. In respect of ideology and the uncanny, Dolar writes that: “The uncanny is always at stake
in ideology – ideology perhaps basically consists of a social attempt to integrate the uncanny, to make
it bearable, to assign it a place, and the criticism of ideology is caught in the same framework if it tries
to reduce it to another kind of content or to make the content conscious and explicit” (19).

!

178

adequately theorize its effects in a given instance requires contextualizing its cause or
reason.

Suggesting the uncanny is the response to knowledges largely viewed as

unproblematic having been problematized, Royle writes that “The uncanny, then, is not
merely an ‘aesthetic’ or ‘psychological’ matter (whatever that might mean): its critical
elaboration is necessarily bound up with analyzing, questioning, and even transforming
what is called ‘everyday life’” (23). According to Royle, the uncanny is more than the
specificities of individual experience as it includes its evocation: it is the experience of
the limits of knowledge as well as the recognition that the individual has been constituted
by such limited knowledge. As Royle continues about the manner in which the uncanny
is the revelation of the individual’s constitution by various discourses:
This applies not only to issues of sexuality, class, race, age, imperialism
and colonialism – so many issues of potentially uncanny ‘otherness’
already evidenced in the nineteenth century… As Christopher Johnson has
described it…: ‘we are animated and agitated by a power of program that
sometimes seems to violate our most intuitive sense of self-determination’.
(23)
It is in his exposing the manner in which the individual is imbricated in, and produced by,
cultural systems of knowledge that Wilson seems uncanny. Challenging the very notion
of “self-determination” Wilson’s fatal remark undermines the presumptions of autonomy
and individuality that are the foundations of property ownership.

Moreover, that

challenge to individuality hints at a model of legal identity created and installed by the
law. Wilson’s joke foreshadows the text’s complicated and uncanny approach to racial
difference: it highlights that the strict racial dualism underpinning one’s legal status
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within slavery is created or constituted by the law itself and is a necessity to perpetuate
the unequal society that exists.37 Racial identity is not an essential fact of an individual’s
being to be recognized, but is ultimately a legal declaration, arbitrarily determined but
necessarily imposed upon the individual.

Fingerprints and the arbitrariness of racial difference
While recourse to the racial legal and political dynamics of the 1890s usefully
frames Pudd’nhead Wilson’s allegorical aims, its setting captures a specific moment in
the American legal history of racial production. Susan Gillman, for example, notes that
early drafts of the novel set its beginning in 1850. Importantly, after a series of revisions,
and “the addition of the race plot,” the published version of the text re-organized the
narrative, changing its opening to 1830 and therefore placing the trial “around 1850”
(88). According to Gillman, this setting was no coincidence, but rather a calculated
invocation of a particular moment in slavery’s history: “… 1850 becomes a memorable
year and the Mississippi River locale a special place. The census of 1850 counted
mulattoes for the first time. In that year, in Kentucky and Missouri, there was one
mulatto slave for every six black slaves…” (88).38 1850s Missouri, then, was a moment
of increased ‘white’ slavery: the unprecedented levels of miscegenation and interracial
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As Martin Kreiswirth writes, “It [the uncanny] is not merely doubt about ontological basics, about,
say whether some person or event exists or doesn’t exist, or whether the identity of our own reflection
is real or imaginary. It concerns, rather, the essential undecidability of the distinction between the two
possibilities themselves” (127). As I discuss, the manner in which the distinction between the races is
understood is wholly arbitrary, which ultimately suggests there is no distinction between them.
38

Of course, even though blackness could be understood or communicated as ‘fractions’ of an
individual’s racial identity, racial difference still operated as a binary even in the absence of any
visible markers of it.
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reproduction meant the proliferation of legally enslaved (and enslaveable) bodies that
increasingly appeared more white. As Gillman continues:
And in that year, Joel Williamson comments “the slave frontier was the
trans-Mississippi South, and it was also pre-eminently the area of mulatto
slavery”; he concludes that where slavery was strongest and getting
stronger, it was also becoming whiter.” (88-89).
Crucially, then, while Twain may have been concerned with exploring the legal
manipulations of racial difference following slavery, the narrative’s specific setting
recalls a time when black skin was becoming the singular reason for enslavement while,
at the same time, slavery was becoming phenotypically whiter. By situating the narrative
within this tumultuous period of increased racial breakdown, Twain does not reify race in
order to subvert it. Rather, Pudd’nhead Wilson, illustrates that racial difference, to the
extent it exists, does not precede its legal determination but is rather produced by it.
Ariela Gross illustrates this problematic nature of legal racial knowledge by
turning to the 1835 South Carolina Court of Appeals decision of State v. Cantey, 20
S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614, wherein the Court “found to be white several witnesses ‘whose
maternal grandfather… although of a dark complexion, had been recognized as a white
man, received into society, and exercised political privileges as such’” (Litigating 164).39
The witnesses in question were “respectable… one of them is a militia officer, and their
caste has never been questioned until now” (Cantey 614-15). The issue before the court,
however, was whether the social status and position of these individuals outweighed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gross notes that South Carolina “had no hypodescent rule before the Civil War” suggesting that
Cantey is “the clearest judicial statement of the overriding importance of white manhood as a
performance of legal prerogatives…” (Litigating 164).
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certain evidence of their negro ancestry, particularly given their ambiguous racial
appearance. Finding that it did, Judge Harper writes that:
… it may be well and proper, that a man of worth, honesty, industry and
respectability, should have the rank of a white man, while a vagabond of
the same degree of blood should be confirmed to the inferior caste... It is
hardly necessary to say that a slave cannot be a white man.

(616

emphasis added)
For Gross, Cantey demonstrates that where the visible signifiers of race were ambiguous
or obscured, the courts would turn to individual behaviour and community racial
recognition to determine and implement that individual’s racial identity. But, as Gross
also notes, Cantey summarizes a peculiar logic whereby racial identity and its meaning to
slavery were reversed: rather than define racial identity as preceding and signifying
slavery or freedom, racial identity is retroactively evoked or recognized to explain
enslavement. Thus, as Judge Harper shifts from racial appearance to performance in
determining racial identity, the result is that an individual who has acquired the benefits
of whiteness must be white. But such reasoning implies an essentialism in respect of
blackness, i.e. only blacks can be enslaved.40 Judge Harper’s strange logic here certainly
maintains the order of racial slavery, but it does so not simply by ensuring that identified
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As Gross explains it: “A slave cannot be a white man. Here was the clearest possible statement that
racial identity was neither a scientific fact nor a mere matter of documentation but rather a socially
and legally defines status that rested on a deeper ideological commitment to race, in which white
equaled free (civic, responsible, manly) and black equaled slave (degraded, irresponsible, unfit for
manly duties) (What Blood 55).
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blackness can be enslaved, but rather by way of the more abstract proposition that
identified whiteness cannot be enslaved.41
Willing, then, to accept community status or performance as evidence of an
individual’s racial identity, Judge Harper’s commitment to racialized slavery takes the
form of a tautology.

Where an individual’s racial identity is essentially unknown,

behaviour in keeping with racial norms could provide sufficient proof of a racial identity
then taken as effectively – or at least legally – essential.42 Thus, this dialectical reasoning
of racial essence and performance advanced by Judge Harper enables the conceptual
possibility that whiteness is a performed behaviour that essentially resists slavery.43
Suggesting that white or black skin may not be determinative of one’s legal racial
identity, but rather may be retroactively read on/in the individual as based on his/her
behaviour and social identity, Judge Harper’s decision in Cantey exemplifies both the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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To explain the manner in which whiteness was equated with citizenship, Gross turns to the Georgia
case of Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185 (1853), wherein a testator’s whiteness was in dispute in respect of
his ability to dispose of his estate after his death. As Gross writes, “This definition of whiteness [of
establishing whiteness by way of civic participation] may appear to modern observers as a kind of
circular argument: in order to be a citizen, one must be white; in order to be (recognized as) white, one
must act like a citizen. Yet contemporary participants in the Southern system did not view these
arguments as circular: rather they saw them as self-evident… civic acts was one more form of
reputation evidence: if a man was allowed to vote, at least some people must have recognized him as
white” (54).
42

Daniel J. Sharfstein explains: “Robert Westley’s elegant essay on racial passing interpreted the
sentence to be the highest expression of the one-drop implications of maternal descent laws, which
were codified across the South in the nineteenth century: “Judge Harper’s coup de grace… set[] up
purity of blood, of character, of liberty, and of personhood as natural barriers to the demise of race
distinction through mixing… The Harper doctrine made whiteness natural, something that resided
internally in purity of blood and character” (Crossing 620)
43

As Gross glosses Judge Harper’s reasoning in Cantey: “Certainly it was the cardinal rule on which
black slavery was based, that a white man could not be a slave. But ‘a slave cannot be a white man’
suggested that not only did status depend on racial identity, but status was part of the essence of racial
identity. Being degraded signified black ‘blood,’ and, conversely, behaving honestly industriously,
and respectably, exercising political privileges… qualified one for whiteness even if one’s ‘degree of
blood’ alone might consign one to ‘the inferior caste’ (164).
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difficulties inherent in identifying race and the lengths to which courts were willing to go
to preserve the notion of racial difference and its meaning to slavery.
Set, then, not at an appeal court nor after the formal end of slavery, but rather at
the level of courtroom trial in slaveholding Missouri, Pudd’nhead Wilson’s closing
restoration of Tom’s blackness (and his corresponding return to slavery) illustrates the
authoritative legal production of racial difference or identity. The trial, as fact-finding
venture was the appropriate forum for determining disputes of racial identity.44 And this
was particularly the case in the slaveholding states of the 1850s where trials were invoked
for such determinations. Gross estimates that throughout the nineteenth-century there
were “sixty-eight cases of racial determination appealed to state supreme courts…” and
that “More than half of these (thirty-six) took place in the last years of slavery – between
1845 and 1861 and the majority involved men” (Litigating 120). As a methodological
point in her considerations of nineteenth-century racial epistemologies, Gross emphasizes
the significance of the “trials themselves in order to suggest a more complex interplay
between legal and cultural meanings of race,” writing that:
Trials brought to the surface conflicting understandings of identity latent
in the culture, people who had lived lives on the “middle ground” of
ambiguous status for years had to fall on one side of the line. Trials
required a confrontation between every day ways of understanding race
and definitions that fit into “official,” well-articulated racial ideology that
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Because trial courts, unlike appeal courts, are tasked with reviewing evidence – its admissibility,
weight, and meaning – the race was both realized and maintained through trial level determinations of
what constituted legal proof of race. Through delineating and demarcating the markers of race
accepted as legally sound – whether biological, cultural, or some mixture thereof – the trial courts
installed the very terms of racial difference on which they relied. The signifiers of race deemed
legally authoritative were not a fact of their extra-legal reality but were, instead, produced at law.
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supported the maintenance of slavery and postwar racial hierarchy.
(Litigating 118)

Conceptualizing the trial as the site where the conflicting understandings and meanings of
racial difference were argued and challenged, Gross notes the importance of the trial to
the community’s understanding of itself. 45 As a forum to mediate the disparate,
conflicting discourses of race and its significance, the trial offered a definition of, and
stability to, racial difference where there was seemingly none.
Amongst the multiple forms of racial determination, “The courtroom confusions
about how to decide whether someone was black or white, whether this was seen as the
essence of race or simply the best available evidence of race, reverberated throughout
Southern culture because of the importance of the courtroom as a cultural arena” (Gross,
Litigating 119).

According to Gross, the racial determination cases of the 1850s

demonstrate judicial reasoning as to the complicated ‘reality’ of racial difference:
because race was always presumed to exist despite being frequently unobservable or
ambiguous, courtroom definitions offered stability and reassurance in place of the
uncertainty and conceptual dissonance underlying race’s fundamental unknowability.
Specifically, where the community was unsure whether race was a material, identifiable
reality that precedes (and dictates) its social expression, or rather an expression of a
fundamental (but potentially unobservable) biological difference amongst groups, the
courts provided an answer by finally suggesting it could be both. What Gross’s research
establishes, and what Twain fictionalizes, is that because courts did not examine the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Gross writes, “Thus, trials of racial determination were important not only to the litigants
themselves whose personal freedom, property holdings, and status as masters and slaves hung in the
balance, but also to the neighbors who participated in the trials as witnesses and jurors, as well as
those who learned its lessons through gossip, newspaper accounts, and literary narratives” (119).
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presumption of racial difference, they were able to find it in either essence or
performance, blood or behaviour, or both.46
Southern trial courts thus varied in the ways in which they recognized racial
difference (or its absence).

Beholden to, and enabling of, an ideology of racial

difference, trial courts provided multiple ways to identify blackness: rather than provide a
definitive methodology for identifying the truth of racial difference, the courts provided a
number of ways and forms through which the presumptions of racial difference could be
proven. Precisely because there was no definitive, indisputable criteria through which
race could be identified, the courts implicitly provided a series of techniques for
identifying racial identity where its determination was obfuscated. Trials did not prove
the indisputable fact of race, but instead provided a number of avenues for creating it:
rather than reveal the true or extra-legal indicators of race, trial courts found more refined
ways to manipulate the presumption of racial difference into existence. In allowing and
encouraging multiple and contradictory legal proofs or definitions of race, courts did not
collectively provide a consensus as to the appropriate form (and content) of racial
determination, but implicitly produced numerous ways to reify race as an extra-legal
reality.47
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At the core of such findings of difference was a presumption of black inferiority: “The trials thus
reveal the implications of a racial ideology that decreed that ‘negro blood’ made a person inferior in
virtue, competency and behavior – that ‘blood’ made a person act in certain ways. The ‘laws’ of race
could be subverted by people who followed all the rules of whiteness but ‘hid’ their intrinsic
blackness. Law, which provided the forum for these challenges, made a discourse of race as
performance especially salient” (Gross, Litigating Whiteness 113).
47

As Sharfstein glosses it, the fundamental point is that there were multiple and often conflicting ways
to assess at race at trials throughout the states: “when the important conclusion to draw is that race is a
social construction, there is little need to inhabit the worlds and minds of individual lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, and judges. Instead, it is enough to show that courts relied on contradictory statutory
definitions of race, historically derived metaphors for race, or performative as opposed to scientific
evidence” (Secret 1483).
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This legal recognition of race, however, was not an explicit commitment by courts

to formulate and impose race on its own terms. Rather, according to Gross, the 1850s
trial determinations of racial identity reveal the lengths to which courts would go to find a
‘truth’ about race that could be integrated by and into the law. In particular, “Trials in the
early nineteenth century, like Phoebe v. Vaughan, often revolved around documentary
evidence, status, and ancestry” (Gross, Litigating 151).48 Further, as exemplified in
Cantey, the slippery notion of race as behaviour was judicially accepted, ultimately
suggesting one’s true or authentic racial identity is merely behaviour, or that it at least
could be transcended or concealed through performing community beliefs about
racialized behaviour. However, despite a multiplicity of ways to legally determine race,
Gross notes that by “… the 1850s… as the question of race became more central and
more hotly contested, courts began to consider ‘scientific’ knowledge of a person’s
‘blood’ as well as the ways she revealed her blood through her acts” (Gross, Litigating
151).

As such, “The mid-nineteenth century saw the development of a scientific

discourse that located the essence of racial difference to physiological characteristics
such as the size of the cranium and the shape of the foot, and attempted to link
physiological, moral, and intellectual difference” (Gross, Litigating 151). This move to
quantitative or measureable criteria to legally establish race thus sought to remedy the
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Butcher v. Vaughan, 8 Tenn. 4 (1827). The Plaintiff, Phoebe, brought a claim that she was of
American Indian, and not negro, descent and was therefore not properly enslaved. Historical records,
and not physical appearance, was determinative of whether she had been properly enslaved and, in the
end, she was freed.
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ambiguity and conflict inherent in community and common-sense definitions of race,
which were often at odds with individuals’ appearances.49
Although “… the introduction of a ‘scientific’ discourse about race into the
[1850s] courtroom, traces its roots to the well-documented rise of ‘racial science’ among
phrenologists and medical doctors during their period,” the ‘science’ invoked in
Pudd’nhead Wilson’s conclusion is, instead, the anachronistic use of fingerprinting
(Gross, Litigating 153). Influenced by Francis Galton’s Finger Prints, published in 1892,
Twain was fascinated by Galton’s thesis “… that fingerprints can establish the identity of
the same person at any stage of his life, between babyhood and old age… as well as
differentiate between twins” (Gillman 97).50 As Sarah E. Chinn explains it:
Twain’s debt to Galton is clear throughout Pudd’nhead Wilson.
Galton devised the practice of oiling the hand by passing it through one’s
hair and then pressing the fingertips on glass – the method Wilson uses in
the novel – although he did not think this was as efficient as using ink or
smoke collected on paper.

He called fingerprints “self-signatures”
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As Gross observes in elaborating on the cases of that period: “The 1850s saw the clamor around
race rise to a fever pitch. The trials of racial determination not only garnered local attention because
of the often salacious subject matter, but they also became the objects of a national political discourse
because they fed into abolitionist claims about white slavery and ‘tragic octoroons.’ Suits for freedom
were politicized in the newspapers and in retellings by abolitionists and fugitive slaves. Litigants
became more invested in the search for the true essence of race, but despite the rhetoric suggesting
that common sense could help distinguish between whites and blacks, that essence was elusive.
Increasingly documentation of status gave way to two arguments for whiteness or blackness: science
and performance. In the postbellum years, the stakes in these courtroom battles changed somewhat,
but the shape of the conflict retained important continuities with disputes of the 1850s” (Litigating
153).
50

Gillman notes that Twain “devoured” Finger Prints in 1892 as he was writing Pudd’nhead Wilson
(97). In particular, she notes that he was taken with the manner in which fingerprints could
distinguish between individuals, including twins, and could also be used to identify criminals and
“…ferreting out the less willful kind of imposture that had fascinated Mark Twain: the possibility ‘of
a harmless person being arrested my mistake for another man’…” (97).
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(Galton, 1892: 168), a phrase quite similar to Twain’s “natal
autographs,”…. (44)

In addition to illustrating the methodical nature of fingerprinting as ostensibly reliable,
Pudd’nhead Wilson narrates that the legal determination of racial difference is ultimately
arbitrary, even when reached through ‘scientific’ evidence or knowledge.
One of Wilson’s various hobbies undertaken upon his failure to practice law in
Dawson’s Landing, fingerprinting furnishes him with a private library of the town’s
various citizens. In true Galtonian fashion:
He [Wilson] carried in his coat pocket a shallow box with grooves in it,
and in the grooves strips of glass five inches long and three inches wide.
Along the lower edge of each stripe was pasted a slip of white paper. He
asked people to pass their hands through their hair, (thus collecting upon
them a thin coating of the natural oil,) and then make a thumb-mark on a
glass strip, following it with the mark of the ball of each finger in
succession. Under this row of faint grease-prints he would write a record
of the strip of white paper – thus:

“JOHN SMITH, right hand”.

and add the day of the month and the year, then take Smith’s left hand on
another glass strip, and add name and date on the words “left hand.” The
strips were not returned to the grooved box, and took their place among
what Wilson called his “records”. (7)
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As a system of cataloguing individual identities, Wilson’s process of fingerprinting is
routine and systematic – a scientific process repeatedly deployed through the novel as
Wilson expands and develops his ‘records’ of the town’s inhabitants. Thus while it is
Wilson’s fingerprint records that provide the narrative with its dramatic courtroom
conclusion of authentic identities amidst ongoing deception of the community, Twain
introduces the form and method of fingerprinting at the beginning of the text and
legitimates its practice as it occurs through the narrative.

And whether or not

fingerprinting possessed scientific merit in the 1890s, for Twain it certainly had
significance as Wilson’s anachronistic use of it throughout the text is internally
consistent, thereby presenting the fingerprint slides as reliable evidence.
Early in the narrative, and in his first encounter with Roxy, Wilson asks to
fingerprint the two children in her care (her own and her master’s infant), asking “‘How
do you tell them apart, Roxy, when they haven’t any clothes on?’” (8). Assuring him that
she can tell them apart when even the plantation master cannot, the narrative continues
that “Wilson chatted for a long while, and presently got Roxy’s fingerprints for his
collection – right hand and left – on a couple of his glass strips, then labeled and dated
them, and took the ‘records’ of both children, and labeled and dated them also” (9). And
importantly, this initial fingerprinting is followed by another round “two months later,”
the day before Roxana conceives of and executes her infant-switching scheme, because
Wilson “… liked to have a ‘series’ – two or three ‘takings’ at intervals during the period
of childhood, these to be followed by others at intervals of several years” (8). Collecting,
then, not just fingerprints of individuals, but multiple copies of those prints over time,
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Wilson’s record-keeping protocol is designed to provide authoritative records of its
subjects.
The narrative closes with Wilson finally getting his first court case. Representing
the Italian count Luigi Capello against charges of murdering Judge Driscoll, Wilson
finally makes public what the reader has always known: Judge Driscoll’s murderer is his
false nephew Tom.

Importantly Wilson obtains Luigi’s exoneration through the

prosecutorial failure to match his (or his twin’s) fingerprints to the murder weapon. And
finding a match for the fingerprints on the undisputed murder weapon would lead the
court to the actual murderer. After advancing to the court his “theory” (107) that the
murder of Judge Driscoll was not planned, but rather the result of a robbery gone awry,
“Wilson [takes up] several of his strips of glass” – “… familiar mementoes of
Pudd’nhead’s old-time childish ‘puttering’ and folly…” – and lays them out in
preparation to divulge their specific evidentiary value to the court (108). Begging “the
indulgence of the court” to allow him some “remarks in explanation of the evidence,”
Wilson launches into his explanation of both the science of fingerprinting and its
relevance to the trial (108). In a lengthy explanation to the court he explains that:
“Every human being carried with him from his cradle to his grave certain
physical marks which do not change their character, and by which he can
always be identified – and that without shade of doubt or question. These
marks are his signature, his physiological autograph, so to speak, and this
autograph cannot be counterfeited, nor can he disguise it or hide it away,
nor can it become illegible by the wear and the mutations of time.” (108)
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Carried by the individual from his birth to his death, fingerprints provide a method for
identifying each individual as unique and discernible.
As a “physical mark” imprinted upon the individual, fingerprints are a “signature”
that the individual cannot eliminate or “disguise.” And, in noting that fingerprints cannot
be disguised, Wilson reiterates their narrative and evidentiary value. Because so much of
Pudd’nhead Wilson’s plot turns on Tom’s various disguises and costumes meant to
conceal his identity, as well as a literal switch of people, the adequate and complete
identification method of fingerprints offered by Wilson cuts through and corrects all the
ruses and misdirections: fingerprints provide indisputable identification of the individual.
Thus, as Wilson continues:
“This signature is not his face – age can change that beyond recognition; it
is not his hair, for that can fall out; it is not his height, for duplicates of
that exist, it is not his form, for duplicates of that exist, also, whereas this
signature is each man’s very own – there is no duplicate of it among the
swarming populations of the globe!” (108)
Where the other physical traits of an individual can be concealed or altered – either
intentionally or inevitably over time – the “natal autograph” is unique. It is without
“duplicate” and an invariable physical mark upon the individual that can stand in for the
individual. Fingerprints are thus uniquely interchangeable with the individual.
Further, as Wilson explains the meaning of fingerprints to his courtroom
audience, who suddenly become “interested once more,” he also confirms the consistency
of his fingerprinting technique (108). Reminding them he has been steadily keeping
fingerprint records for many years, he notes for them that: “For more than twenty years I
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have amused my compulsory leisure with collecting these curious physical signatures in
this town. At my house I have hundreds upon hundreds of them. Each and every one is
labelled with name and date; not labeled the next day or even the next hour, but in the
very minute that the impression was taken…” (109).

Assuring them that his

methodology has always been consistent, and that he has eliminated the possibility of
cataloguing errors, Wilson also reminds them that he likely has records of those in
attendance in the courtroom: “There is hardly a person in this room, white or black,
whose natal signature I cannot produce, and not one of them can so disguise himself that
cannot pick him out from a multitude of his fellow creatures and unerringly identify him
by his hands” (109). Subtly remarking that he has been racially indiscriminate in his
accumulation of his fingerprint records, Wilson states that all present could be identified
by those records: no disguise could adequately overcome the truths they record. As both
Wilson and the reader know, in the court sits Tom, the actual murderer and mixed-blood
individual who has also been passing as white. And Wilson, gleefully agreeing to the
prosecution’s insistence that “the blood-stained finger-prints up the knife handle were left
there by the assassin of Judge Driscoll,” reveals the assassin was not the twins but Tom
(111). After the twins’ prints are shown to not match those on the murder weapon,
Wilson provides the prints that do. But in demonstrating the prints of the murderer,
Wilson is required to invoke Tom’s racially correct baby prints taken before he was
switched with his master and heir.
Returning “to the infant autographs of A and B,” Wilson has the jury confirm that
“these large pantograph facsimiles of A’s [and B’s], marked five months and seven
months” match (111). Introducing the records marked eight months, however, reveals a
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stunning inconsistency – the fingerprint records of A and B at eight months do not match
their earlier records. And it is at this point that Wilson reveals to the community
Roxana’s earlier baby switch: after establishing the legitimacy of the fingerprint records –
the consistency of his methodology as well as fingerprints as an authoritative science for
determining identity – Wilson relies on them to first recognize individual identities, and
then to ascertain that those individuals’ identities had been switched at some point.51
Thus, when the juror foreman notes different fingerprints have been labelled the same,
Wilson responds “Do you know how to account for these strange discrepancies? I will
tell you. For a purpose unknown to us, but probably a selfish one, somebody changed
those children in the cradle” (112 emphasis added). The “purpose” of the switch has
always been known by the reader: Roxana’s inauguration of the very events of the
narrative was designed to save her own child from slavery, even if it meant damning
another. But this contextual information is never related as Wilson exposes merely the
fact of the switch.
As Wilson explains to the courtroom:
“A was put into B’s cradle in the nursery; B was transferred to the
kitchen and became a negro and a slave” – [Sensation – confusion of
angry ejaculations] – “but within a quarter of an hour he will stand before
you white and free!” [Burst of applause, checked by the officers.] “From
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The authoritative nature of fingerprints, which ultimately do not signify anything of substance,
echoes Twain’s “Whisper to the Reader” which opens the text. In particular, therein Twain confirms
that he consulted with a lawyer to ensure the legal passages in the text are correct: “He was a little
rusty on his law, but he rubbed up for this book, and those two or three legal chapters are right and
straight, now” (1-2). However, as expected, Twain undermines any certainty that Pudd’nhead Wilson
offers by noting “He [the lawyer] told me so himself” (2). Put another way, the correctness of the
legal passages is confirmed merely by way of claiming it is correct – there is no absolute confirmation
of this fact.
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seven months onward until now, A has still been a usurper, and in my
finger-records he bears B’s name. Here is his pantography, at the age of
twelve. Compare it with the assassin’s signature upon the knife handle.
Do they tally?” (112)

And, as the jury foreman notes that A’s print match “‘To the minutest detail!’” the prints
on the murder weapon, the whole truth is revealed. Conflated with, and subsumed by,
Judge Driscoll’s murder, Roxana’s racial deception is finally rectified. Singling out Tom
before the entire courtroom, Wilson triumphantly announces that: “‘The murderer of your
friend and mine – York Driscoll, of the generous hand and the kindly spirit – sits among
you. Valet de Chambre, negro and slave – falsely called Thomas a Becket Driscoll –
make upon the window the finger-prints that will hang you!”’ (112). At last providing his
courtroom declaration of Judge Driscoll’s murderer, Wilson also illuminates and resolves
a fraud perpetrated against the community of which it was entirely unaware.
Importantly, however, the fingerprints that establish Tom’s blackness do not
reveal any essential truth about race or its identification. Rather, Wilson’s fingerprints
operate only to confirm the free/slave statuses of Tom and Valet as infants when they
occupied their correct legal statuses. After all, Tom’s blackness is and has always been
imperceptible. His interchangeability with his white master is precisely what facilitated
the ease with which Roxana switched them in the first place, and which remained
undetected all along. As a result, the infant fingerprints which mark Tom’s blackness do
not mark any extra-legal truth about race or its identification. Thus as Tom’s race lacks
any phenotypic or behavioural expression, it is arbitrarily imposed on him, as it was on
his mother, as “a fiction of law and custom” (9). As Gillman explains it, although
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Wilson’s declaration resolves the legal dilemma driving the narrative, it offers no
meaningful information about race: “Neither the triumphant tone nor the burst of
applause from the audience nor the aura of logical deduction and absolute clarity
disguises the fact that Wilson’s conclusion, though strictly ‘the truth,’ is also illogical and
arbitrary, almost more confusing than clarifying” (99). Rather, the fingerprint records
simply refer to the infants’ social positions – ‘A’ and ‘B’ – and racial difference, which is
not detectable but is nonetheless read into them as an explanation for their initial
positions of master and slave:
Yet in spite of the methodologically essential social context, the
fingerprints tell us nothing socially, as opposed to physiologically,
significant about either A or B as individuals, much less about the lives of
“Chambers” or “Tom.”.

What they prove, in fact, is that one can be

interchangeably ‘white and free’ and ‘a negro and a slave’ (Gillman 99
emphasis added).
It is thus that in the courtroom re-racing of Tom, the tensions of the various dualisms
underpinning the text appear to be resolved but, in the last analysis, no substantial
information about race or its significance is provided.
Nonetheless, even in its purely formal operation, the fingerprint revelation
stabilizes the (racial) ambiguity and uncertainty generated by the events that preceded it.
Certainly, Wilson’s uncanniness is finally resolved and he is finally entirely accepted into
Dawson’s Landing.

Earlier in the text, when his practice of fingerprinting is first

observed, it is presented as mysterious or suspicious. As noted above, the form and
technique of this science is explained. But its meaning – and in particular its meaning to
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Wilson – is unknown to those in the town: “He often studied his records, examining and
poring over them with absorbing interest until far into the night, but what he found there
– if he found anything – he revealed to no one” (7 emphasis added).

Although

withholding Wilson’s reason for fingerprinting, that early description does explain his
method, suggesting that Wilson knows what he is doing even if those around him do not:
“Sometimes he copied on paper the involved and delicate pattern left by the ball of a
finger, and then vastly enlarged it with a pantograph so that he could examine its web of
curving lines with ease and convenience” (7). As the fingerprints correct the racial
deception perpetrated against the community, the significance to the town of Wilson’s
fingerprinting hobby, as well as Wilson himself, are revealed. Thus, while Tom of course
finds himself doomed at the twins’ trial, Wilson manages to find personal success.52
While his joke on dog ownership alienated him from the town as a result of its laying
bare the interdependency of individuals in a community, particularly in respect of
property ownership, Wilson’s courtroom conflation of individual identity and race, which
conceals such interdependency by presenting individual racial identity as an essential
feature of their identity, returns him to the town triumphant. 53 In re-iterating this
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Interestingly, Valet’s fate is only briefly alluded to. On learning that he is in fact the true heir, he is
rescued from slavery and assumes the proper role of heir. Sadly, the wealth and goods to which he
ends up with access only emphasize his inabilities attributable to having been raised in slavery,
including illiteracy and “... the basest dialect of the negro quarter” (114). Suggesting that race is
purely behaviour or training (or at least devoid of any biological determination) it is noted that even
after Valet has been declared white, he cannot take advantage of it and is, in fact, frightened by its
consequences: “His gait, his attitudes, his gestures, his bearing, his laugh – all were vulgar and
uncouth; his manners were the manners of a slave… The poor fellow could not endure the terrors of
the white man’s parlor, and felt at home and at peace nowhere but in the kitchen” (114). See Lee
Clark Mitchell’s, “ ‘De Nigger in You’: Race or Training in Pudd’nhead Wilson?” for a discussion of
the extent to which race is treated in the text as one of individual training or learning.
53

“The town sat up all night to discuss the amazing events of the day and swap guesses as to when
Tom’s trial would begin. Troop after troop of citizens came to serenade Wilson, and require a speech,
and shout themselves hoarse over every sentence that fell from his lips – for all his sentences were
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unquestioned racial ideology of the town, Wilson finds community acceptance embracing
the ideology and reflecting it back to them as authoritative.
More importantly, Wilson’s courtroom declaration of Tom’s blackness, in
addition to confirming for the town the essential nature of race, also confirms its
significance. In particular, it converts Tom into property, to be properly re-situated
within slavery.54 As a result, the public disclosure of Tom’s identity as murderer by way
of fingerprints creates two legal identities for him – murderer and enslaved – each to be
ruled on by the court. 55 Thus conflicted between punishing a murderer and appeasing the
creditors of the Driscoll estate (of which Tom as his uncle’s property necessarily forms
part), “the tautological subtleties of the color line” are most evident in the court’s
reasoning (Sundquist, To Wake 258). The two legal positions Tom eventually occupies
are thus mutually exclusive: to be punished as a murderer is to extract him from the
system of chattel slavery, but to deem him as singularly an object of property is to forego
punishing him. In the last analysis, it is deemed by all involved, including the court, only
sensible to return him to slavery: “Everybody granted that if ‘Tom’ were white and free it
would be unquestionably right to punish him – it would be no loss to anybody; but to shut
up a valuable slave for life – that was quite another matter” (115). Deeming it unjust to
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golden, now, all were marvellous. His long fight against hard luck and prejudice was ended, he was a
made man for good” (Twain 113-14).
54

As Chinn explains, Wilson’s courtroom identification effectively silences Tom, turning him into an
object such that, given the conclusive nature of his fingerprints, he does not even really need to be
present: “The reader’s identification with Tom is brief and glancing, but not insignificant. Audience is
crucial to the climactic scene of the novel, in which Tom is exposed as both ‘really’ black and as
Judge Driscoll’s murderer. More importantly, during that scene, Tom is transformed from audience
member to spectacle, from white subject to black object (and object of exchange in the system of
chattel slavery)” (38).
55

As noted in the text, although “The false heir [Tom] made a full confession and was sentenced to
imprisonment for life… a complication came up” (114).
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further extend Tom’s terror on the propertied of Dawson’s Landing, the creditors argue
they had been deprived of the full value of their property for the last eight years by virtue
of Tom’s racial deception: Tom ought to have been properly catalogued as his uncle’s
property – an asset that would form part of his estate. 56 They further argue that if Tom
had been treated as (their) property in the first place he would not have been free to
murder Judge Driscoll, and “Everybody saw the reason in this” (155). Thus, almost as
soon as Tom’s guilt had been established he was “pardoned” by the Governor for his
crime, and the creditors sell him down the river (115). Once Tom’s secret blackness is
finally ‘recognized’ by the court, his re-installation into slavery is easily achieved.57
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As Thomas D. Morris notes in respect of the criminal offences of slaves: “Masters, under various
pressures, turned away from the use of the law to reinforce their authority over their slaves by
prosecuting them for crimes unless they were capital offenses such as murder, rape, or arson. But
masters were involved in other ways. They could be held legally liable for the criminal conduct of
their slaves, such as in requirements that they pay the legal costs for the successful prosecution of their
slaves or make some restitution for the injuries caused by them” (251). Interestingly, as Morris goes
on to note, by the end of the eighteenth century, “States imposed a responsibility on owners to provide
legal counsel for an accused slave…” (251-52). That noted, Missouri seemed to exempt masters from
paying the costs for the legal defence of their slaves, even if slaves were required to have legal counsel
to defend this. This was because the court in Missouri formulated this as a responsibility of justice
and not a contractual responsibility between the master and his slave’s counsel, as in Manning v.
Cordell 6 Mo. 474 (1840) and so this “exonerate[d] Missouri masters from this form of duty or legal
liability” (Morris 253). Further, as Morris notes, owners could be liable for “some form of restitution
for the criminal offenses of their slaves… In 1835 the Missouri legislature approved an adaptation of
continental civil law. It provided that ‘every person who shall be injured by the commission of any
offense against his person… committed by a slave, shall have an action against the master or owner of
such slave for the time, to recover any damages by him sustained by the commission of such offense,
not exceeding in amount the value of the slave” (259-60). As discussed in the first chapter of this
thesis, there was a curious tension in the legal response to the criminal offences of slaves, reflecting
their unique status as human property. In his examples from Missouri in respect of owner liability for
slave criminality, Morris notes that in Jennings v. Kavanagh, 5 Mo. 27-28 (1837), the Missouri
Supreme Court found the relevant statute did not allow recovery against a master whose slave had
killed another slave as that was a property crime; and in Ewing v. Thompson, 13 Mo. 137-39 (1850),
the court refused to permit recovery because slaves possess an agency that the master cannot be
expected to entirely control and, absent any indication the slave’s criminal conduct was as a result of
lax discipline, the master cannot be liable (260).
57

Crucially, then, Tom’s blackness operates as a marker through which the multiple conflicting
interests in his person can converge and be resolved. As Sundquist writes: “Brought to light, so to
speak, Tom’s blackness is ruthlessly efficient: it deprives him of property and at the same time turns
him into property. In the plot’s terms he is part of the creditor’s inventory, but in terms of the novel’s
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In its purportedly scientific analysis, the fingerprints may properly function to

adduce individual identity, but their arbitrary conversion to racial marks is in service of
slavery. And, in the court’s unquestioning acceptance of their evidence as racial
difference, that arbitrariness is concealed. After all, as Tom and Valet were initially
indistinguishable, their fingerprints merely recorded their social positions of master and
slave. Therefore the final courtroom re-identification confirms only those initial social
positions. As it does so, it reads back into those positions a racial essentialism in slavery
that has in fact been entirely unobservable. The logic of racialized slavery is thus
reversed: Tom’s fingerprints alone identify on him the “indelible marks” of race, but only
after his identity as slave has been established. The Court’s reasoning is thus to some
extent the obverse of the Court’s in Cantey – in Dawson’s Landing, a slave can only be a
black man. Accordingly, the “fiction” that defined Tom as black in the first place is
subsequently legitimated in Wilson’s ‘science’ of fingerprints, rendering the
community’s ideology authoritative and truthful.58

Conclusion
To be clear, science was not the singular explanation of racial difference during
slavery. In reviewing the manner in which historians have incorrectly emphasized the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contemporary frame of reference, the sudden exposure of Tom’s hidden blood puts him… in bondage
to the entire white race” (258).
58

As Carton explains: “No set of fingerprints, not even those of identical twins, duplicate each other.
Fingerprints conceal human interdependency. They collapse the distinction between biology and
convention, for they represent biology in the service of convention. Tom’s scornful depiction of them
as ‘palace window decorations’ does not entirely mistake their political function” (92).
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courts’ scientific approach to race in the nineteenth century, Gross writes that a more
nuanced review of the nineteenth century racial identity cases is required:
By

drawing

the

contrast

between

nineteenth-century

biological

essentialism and early twentieth-century anthropological theories, which
saw racial differences as the product of social and cultural construction,
these historical accounts make “science” appear to have been the
monolithic language of race in the nineteenth century. (Litigating 153).
Certainly, as noted above, behaviours such as civic participation impacted legal
determinations of race. However, as Gross continues, “Only nine cases appear to have
relied on expert scientific testimony about racial differences” though eight of those nine
were after 1848 (Litigating 153).59 While expert testimony is not the only way in which a
scientific understanding of race would have been before the courts, Gross confirms the
legal emphasis on scientific or essentialist approaches to race in the mid-nineteenth
century – that is, during the final years of slavery – an emphasis that would not have been
previously required when the identification of visible whiteness with freedom was less
challenged. Further, following slavery, when blacks were beginning to make significant
steps towards legal equality, the ‘fact’ and inescapability of race became increasingly
important to ensure that racial equality would remain out of their reach.
In noting that the political advancements made by blacks during Reconstruction
had largely been undone by the 1890s (and would continue to be undone into the new
century), Michael J. Klarman explains that, “By around 1890, race relations in the South
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That is nine of what Gross has identified as the total of “…sixty-eight trials of racial determination
appealed to state supreme courts in the nineteenth-century South” (Litigating 109).
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had begun what was to be a long downward spiral” (10).60 Noting this spiral ultimately
meant that “The number of blacks [being] lynched each year rose dramatically,” Klarman
summarizes the political losses blacks endured in this period:
The same… politicians… who had earlier campaigned for black votes now
demanded disenfranchisement. States adopted poll taxes and literacy tests
to suppress any black voting not already nullified by fraud and violence.
Segregation in railway travel increased, soon it was mandated by statute.
Blacks seldom sat on juries any longer. Black officeholding waned, then
disappeared. Racial disparities in educational funding increased in the
1890s; early on the twentieth century, they became enormous… Virtually
all this integration disappeared in the 1890s. (10-11)
Fundamental to withdrawing or eliminating black rights – including by way of extensive
violence and intimidation – was a belief in the factual distinctness and difference of
blacks from whites that had unavoidable political consequences.61
The basis for this black subordination continued the scientific inquiries into race
begun during slavery.

Khalil Gibran Muhammad has noted that even in efforts to
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In summarizing the political advancements made by blacks following Emancipation, Klarman
explains: “Extraordinary changes in racial attitudes and practices occurred in the Reconstruction
decade following the Civil War. Slavery was abolished. The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed blacks basic civil rights, such as freedom of contract and property
ownership. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 and the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised blacks for the
first time in most of the nation. Additional federal legislation in the 1870s solidified suffrage
protection, forbade race discrimination in jury selection, and guaranteed equal access to common
carriers and public accommodations. Southern blacks voted in extraordinary numbers, electing
hundreds of black officeholders. Black jury service was common; streetcars generally were
desegregated; and blacks finally gained access to public education. In the North as well, blacks in
most states voted for the first time; restrictions on their legal testimony were removed; and blacks
were admitted to public schools, which in some states were integrated” (10).
61

For a review of the various ways in which race was legally conceptualized between Emancipation
and the beginning of Jim Crow-era changes, see Michael A. Elliott’s, “Telling the Difference:
Nineteenth-Century Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy”.
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understand the implications of black freedom and ostensibly equal political participation,
scientific theories of race and racial difference dominated. Beginning in the 1860s and:
Using new data from the 1870, 1880, and 1890 U.S. census reports, the
earliest demographic studies to measure the full scale of black life as
freedom, these post-emancipation writers helped to create the racial
knowledge necessary to shape the future of race relations.

Racial

knowledge that had been dominated by anecdotal, hereditarian, and
pseudo-biological theories of race would gradually be transformed by new
social scientific theories of race and society and new tools of analysis,
namely racial statistics and social surveys. (20)
In consolidating the various formal and informal ways of assessing race, these new
“social scientific theories of race” sought to provide an explanation of blackness that
would predict, to ultimately limit, black civic participation. It is this 1890s climate of
extensive black subordination, as well as its seemingly scientific basis, that Twain
considers in Pudd’nhead Wilson. And to do so, he turns to the latter years of slavery in
which scientific explanations about race began to take hold.
In particular, Pudd’nhead Wilson refuses the “indelible mark” of blackness –
generated within slavery and with its meaning persisting after.

As black freedom

required whites to consider what blackness meant to the broader society, as well as how it
could be definitively identified in the absence of slavery, Pudd’nhead Wilson questions
the very knowability (and by consequence significance of) race itself. In its tale of
indistinguishable master and slave, and corresponding declarations of their racial
difference taken to be scientifically true, the novel demonstrates the very fact of race to
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be nothing more than ideology – a conceptual commitment that conceals and explains the
arbitrariness of the racial divisions that underpin it.

And what Pudd’nhead Wilson

dramatizes is the tautological nature of the ‘science’ that confirmed those divisions.
Fingerprints in Dawson’s Landing, like phrenology, notions of ‘blood’, or even skin
colour, do not in themselves reflect an inherent or culturally significant difference.
Rather, they merely reflect the search for one. In exploring slavery’s racial logic during
the anti-black animus of the 1890s, Twain illustrates the historical emphasis on race to
have been an unavoidable result of the racial dualism generated within slavery: whatever
the method for determining it, an individual’s race had to be posited. In the end,
Pudd’nhead Wilson shows that no matter how strongly believed or asserted, the existence
and persistence of race, within slavery and without, is little more than “a fiction of law
and custom”.
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CONCLUSION

“What is a White Man?”: Potential Directions

In his essay, “What is a White Man?”, published in 1889 by the periodical The
Independent, Charles W. Chesnutt considers its titular question.

In an effort to

comprehend racial whiteness and the persistent subordination of blacks following
Emancipation, Chesnutt briefly reviews the legislation defining “a mulatto or person of
colour,” both within slavery and after, so as to understand precisely who would be legally
considered black (5). Noting that states identified blackness in an individual down to
statutorily set fractions of ‘negro’ ancestry, Chesnutt concludes that although such
legislation typically dictated that inheriting even minor fractions of such ancestry defined
an individual as black, individuals who self-identified and lived as white could
nonetheless possess a (very minor) fraction of such ancestry that would not disrupt or
subvert their whiteness. Further, to the extent an individual’s whiteness was challenged,
and in the absence of conclusive ancestral evidence, establishing that he or she had
exercised certain rights or privileges afforded only to whites would provide definitive
proof of whiteness.
In noting that whiteness could survive some blackness and that it also possessed a
performative element, Chesnutt notes a disjunct between legal racial definitions and the
individual experience of race. Focussing on children of interracial relationships, typically
considered black and illegitimate as a result of the illegality of interracial unions,
Chesnutt questions why they should not qualify or be identified as white, particularly in
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cases where they appeared white and their conduct suggested the same. That is, the legal
designation of such individuals as black was often unfairly or wrongly at odds with how
they lived and potentially even their ancestral history. Such racial designation, however,
was not arbitrary. Rather, it was the unavoidable result of the post-Emancipation push
towards racial purity, which culminated in the ‘one-drop’ rule. For Chesnutt, the promise
of black equality as well as the increasing population of mixed-race individuals, would
require a reconsideration of the meaning of race and its divisions to ensure a meaningful,
national political future.1 Although a full consideration of the reasoning and implications
of Chesnutt’s essay is beyond the scope of this chapter, the essay usefully frames a
number of issues raised or suggested in this thesis that were unexplored but would further
illuminate the manner in which race was produced within slavery.
The most obvious of these issues is an examination of how the law (legislation,
judicial decisions, and individual legal actors) produced whiteness as a racial identity.
This thesis, of course, focussed on the legal production of blackness and racial difference
during its formative period in slavery. But to be sure, whiteness too was produced.
However because of its hegemony it was in the background of those legal productions of
blackness. As a result, the manner in which whiteness was conceptualized and produced,
especially in its relation to blackness, often went unexamined or unarticulated. In the
Supreme Court 1857 decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford, for example, (the potential for)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

“More than half of the colored people of the United States are of mixed blood; they marry and are
given in marriage, and they beget children of complexions similar to their own. Whether or not,
therefore, laws which stamp these children as illegitimate, and which by indirection establish a lower
standard of morality for a large part of the population than the remaining part is judged by, are wise
laws; and whether or not the purity of the white race could not be as well preserved by the exercise of
virtue, and the operation of those natural laws which are so often quoted by Southern writers as the
justification of all sorts of Southern ‘policies’-are questions which the good citizen may at least turn
over in his mind occasionally, pending the settlement of other complications which have grown out of
the presence of the Negro on this continent” (6).
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black citizenship was distinguished from that of whites on the basis that blacks possessed
a permanent mark, acquired in part from the historical circumstances of slavery, making
it inconceivable they would be entitled to the same legal treatment as whites. The
majority legitimated this difference by invoking the Constitution’s framing: reasoning the
founders would not have ever understood blacks to be citizens, the majority defined
citizenship going forward to be only what the founders presumably intended.

The

consequence of such an originalist reading of the Constitution was an implicitly
racialized, limited understanding of citizenship beholden to slavery: in Dred Scott
citizenship was unquestioningly white.2
As W.E.B. DuBois would write in the 1920s that “The discovery of personal
whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing,” the Court’s reasoning in
Dred Scott ought not to be surprising (224).3 While the Court understood that the
practice of slaveholding that defined America’s past, conditioned its future, it paid no
critical attention to how that past racially conditioned the past understandings of
citizenships on which it relied, nor how such understandings were incommensurable with
the abolition of slavery and constitutionally guaranteed (racial) equality. Moreover, the
court’s emphasis on blackness as different – a difference it acknowledged was generated
within slavery – normalized and concealed the whiteness implicit and inextricable from

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Joe R. Feagin notes that: “The principal foundation of this country’s legal system is the U.S. Constitution.
In 1787, at Philadelphia, fifty-five white men met and created a constitution for what most have viewed as
the ‘first democratic nation.’ These founders of European background and mostly well-off. Some 40
percent were or had been slaveowners and many others profited as merchants, shippers, lawyers, or bankers
from economic connections to the slavery system” (29).
3

Feagin explains: “For centuries the white racial framing of ingroup superiority and outgoing
inferiority has been, to use Antonio Gramsci’s term, hegemonic in this society – that is, it has been
part of a distinctive way of life that dominates all aspects of society” (11).
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the citizenship it withheld from blacks. It also incorrectly formulated American slavery
as having always been the expression of racial inequality.
David R. Roediger explains that it took some time before the practice of
American slavery became the expression of purely racial difference: “Even in colonies
deeply associated with plantation agriculture, it took time for white supremacy to emerge
as a centerpiece of the legal and labor systems” (2). Scholars such as Roediger, Edmund
S. Morgan, and Theodore W. Allen, have traced the creation of white racial supremacy
within slavery to an effect of class consolidation, particularly among whites.

The

purpose of such class consolidation was to legitimate economic disparity: by the
eighteenth century, those whites wealthy enough to hold slaves began to conceptualize
and promulgate the notion of whites as a unified race collectively distinguishable from
blacks, as opposed to scattered or disparate (white) individuals, many of whom lived and
toiled alongside and in the same (poor) conditions as blacks.4 As Allen explains:
Edmund S. Morgan… concludes that the subordination of class by “race”
at the beginning of the eighteenth century is the key to the emergence of
the republic at the end of it…. The modern historian Gary B. Nash is more
explicit: “In the late seventeenth century,” he writes “southern colonizers
were able to forge a consensus among upper- and lower-class whites…
Race became the primary badge of status.” (Vol. 2, 20)
This shift to a racial as opposed to economic or class explanation for slavery justified
slaveholding as a racial phenomenon, thereby eliding the economic inequalities amongst
whites that slavery generated.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As David Brion Davis notes, even into the nineteenth century a small number of free blacks
managed to acquire and keep slaves, suggesting the persistence of slavery as a class phenomenon
(Inhuman 180-181).
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The period of this ideological shift is somewhat beyond the historical scope of

this project.

But it provides context for how and why whiteness was defined or

understood within slavery, particularly in the nineteenth century when race
fundamentally became a legal problem. For example, as Ariela J. Gross notes, when it
became urgent for the courts to distinguish between black and white in the 1850s and
1860s, particularly in respect of slavery, whiteness was frequently legally established by
its past performance. As Gross explains, “In racial identity trials – and particularly at the
appellate level – judges gave special weight to the civic performance of white manhood”
(What Blood 49). And, for women, “… performing whiteness meant acting out purity
and moral virtue” (Gross, What Blood 49).

To avail oneself of the privileges of

whiteness required having already done so.

This tautological notion of whiteness,

particularly in respect of civic duty, suggests the manner in which whiteness largely
operated as an unspoken default of a binarized understanding of race, caused by slavery.
An examination of the manner in which whiteness resulted from the legal configurations
of blackness as different and distinguishable, including in respect of class dynamics,
would be a useful supplement to this project.
Obviously, race in America was not a binary of black/white. Although in many
ways it has been treated as such, particularly in respect of slavery, to suggest otherwise is
wrong. To its detriment, but because of its focus, this thesis does not consider the
relationship or significance of other races. In respect of slavery, Thomas D. Morris, for
example, writes that although “… the experience with Indian slavery was not deep…”
(19) and “Even though marginal, Indian slavery did exist” (20). The experience of
Indians, and their legal treatment as potentially enslavable, certainly complicates the
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racial dynamics considered in this thesis. Among other things, it suggests that while
slavery largely hinged on notions of black inferiority, it was not entirely a racially binary
proposition, either practically or legally, even though it largely became one as slavery
developed into the mid-nineteenth century. Certainly, a tracing of the ways in which
Indian identity was produced within and without enslavement would shed additional light
on the connection at law between blackness and slavery, particularly to the extent
blackness legally amounted to difference from whiteness.
American racial dynamics were even further complicated in the prerequisite
cases, fifty-two cases between 1878 and 1952 that considered who was white for the
purposes of joining the American citizenry. Those cases considered individuals from
ethnicities such as Japanese, East Indian, and Eastern European. The prerequisite cases
were determined largely by way of scientific evidence or ‘common sense’ propositions
about race. Either way, as Ian Haney Lopez argues, “The prerequisite cases compellingly
demonstrate that races are socially constructed” (7). The legal construction of these other
races, which occurred during Reconstruction and Jim Crow, flesh out America’s racial
history in important ways, including demonstrating how white supremacy existed in all
cross-racial encounters. In particular, they confirm that racial supremacy was achieved
by whiteness being the norm of citizenship from which other races deviated.
Noting the above topics merit exploration to better understand the issues raised in
this thesis, does not mean the issues raised within it have been exhaustively mined. For
example, as noted in this thesis, one reason for the increase in cases distinguishing
between the races in the 1850s was abolitionist pressure on slaveholders. At the core of
the abolitionist movement was an effort to do away with bondage.

In that sense,
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abolitionist philosophies shaped the meaning and significance of race, and a critical
elaboration of their involvement in the production of racial difference within slavery
would provide useful context to the legal definitions that reigned. Similarly, to the extent
slavery era racial definitions conditioned Reconstruction and Jim Crow era black
subordination, a fuller exposition on the post-Emancipation legal manipulations –
including the legal and political advancements made by blacks after Emancipation and
that were lost in Jim Crow – would better illustrate the legal origin and historical
transmission of anti-black discrimination.
While the literary texts selected for this thesis represent a significant period in the
history of American race relations, there are a number of other texts I could have selected
from that same period, many of which overlap in their relevance and that supplement or
expand my analysis. For example, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s fictional Uncle Tom’s Cabin
and Harriet Jacobs’ autobiographical Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, published in
1852 and 1861 respectively, offer compelling narratives of plantation life, including the
horrific treatment of the enslaved and how it shaped the meaning of black skin. In
respect of the gendered stabilization of racial difference, Frances Harper’s 1892 novel,
Iola Leroy, provides a useful counterpoint to the white Child’s Romance of the Republic,
including because of Harper being African-American. Similarly, William Wells Brown’s
Clotel, or the President’s Daughter, published in 1853 concerns itself with the effect of
miscegenous relationships on children, fictionalizing the relationship between Thomas
Jefferson and his slave Sally Hemmings that had then been the subject of much popular
opinion. Finally, Rebecca Harding Davis’s 1867 novel Waiting for the Verdict and
Pauline Hopkins’ 1903 novel Of One Blood each examine the arbitrariness and absurdity
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of racial differences. Particularly because they were published on either side of Twain’s
Pudd’nhead Wilson, these novels provide useful context for the conclusions Twain’s text
draws.

*

*

*

In The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice, published in 1853,
abolitionist William Goodell surveys the various laws and certain cases across the states
pertaining to slavery. Contemplating, among other things, the “Origin of the [MasterSlave] Relation, and its Subjects” (258), Goodell concludes that “The whole process [of
slavery] is, and has been, illegal, from beginning to end” (260). Specifically, Goodell
argues that there had been no legislative or statutory foundation for implementing slavery
in the colonies. As a result, “When statutes were enacted, they did not pretend to create
or originate their relation… They only assume or took for granted the existence of slave
property, and made laws for its security and regulation” (260-61).

For Goodell,

American slavery was a phenomenon, illegally implemented, assumed without
foundation to have been a fact of society.5 Importantly, he goes on to explain that as a
result of such assumption, the laws that (wrongfully) preserved slavery, “… [did not]
define, with exactness, who were slaves and were not slaves” (260). Thus, in addition to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Briefly, Goodell’s argument is that the slave trade had been determined illegal by the English courts
and that law applied to the colonies. Subsequently, the states never properly enacted legislation to
legalize slavery and in some instances state courts early determined slavery to be illegal. Nonetheless,
the practice persisted and was preserved by municipal laws which Goodell finds insufficiently
authoritative to overturn or undo the higher legal determinations of slavery’s illegality: “Put this by
the side of the Southern decisions, before cited, that slavery can have no legal existence in the absence
of municipal law, and we have the result that slavery in this country had no legal origin, and has
continued to exist without law ; since (by the same testimony) ‘no legislative act of the Colonies can
be found in relation to it’” (268).
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there being no legal basis for slavery – and because its practice in the colonies had been
an acquired custom – there were no clear or rigid legal definitions distinguishing between
master and slave.
Of course, that blacks were fundamentally subordinated by the practice of slavery
was well understood by Goodell. He notes that the “subjects” (271) of slavery are blacks
– either “The descendants of all who were stolen by John Hawkins and others on the
coast of Africa!... [thereby]… being ‘born to a slave inheritance!’” (272) or “Free people
of color [who] may be and continually are brought into slavery, in this country, in a
variety of ways” (274). While emphasizing this historical connection between blacks and
enslavement – whether they inherited or acquired their slave status, blacks were to be
enslaved – Goodell also notes that on occasion, whites have also been enslaved. 6
Suggesting this to be a recent phenomenon, wherein the fact of racial intermixture
resulted in ‘pure’ whites wrongfully being captured and enslaved on the basis they
matched physical description evidence supporting claims advanced under the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act, Goodell writes:
Several known instances have occurred already of the successful
kidnapping of free whites, without a drop of negro or Indian blood in their
veins!

And the process of intermixture of the races is now so far

advanced, and is so rapidly going forward, that a “perfectly white
complexion, light blue eyes, and flaxen hair,” are scarcely a presumptive
evidence of freedom. (282)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Importantly, Goodell also notes the existence of Indian slavery which, by statute, ensured
descendants of enslaved Indians were to be enslaved: “But the descendants of Africans are not the
only subjects of American slavery. The native Indians have also been enslaved, and their descendants
are still in slavery” (281).
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For Goodell, because (white) “Persons thus described are advertised as runaway slaves,”
like free blacks they too would be available and liable to be ensnared in the procedurally
unfair and biased Act, resulting in their illegal ‘return’ to slavery (282).
It is this difficulty in maintaining the racialized underpinning of slavery that this
thesis considers.

Because there was a racial correspondence in slavery’s early

development that reflected presumed racial distinctions (and their knowability), there was
no need to legally define the races (or their related positions within that master-slave
racial hierarchy). However, as that racial correspondence was increasingly destabilized
through the nineteenth century – by racial mixing, the presence of free blacks, and
Northern abolitionists – it became urgent to identify the distinction between the races and
its significance. That urgency was perhaps most clearly and importantly articulated in the
legal arena as legislators, litigants, and courts struggled to conceptualize what it meant to
be racially different within slavery.
Nonetheless, consensus or agreement on how to identify blackness legally
continued to be out of reach, even as it became more and more important for slaveholding
to do so. Legal texts from the final years of slavery reflected conflicting definitions of
race: at any given time, in any given courtroom, notions of behaviour, ancestral records,
or scientific or physiognomic evidence could prove determinative of race. There was
thus no singularly definitive way across the states to legally establish racial difference, as
would be expected if race was, in the last analysis, essential. Concerned with the various
ways in which race was legally understood during slavery, the literary texts examined in
this thesis suggest that race, or knowledge of its existence, was ultimately produced
during and in service of slavery.
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This is not, of course, to argue the texts suggest race was invented or purely

created within slavery. Certainly, Douglass accepts race as a fact. Nonetheless, My
Bondage and My Freedom establishes that its significance – its meaning – was
conditioned by the demands of slavery: blackness eventually came to signify wrongdoing
that legitimated slaveowner disciplinary power over slaves. This conflation of blackness
and wrongdoing persisted, even after slavery, most explicitly in the Jim Crow era policies
that effectively rendered black existence illegal. Child also accepts the fact of racial
difference even as she examines its perpetuation. In contrasting the lived experience of
racial identity with the law’s authority to race, A Romance of the Republic problematizes
racial identity, unhinging phenotypic and behavioural markers of race from enslavement,
illustrating the possibility that those who live and self-identify as white could nonetheless
be legally declared black and subjected to enslavement. In the end, Romance suggests
(legal conceptions of) race to be an effect of slavery and not its cause. Even Twain’s
Pudd’nhead Wilson does not entirely disavow the possible existence of race even though
it fundamentally questions whether race or racial difference is ever truly knowable. In
that text, Twain undermines a scientific methodology of identifying race, showing any
such approach merely confirms what has already been determined to exist.
Together these texts suggest that legal definitions of race during slavery were
arbitrary.

The terms of such definitions – whether maternity, civic participation,

ancestry, or blood – were arbitrarily determined and imposed, often in the absence of
discernible hallmarks of race. However, while such stabilization of the elusive nature of
race may have relied on arbitrary and often conflicting criteria, the deployment of legal
definitions was not arbitrary. Rather what these literary texts, as well as the legal texts
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against which they are herein read, illustrate, is that in slavery the presumption of race
was determinative of its existence. To confirm this presumption of racial difference – to
confirm the belief in slavery as inherently, properly, and understandably based on racial
distinctions – race was legally produced.
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